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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the role and effectiveness of law and 
regulation in relation to the problem of financial exclusion. The research was 
conducted through a comparative study of the United Kingdom (hereinafter ‘UK’) 
and China, and focuses on whether law and regulation could fulfil a role in 
facilitating vulnerable consumer’s access to basic banking services. 
 
The thesis begins with an overview of the theory of financial exclusion and 
provides definitions of consumer vulnerability. It reviews the exclusion conditions 
in both countries in respect of basic payment services and consumer credit, and 
analyses the reasons for, and negative consequences of, being excluded from such 
services. The thesis then demonstrates the theory of equal opportunity, and the 
role of law and regulation in the context of facilitating financial inclusion, 
followed by an overview of credit regulation from a historical perspective.  
 
The main content of this thesis is divided into three major parts. The experiences 
of the UK, China and the European Union (hereinafter ‘EU’) are analysed, and it 
is found that the process of financial inclusion could be facilitated by way of 
regulation. First, commercial banks are at the centre of the mainstream market. 
However, their role in financial inclusion largely focuses on payment services.  
Whether vulnerable customers’ access to payment services could be facilitated by 
regulations is the main content of chapter two. This thesis suggests that without 
enough incentive, banks can be less motivated in this progress.   
 
To accelerate financial inclusion in respect of consumer credit, alternative credit 
facilities on the consumer market should be supported by law and regulation, 
available funding should be made available and regulatory barriers be removed. 
After a comprehensive review of their legal and regulatory environment, the 
present research suggests that the UK has generally made good progress in this 
regard, while China is still in the nascent stage of development. The weakness in a 
‘one-size-fits-all’ model is clarified through the analysis. 
 
Subprime lenders are also essential in the market because they fill a gap. 
Standards that regulate subprime lenders should be equal for all lenders in the 
iv 
 
market, but also give consumers in the high-risk subprime lending sector. In the 
case of detriment, the regulatory regime would be able to provide recovery or 
simple and easy dispute resolution. This thesis argues for both ex ante and ex post 
consumer protection. 
 
Key words:  basic banking services, consumer credit, financial exclusion, 
regulation, subprime lending 
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Chapter 1: Financial inclusion and exclusion in the  
United Kingdom and China: Manifestations,  
significance and influences 
 
1.1. Financial exclusion and inclusion 
 
1.1.1.  Concepts and scope 
 
The concepts of financial exclusion and financial inclusion are commonly used in 
mass media and academic research. 1  The earliest concerns about these issues 
originated in the United Kingdom (hereinafter ‘UK’) in the mid-1990s after an 
earlier debt crisis which led to ‘financial infrastructure withdrawal’ and the 
redirecting of credit sources2 during which many bank branches in less-affluent or 
remote communities were closed. 3  Earlier definitions of financial exclusion 
focused on geographical factors: Leyshon and Nigel, 4 for example, define it as 
‘processes that serve to prevent certain social groups and individuals from gaining 
access to the financial system’ due to their lack of geographical access.  
 
Based on this recognition, the concept later developed into a more sophisticated 
form, with more social and economic factors being taken into consideration. The 
condition is found to be closely related to the social status of excluded people who 
usually earn low incomes or have bad credit records and therefore have fewer 
options of obtaining access to financial services. 5 Kempson and Whyley6 define 
several dimensions of financial exclusion apart from the problem of geographical 
access: people cannot obtain information on an appropriate financial product due 
to targeted marketing, they do not feel confident enough to apply for a financial 
                                                 
1
 For example, there is now a database, the Global Findex under the World Bank, that provides 
data and conditions of global financial inclusion. See, World Bank, ‘Financial Inclusion Data’ 
<http://datatopics.worldbank.org/financialinclusion/> accessed 26 March 2015. 
2
 Shaun French, Andrew Leyshon and Sam Meek, ‘The Changing Geography of Brit ish Bank and 
Building Society Branch Networks, 2003-2012’. More than 7,500 bank and building branches in 
the UK were closed between 1989 and 2012, and ‘two thirds of branch closures have occurred in 
areas comprised of the least affluent third of the population.’ 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Andrew Leyshon and Nigel Thrift, ‘Geographies of Financial Exclusion: Financial Abandonment 
in Britain and the United States’ (1995) 20 Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 
New Series 312.  
5
 Elaine Kempson and others, ‘In or Out? Financial Exclusion: A Literature and Research Review’ 
(2000) para 3.120. 
6
 Elaine Kempson and Claire Whyley, Kept Uut or Opted Out ? Understanding and Combating 
Financial Exclusion (1st edn, The Policy Press 1999). 
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product from commercial banks, they cannot pass the risk assessments or because 
they cannot afford certain products. The standard of ‘available’ financial services 
has also been tightened to mainstream services only, 7 with the implication that 
financial services should be affordable and safe, since the subprime market offers 
costly alternatives to people who are denied access by banks. 8 People who are 
unable to obtain services from mainstream financial service providers are thus 
regarded as the ‘financially excluded’, not only because there are no bank 
branches in their community, but also because they are rejected or unable to use 
banks and building societies’ services or products.  
 
This understanding was later widely adopted in political and academic contexts, 
and introduced to other regions and countries, including the People’s Republic of 
China and Europe. In the context of China, the corresponding concept of financial 
inclusion was recently officially proposed by the government and the governing 
party, with the intention of promoting more readily available access to affordable 
and safe financial services for low-income residents and small businesses who are 
excluded from mainstream banking.9 This recognition is obviously influenced by 
international experiences of developed counties.  
 
At the European Union (hereinafter ‘EU’) level, the concept of financial exclusion  
is also used in similar contexts; for example, in a 2008 report of the Europe 
Commission,10 it is defined as follows: 
 
A process whereby people encounter difficulties accessing and/or 
using financial services and products in the mainstream market that 
are appropriate to their needs and enable them to lead a normal social 
life in the society in which they belong.  
 
Apparently, although the macroeconomic factor that causes financial exclusion is 
distinct in each country, the concept of financial exclusion in the UK, China and 
                                                 
7
 Ibid. See also  Collard S and Kempson E, Affordable Credit: The Way Forward  (1st edn, The 
Policy Press 2005) 1. 
8
 Kempson and others  (n 5) para 3.120. 
9
 Communist Party of China (hereinafter ‘CPC’) Central Committee, 中共中央关于全面深化改
革若干重大问题的决定 [Decision of the CCCPC on Some Major Issues Concerning 
Comprehensively Deepening the Reform], 12 November 2013. pt 3, para 12. Authorised English 
translation available at < http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2014-01/16/content_31215162.htm> 
accessed 2 December 2014. 
10
 European Commission, ‘Financial Services Provision and Prevention of Financial Exclusion’ 
(2008).  
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EU are, by and large, similar, and focuses on a similar problem in their territories. 
The meaning of the concept financial exclusion  used throughout this thesis is 
therefore the commonly used definition, which refers to the unavailability of 
essential financial services or products from mainstream providers for people who 
are vulnerable in their social and economic status.  
 
Related to the concept of financial exclusion, the scope of essential financial 
services to maintain basic life needs is also generally recognized, which usually 
involves savings, credit, payments and sometimes also includes insurance and 
pensions.11 However, even among the essential financial services there is still a 
hierarchy, as Kempson and Whyley suggest, the most typically owned financial 
product among vulnerable people is a current or savings account at a bank or 
building society, 12  as this does not involve a debt relationship or long-term 
arrangements.  
 
Furthermore, the unavailability of bank accounts and credit has a more direct 
negative influence than being without insurance or a pension. For example, in a 
society where non-cash transmission is increasingly used, having no bank account 
could cause inconvenience in saving and making payments.13 Without available 
sources of affordable credit, low-income people may have to borrow from 
informal lenders at high costs. While the availability of pensions and insurance is 
closely related to employment or steady income and the focus on future 
perspectives, they are, to some extent, more ‘advanced’ than payment accounts or 
credit products. 14  This hierarchy among essential financial services is also 
influenced by the level of macroeconomic development, as in China the scope of 
essential financial services is generally only limited to banking services and credit, 
while work, medical or accident insurance and pensions have a more ‘social 
security’ context rather than being financial services. Therefore, the scope of 
essential financial services discussed in this thesis is limited to a ‘more basic’ 
definition, namely the use of a payment account and consumer credit. 
                                                 
11
 Kempson and others  (n 5) part 3; European Commission (n 10) pt 2. 
12
 Kempson and Whyley (n 6) 40. 
13
 Leyshon and Thrift (n 4) 313. 
14
 Reasons for people not having insurance in the UK include affordability, improper product and 
delivery mechanis ms, and difficu lties in  personal conditions, lack of knowledge, having no need to 
be or choose to remain uninsured. Similarly, reasons for not having a pension include ‘lack of 
opportunity or interest, lack of disposable income and lack of knowledge or mistrust of pension 
providers’. It  is also noticed that young people sometimes think re tirement is too far away to 
secure a pension. See Kempson and others  (n 5) paras 3.84-95, 3.105-114. 
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1.1.2 Consumer vulnerability, disadvantage and financial exclusion 
 
An essential related issue in any discussion about financial exclusion is the 
‘vulnerability’ of consumers in their relationship with commercial banks. It 
describes certain negative conditions that people may find themselves in, and 
some people are viewed as ‘vulnerable’ due to their financial circumstances.15 
Other descriptions such as ‘disadvantaged’ or ‘less privileged’ are also used in 
similar cases.16 If someone is excluded from access to mainstream credit and has 
to borrow from a payday lender, it could be assumed that he or she is vulnerable 
to possible risks such as over- indebtedness. As customer protection is now one of 
the central values of financial regulation, it is reasonable to anticipate some levels 
of legal or regulatory protection of those vulnerable customers who are financia lly 
excluded. 
 
However, consumer vulnerability cannot simply be viewed as the cause of 
financial exclusion. The concept of consumer vulnerability is defined by many 
researchers, for example, Baker, Gentry and Rittenburg, as ‘a state of 
powerlessness that arises from an imbalance in marketplace interactions or from 
the consumption of marketing messages and products’. 17  Similarly, in the 
Financial Conduct Authority’s (hereinafter ‘FCA’) view, a vulnerable customer is 
‘someone who, due to their personal circumstances, is especially susceptible to 
detriment’. 18  What is underlined in the definition is the imbalance in power 
between two contracting parties and the underlying risks from this imbalance, 
which most customers actually experience at some point in their life. 19 
Vulnerable customers are therefore not necessarily financially excluded and only 
have a low income, although excluded customers easily suffer from the detriment 
of the risk of vulnerable circumstances. For example, well-educated people with a 
normal income could also be vulnerable when they pay their mortgage because of 
the complex contract terms without actually being excluded by mainstream 
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mortgage lenders. Besides, not all vulnerable consumers suffer from detriment.20 
Vulnerability in this sense is less related to customer’s economic status or income. 
As Cartwright21 suggests, vulnerability is ‘relative’ rather than an absolute status 
and is less related to income.  
 
Research also uses the terminology disadvantaged to describe this negative 
status. 22  However, there is a difference between the extent of consumer 
vulnerability and disadvantage, which is sometimes neglected and mixed up. The 
degree of customer detriment is not on the same level. The detriment is not 
necessarily suffered but the risk is high that it will happen in the case of consumer 
vulnerability.23 While consumer disadvantage is, as defined by Consumer Affairs 
Victoria (hereinafter ‘CAV’) of Australia, the status of ‘persisting susceptibility to 
detriment in consumption’;24 in other words, it is the ‘real, material’ disadvantage 
that has already occurred. 25  Furthermore, in CAV’s definition, ‘disadvantaged 
customers’ are those who are ‘in persistent circumstances and/or with on-going 
attributes which adversely affect consumption thereby causing a continuing 
susceptibility to detriment in consumption.’ 26  They are de facto negatively 
influenced by their inappropriate choice of financial products rather than only the 
risk thereof. CAV clearly states this relation:27 
  
Not all vulnerable consumers are disadvantaged consumers. Some 
consumers will be vulnerable only because of either temporary 
personal circumstances that adversely affect them in consumption; or 
adverse market, product or transaction characteristics specific to a 
particular purchase, rather than their purchases generally. Consumer 
vulnerability is the broader concept, but both are relative and dynamic 
concepts. 
 
In this sense, most financial consumers can be viewed as more or less ‘vulnerable’, 
considering the bargaining power and other imbalances between contracting 
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parties. However, the customer is in a disadvantaged circumstance only if real 
detriment occurs. If a customer is excluded by mainstream banks and has to use 
high-cost credit, the risk of long-term detriment would be high, lead to the 
disadvantaged circumstance and real damages. Income level is also less relevant 
with vulnerability, as the Office of Fair Trading (hereinafter ‘OFT’) 28  puts it: 
‘Vulnerability is not exclusively determined by low income. Consumers can be 
rendered vulnerable also by higher search costs and particular difficulty in 
assimilating information.’ However, the OFT’s report also agrees that low income 
is ‘considerably’ associated with both vulnerability and financial exclusion. 29 The 
general role of financial regulation and customer protection therefore does not 
distinguish the economic circumstance of the customer; all customers are 
generally protected equally in aspects of, for example, information disclosure and 
cooling-off period, although some consumers are indeed additionally protected 
due to other disadvantaged statuses such as mental disability. 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, both terms vulnerable and disadvantaged are 
covered, as the former mainly describes the imbalance between contractual parties, 
while the latter is about the negative circumstances that lead to real detriment. 
Both of them are covered by the content of this thesis under the umbrella 
definition of financial exclusion. The use of these two terms in the sections of this 
thesis that follow is in line with this understanding, as the problem of financial 
exclusion includes both the condition of being unable to access mainstream 
financial services and the circumstance of customer detriment caused by their 
resorting to subprime alternatives. 
 
1.2 Conditions of financial exclusion (1): The scarcity of basic banking 
services 
 
Basic banking services include measures of payment and receiving payment that 
fulfil the basic demands of less-privileged customers to maintain their daily 
lives.30 This involves the use of a payment account from formal institutions. In 
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both the UK and China, promoting the use of a bank account is viewed as the 
most basic part of financial inclusion, although with a few different features. 
 
1.2.1. The United Kingdom 
 
As a developed country with mature financial infrastructure, the UK has a high 
penetration of bank or building account holding. According to World Bank data,31 
for example, the percentage of UK adults with an account held at a formal 
institution reached 97% in 2011, listing among the group with the highest account 
ownership in the world (81–99%). There is also no significant gender difference 
in the account-holding percentage.32 This figure does not, however, distinguish 
between a traditional current account and a savings account, as the former has 
more features convenient for daily transaction (eg, setting up an overdraft facility, 
direct debit and easy bill payment), while the latter is mainly for safely saving 
money at higher interest rates. Nevertheless, early research also shows a high 
percentage of current-account holding33 and, recently, the difference between the 
two types of account has also been blurring.34 In any sense, the UK has a solid 
foundation for account use among its residents. 
 
However, for the remaining people who are still unbanked, convenient payment 
services are less easy to access. The condition is exacerbated as non-cash 
transactions have been growing since the 1990s; bank accounts are widely used in, 
for example, bill payments, online purchases, salary payment or government 
benefit transmission.35 Access to basic banking services is therefore regarded as ‘a 
social necessity within a contemporary capitalist economy’.36 Without account-
holding, it is less convenient and more expensive for those people to deal with 
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daily life; for example, a 1999 Treasury Report mentions the additional costs for 
unbanked people when they pay for utility bills.37 
 
Kempson and others regard low income as the basic factor that negatively 
influences the account-holding level, which derives from various adverse social 
statuses such as unemployment, long-term illness or being a single parent. 38 
However, it is important to note that not all non-account holders are denied access 
to formal institutions due to low income. First, people who are denied access 
actually only make up a very small percentage of non-account holders, and some 
of them are homeless people due to lack of identity or address.39 For the extreme 
cases, a possible appropriate solution would be social assistance rather than 
financial regulation. The Report of the Policy Action Team 1440 found that ‘past 
difficulty managing personal finances and other factors, such as poor employment 
record and low income, lead to an adverse credit score, which is the commonest 
reason for refusal’. Income is significant in this sense. 
 
Second, among the non-account holders, there are also people who choose to 
close their accounts due to a drop in income, which helps them to control their 
expenses. 41  However, at the same time, the need of these people cannot be 
neglected due to their vulnerable social status. Kempson also points out that 
people with low income would prefer an account with no access to an overdraft, 
in case they inadvertently become overdrawn and to better control their personal 
finances. 42  This is the so called self-exclusion when people feel less confident 
about applying for or using bank accounts.43  
 
Third, products from banks are inappropriate for some potential customers, which 
leads to non-account holding, as some people prefer a simple account without 
overdraft facility to better control their money, but do not have available choices, 
or do not have information at their disposal on the availability of such basic 
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accounts.44 People do not choose to close their previous account but are unable to 
use appropriate products. Last but not least, the closure of bank branches is also 
found to exclude some customer in deprived communities from using banking 
services.45  
 
All these internal and external reasons lead to non-account holding, and the 
consequences of having no bank account is fully illustrated in the FSA’s ‘In or 
Out?’ review. Without a bank account, people have to use cash for transactions, 
cannot use direct debits for bill payment, and have difficulty in using banking 
facilities that require them to have bank accounts.46 This raises the cost of living, 
which leads to ‘the poor pays more’. Moreover, bank accounts act as the threshold 
for entering into the market, since some other financial product suppliers (eg,, 
insurance companies) require bank accounts for their products. Similarly, without 
a history of banking transactions, it is also less possible to borrow from banks.47  
 
Given the significance of account holding, the UK government has recognised the 
problem since the 1990s. An early attempt was made by HM Treasury to propose 
the promotion of a basic bank account, which intended to help those people with a 
low credit score who would possibly be rejected in their application for traditional 
current accounts.48 Such scheme was specifically designed to solve the financial 
exclusion problem, according to the Treasury,49 since the original aim of basic 
bank accounts was to support the move to direct (electronic) payment of welfare 
benefits.50 The core features of a basic account can be concluded as convenience, 
no costs for everyday transactions and no risks of overdrafts. 
  
1.2.2  China 
 
As one of the largest economic entities in the world, China also has a large 
customer base for its banking sector. Economic growth in the country and the 
expansion of banking services have promoted the wide use of modern payment 
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methods; bank accounts and bank cards have increasingly become available to the 
majority of people in the country in recent years.  
 
There are currently two main kinds of personal renminbi (ie. official Chinese 
currency, hereinafter ‘RMB’) bank accounts in China, namely (i) the personal 
bank settlement account and (ii) the personal savings account.51  The former is 
largely equivalent to the current account in the UK banking system, with a full 
scope of services, including saving, withdrawing money at a branch or through 
automated teller machines, transferring money, a debit card, e-channel services, 
wage payroll and bill payment. However, it does not have an overdraft feature, 
which is the most obvious difference between it and the  current account in the 
UK. On the other end of the spectrum, the personal savings account is limited in 
its functions, with only saving, withdrawing money through tellers at a branch or 
using a deposit book and transferring to, or from, an account owner’s other bank 
accounts under his or her name functions available. 52  Customers are free to 
choose the type of account, depending on their needs. Based on a customer’s 
application, a bank would open an account if eligible criteria are met.  
 
Although official statistics from domestic commercial banks are usually  
unavailable, increasingly, the use of bank accounts or cards in China could still be 
verified through various channels. For example, the annual report of the People’s 
Bank of China (2012) (hereinafter ‘PBoC’) shows that by the end of 2011, 
commercial banks in the country had issued over 3.53 billion bank cards in total 
in past years.53 This is nearly triple that of the total population of the country; on 
average, the number of bank cards held by customers is around 2.5 per capita. In 
addition, the total number of bank cards issued in China continued to rise, based 
on PBoC data in the past three years. 54  However, compared to developed 
countries such as the UK, the penetration level of bank accounts in China is still 
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moderate: according to data of the World Bank survey conducted in 2011 the 
percentage of adults with an account at a formal financial institution in China was 
63.81%,55 while in the UK it was 97%.56  
 
The ownership of bank accounts among well-off and vulnerable groups is also not 
balanced. Globally, low income was the most cited reason for not having bank 
accounts. 57  Gender, education, age and rural or urban residence have strong 
influences on account ownership.58 Geographical factors also have influences on 
customers who live in remote areas with fewer or no bank branches in those areas, 
where it is less convenient to use bank accounts as a way of saving and payment 
than cash. Generally, it is less possible for vulnerable groups of people (eg, being 
female, primary school or less educated, or rural residents) in the developing 
world to own and use personal bank accounts. 59 These factors also exist in the 
case of China, yet with some special features; for example, the female:male ratio 
of personal accounts ownership was not significantly different. 60  The biggest 
difference was between rural and urban groups, as only 58.02% of rural adults 
held accounts with formal financial institutions in 2011, while in urban areas it 
was 82.11%. 61  This indicates that nearly half of rural residents own no bank 
accounts.  
 
One of the virtual difficulties of research into the situation in China is the opacity 
of statistics from official channels. Therefore, in this thesis conclusions were 
deduced from indirect sources. 62  However, these indirect sources show useful 
information; for example, PBoC’s annual report (2012) shows that until the end of 
2011, bank cards issued for rural residents was around 1.5 per capita. 63 Of course, 
this percentage does not mean all rural residents have at least one bank card. 
Compared with the average number of bank cards held by domestic customers 
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without differentiated rural and urban residence (2.5 per capita), it is obvious that 
access to basic banking services in China is seriously imbalanced. People who do 
not have easy access to basic banking services are largely rural residents.64 This 
urban–rural segmentation is actually one of the main features of the Chinese 
banking service system.65 However, migrant workers from rural areas who work 
in towns also experience difficulties in accessing banking services in their 
workplace.66 In fact, according to research conducted by the Consultative Group 
to Assist the Poor (hereinafter ‘CGAP’), people in China who have most the 
difficulty with basic banking services are rural households in remote areas and 
migrant low-wage workers who have no residence status in their workplace and 
are therefore unable to open accounts.67 
 
Both external and internal reasons would influence the penetration rate of bank 
accounts in the case of China. The internal reasons include the fact that the 
income level of rural households and migrant workers is lower than their urban 
counterparts,68 which would weaken their consumption capacity and reduce the 
demand for using a payment system. Considering the income imbalance between 
China’s urban and rural area, it could be assumed that low income is the basic 
factor that influences the account-holding level. Fees for using banking services is 
another factor that negatively influences low-income people using bank accounts 
and other banking services. There is also the issue of information, as many low-
income people are less educated and find it difficult to understand conditions of 
banking products and how to use them.69 In addition, self-exclusion also exists 
when low-income people think that bank clerks are discriminating against them.70 
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For external reasons, the economic growth level and infrastructure of the banking 
industry would accelerate the popularity of basic banking services, and access to 
banking services would reduce inconvenience for bank branches and outlets. As 
the CBRC puts it: 
 
[T]he people living in townships and villages still have rather limited 
access to banking services. Although there are in average more than 
50 banking institutions per county, yet over 30% of them are located 
in the counties instead of lower level townships and villages. The 
number of banking institutions per township is less than 3, moreover, 
a total of 3302 townships are virtually unbanked.71  
 
Branch closures during the past decades have exacerbated the access problem, as 
commercial banks closed many of their unprofitable branches and outlets to 
reduce high fixed and operational costs during the market-oriented banking 
system reform. 72  Between 1995 and 2005 the total number of state-owned 
commercial bank branches (157,704) was halved to  74,712; this was also the case 
for rural credit co-operatives (hereinafter ‘RCC’), which is the main banking 
service provider in many remote areas.73 Many of these unprofitable branches that 
were closed were located in remote rural areas. For rural residents, this imbalance 
of available branches deprives them of the ability to use a modern method of 
saving, transferring money and making payments. 
 
Therefore, there are two issues to the problem of access to basic banking services  
in China, namely (i) the lower income level that prevents people from using 
banking services and (ii) the scarcity of financial resources in rural areas that 
would increase the cost of going to a branch. Although one cannot suppose that all 
citizens would prefer using banking services rather than simply using cash, it is 
still meaningful to provide equal access to basic banking services. The 
government and banking regulator of China has already recognized this issue. The 
CBRC has been promoting ‘universal access to basic banking services’ since 2005, 
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by increasing ‘the number of branches and exploring innovative alternatives to 
physical facilities’, and handling the social benefits paid through bank cards.74  
 
1.2.3  Concluding remarks 
 
This section clarifies the status quo of exclusion in the banking services in the UK 
and China. Based on the analysis made above, the conclusion could be drawn that 
non-account holding is clearly influenced by income level in both countries, 
although the UK has a much higher penetration level of account ownership. 
Basically, this is due to the different levels of economic development between the 
two countries, which further impacts on the financial infrastructure. However, for 
the non-account-holding group in both countries, low income is the common 
primary reason that limits people’s use of accounts at formal institutions. For low-
income people, their economic status either leads to denied access to formal 
institutions, or self-exclusion in which people choose not to use bank accounts. In 
addition, the problem of lack of information also exists as non-account holders are 
sometimes not informed about the availability of basic accounts or the banks 
discriminate against them.  
 
It is inevitable that no matter where, there are always low-income people with a 
vulnerable status or who live in remote or deprived areas without bank outlets. 
This is, however, no excuse for not providing enough banking services to them. 
This means that the account products available should be equipped with basic 
features such as savings and payment facilities, while lower fees should be 
charged to lower the threshold for using such accounts. For the basic account, 
banks’ eligibility criteria to opening an account should be appropriate. 
Information about available accounts should also be provided to avoid 
unawareness. Fees for using banking services should be affordable. On the other 
end of the spectrum, setting up new bank branches and new, alternative financial 
institutions in deprived areas appears to be an expensive, yet effective, by-product 
of promoting financial inclusion, especially in China where many residents are 
still physically excluded from using banking services. If there are bank branches 
in the community, making use of existing banking branches could be achieved 
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more easily. This leads to the question of whether banks should take up this duty 
and offer basic bank accounts to less-affluent people under regulation. 
 
1.3 Conditions of financial exclusion (2): Scarcity of affordable 
consumer credit 
 
1.3.1 Role of consumer credit 
 
The role of credit and debt in the modern era should in no way be ignored. This is 
reflected in many aspects of the market in which all the participants, including the 
market itself, could benefit from the use of credit, if used properly. Merchants 
who provide products or services are allowed to sell more if customers choose to 
use credit rather than merely their own savings. They could also benefit from this 
kind of credit agreement due to the increased cash flow at the time of the 
transaction. Furthermore, individuals are allowed to consume more with access to 
affordable credit, which gives them the chance to purchase products or services 
they would not otherwise be able to afford at the moment, making it possible for 
customers to spread their entire purchase price in future but receive the products 
or services right away.75 A virtuous circle exists in this circumstance if credit is 
used properly. Considering the essential role of customer spending in the real 
economy, it is assumed that a well- functioning market economy largely relies on 
the availability of affordable credit. As Wallace puts it, ‘consumer credit may well 
promote economic growth by permitting the anticipation of purchases and shifting 
demand toward durable goods industries which have greater potential for 
expansion’. 76  In contrast, failing to provide enough access to affordable credit 
would theoretically reduce customer spending and hinder economic growth. When 
lending ceases, ‘the wheels of commerce grind to a halt’. 77 These are examples of 
the general benefits of credit for the macro-economy.  
 
Nevertheless, there is little evidence on the precise effect on the macro-economy 
of credit availability in the high-risk, low-income consumer group. Wallace, in his 
discussion of the US consumer credit reform in the 1970s, when that country was 
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in recession due to the small volume of debts and relatively low purchasing power, 
argues that less availability of credit in the lower-end of the market is less 
significant for the economy. 78  It is possible that the lower spectrum of the 
personal credit market has fewer stimulating influences on the economy as a 
whole, but this should not be the pretext for giving up this market.  
 
However, from the perspective of consumer benefits, there are several reasons that 
justify providing the less affluent group with affordable credit.  
 
First, credit could shift the time of cash flow and allow people to consume that 
which they would not be able to afford with their present income, as discussed 
above. 79  A mismatch between income and expenditure exists in many 
circumstances, even for the middle- income households and individuals: 
borrowing money in this case allows people to bridge the gap between uneven 
income and expenses. 80  In general, one solution to solve this problem of a 
mismatch is to save money and spend less; the proverbial accumulation of a 
‘financial nest egg’.81 However, saving is not always possible. People in a better 
financial position could use savings to deal with daily life, while many lower-
income consumers have no chance to save and rely on credit. 82 Hence, the demand 
for a little credit in the low-income customer group is perhaps more intense than 
in the case of well-off counterparts due to the extent of the income–expense 
mismatch.83 For the vulnerable group of people who have less disposable income 
and no savings, availability of affordable credit is, to some extent, unavoidable, 
although it may not be desirable.  
 
Furthermore, the availability of affordable credit can act as a cushion for 
unplanned events.84 For people who are struggling to keep the balance between 
income and expenditure, unexpected changes in life could result in a sharp rise in 
expense or income reduction, and worsen the situation.85 These unplanned events 
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could be illness or unemployment or a decrease in income, 86 all of which would 
cause financial difficulties for the vulnerable group who have no unemployment 
or health insurance to cover such negative situations.87 Ideally, people could use 
savings to get by on rainy days, but even savings could be wiped out during long 
periods of unemployment or serious medical emergency; for the vulnerable that 
have less or no savings, this is fatal. Thus, borrowing money is unavoidable.88 If 
the current social welfare system cannot cover all emergencies, borrowing money 
is the last and, perhaps only, solution for the vulnerable group when meeting with 
financial difficulty. Credit in this sense is an exterior way of support for people 
who are unable to get through the difficulty by themselves. Therefore, being 
without access to affordable credit is in this way regarded as one aspect of 
financial exclusion, in a similar manner to being excluded from basic banking 
services.  
 
1.3.2   Consumer credit exclusion in the United Kingdom and China 
 
Generally, credit-related activities include both consumer credit lending and hire 
purchase. 89  The former refers to regulated lending activities, including 
moneylending such as personal loans, credit card lending, overdrafts, 
pawnbroking, and activities related to buying goods on, for example, hire 
purchase and conditional sales.90  
 
However, despite the perpetual need for credit that always exists, it is harder for 
some individuals and households to obtain credit from banks than for the 
wealthier group. It is ironically said that those who need credit the most are often 
among the least creditworthy of the would-be borrowers.91 This is the case in both 
the UK and China. Both countries share the problem of financial exclusion in the 
area of consumer credit. In the UK, there are mainly two groups of people who 
have limited access to mainstream credit, one is affected by low-income and less-
stable personal financial status, and the other is influenced by previous poor credit 
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records or a history of bad debt.92 In China, the low-income factor has the highest 
negative influence on this issue, as the majority of low-income people live in rural 
areas or are rural migrant workers, who not only have a limited income, but also 
tend to have no credit histories.93  
 
This exclusion is reflected in figures, for instance, 1999 OFT research shows that 
although the majority of UK households have access to mainstream consumer 
credit, 33% of the total population in the UK have no access to ‘high street’ credit 
from a mainstream provider.94 It was found that the use of high street credit was 
strongly related to household income. 95  A survey undertaken for the UK 
government found that 26% of households had no credit facilities in 2002. 96 The 
figure in the Eurobarometer data is 30%.97 This figure is, however, criticized for 
over-estimating the condition,98 as credit might not be needed since savings could 
be used. However, it is admitted that there is currently still a gap between the 
mainstream credit market and some potential borrowers. Data obtained in 2012 
found that 7 million low-income people in the UK were affected by this problem 
and had to use high-cost credit.99 
 
It is unfortunate that data on people excluded from mainstream credit in China are 
unavailable from the CBRC or the PBoC. Nevertheless, one can still deduce some 
observations from the continual attempts by the Chinese government to facilitate 
rural small personal loans, as most of the official attempts are concentred on rural 
credit markets. In addition, CGAP research in which an indirect calculation of the 
proportion of rural households that have credit from formal providers was made 
on the basis of lenders’ data and total number of rural residents 100 came to the 
conclusion that 58% of total rural households have a loan from a commercial bank 
and RCC.101 However, the research also admits that the real percentage should be 
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significantly lower, considering the number of people who do not want to borrow 
money from a bank.102 Although the figure is only meaningful in a limited sense, 
the remaining group of people who are unable to obtain credit from banks but, in 
fact, have such a demand are the most vulnerable in this context.  
 
However, it is important to note that only a few people are completely denied any 
kind of credit available in the market; even those with a lower income and poor 
credit records are taken into consideration.103 This is because there are plenty of 
substitute products available from subprime lenders; people who are ineligible for 
mainstream credit could still turn to the alternative credit market, although with 
less favourable conditions and higher interest rates. The adage ‘the poor pays 
more’ exists in this circumstance, since lenders have to cover the default risks of 
high-risk but less creditworthy borrowers.104 In the UK, sub-prime lender includes 
payday lenders and pawnshops. 105  In China, they include loan companies and 
pawnshops, who are privately invested and lend at higher interest rates. 106 Beside 
the ‘regulated’ moneylender, there are also underground, unlicensed lenders who 
lend at even higher rates.107  
 
However, using alternative ways of lending should not become the ideal solution 
for financial exclusion, considering the high interest rates and fees of these 
moneylenders. Economic status is not a fair reason for rationalising the high 
interests paid by vulnerable customers. Moreover, many have criticized subprime 
lenders for specially targeting vulnerable people and encouraging them to roll 
over their loan, which will trap the borrower in debt. 108 This is the problem of 
credit being too easily accessible, rather than too difficult to access, which often 
causes indebtedness problems.109  
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In this sense, being excluded from credit actually refers to ‘being excluded from 
mainstream credit’. 110  Any discussion about ‘financial exclusion in respect of 
consumer credit’ must be located in this context. Only affordable credit that is 
available in a responsible manner to vulnerable customers could relieve people’s 
financial stress, rather than high- interest, subprime loans from payday lenders. 
The type and amount of consumer credit therefore has two features: (i) the amount 
of the loan should be small, and (ii) the loan should be affordable. 111 This is not 
only to ensure banks’ profit, but also to ensure repayment can be made and does 
not ‘trap’ borrowers in debt. 
 
1.3.3 Reasons for being excluded from mainstream credit:  
The borrower’s perspective  
 
1.3.3.1       Economic circumstance 
 
From the consumer’s perspective, there are several factors that influence the 
problem of access. The first and basic reason for denied access can be attributed to 
income level, namely people with low or unstable income may find it harder to 
obtain high street credit from mainstream providers.  
 
Empirical research of both the UK and China confirmed this basic reason; for 
example, in the UK people who use ‘low-income credit’112 include (i) people with 
a very low income, (ii) single parents, (iii) people who do not have a current 
account, (iv) the unemployed, and (v) the sick or disabled. 113  Owing to their 
economic status, they are unable to obtain high street credit from, for example, 
banks, building societies or other lenders.114  
 
This is also the case in China. Individuals who find it difficult to access 
mainstream credit from commercial banks and rural credit co-operations include (i) 
rural households, (ii) low-wage workers and (iii) the unemployed.115 For all of the 
listed sub-groups, lower (and/or uncertain) disposable income limits their access 
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to mainstream credit, because banks are concerned about their repayment ability 
and potential risk of default, which are closely linked to disposable income.  
 
Certainly, income level cannot be equated with willingness and ability to repay a 
loan. People with a high income could also default on a loan due to unexpected 
changes in their life or just ignorance; in this sense, ‘low income’ is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition to default. However, compared to ‘intention 
to repay’ or willingness, income and many other aspects of economic condition 
are more measureable standards for banks to make assessments. 116 With profits 
coming from the interest rates they charge to borrowers and pay to deposits, banks 
are therefore concerned with the repayment ability of the would-be borrower in 
order to avoid default risk and profit loss.117 However, only borrowers themselves 
know precisely whether they will repay the loan on time and how to afford it. The 
lender, in turn, may find that it is hard to obtain such ‘insider information’ from 
borrowers in order to establish if they can afford the credit.118  
 
In this sense, there is a problem with information asymmetry, which forces 
lenders to examine borrowers’ information in a more statistical way, rather than 
simply literal promises to repayment on time.119 Hence, banks need to estimate 
borrowers’ credibility and economic condition in a more external way, while 
disposable income, employment and assets are therefore more easily measurable 
criteria for lenders to manage possible default risks. 120 To meet banks’ eligibility 
criteria, individual borrowers must usually present information about their 
employment, income and net worth; banks then use such information to eliminate 
potential default risk and to obtain creditworthy borrowers. People living on a low 
income or in less stable economic condition are therefore likely to be classified as 
less creditworthy, and being denied a loan due to matters related to affordability. 
Income level in this sense forms the first barrier for vulnerable people attempting 
to obtain high street credit. 
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1.3.3.2  Poor or empty credit record 
 
The second and related factor that influences access to high street credit is credit 
record. Generally, there is a greater likelihood that the lender will deny credit to 
people with poor credit records. However, it is important to clarify that people 
with poor credit records do not totally equate to people living on a low income, 
although these two groups sometimes overlap. Bad credit records could come 
from many other reasons such as court judgments and unused mobile contracts.121  
 
In fact, what is implied in ‘credit record’ is the trustworthiness of the borrower, 
since all records suggest past experience linked to personal economic condition 
and, more importantly, the intention to repay debts on time. 122 People with poor 
credit records are statistically assumed to be more likely to default on a loan than 
those with higher credit records and a good repayment history. 123  With many 
aspects of daily life included in a person’s credit file, lenders can conveniently 
check the credit report and assess the creditworthiness of the would-be borrower. 
 
For example, missed payments on gas or electricity bills in the UK will stay on 
credit files for six years and would therefore influence credit rating. 124 Moving 
home frequently has similar negative influence too. 125  People living on a low 
income who do not own a home and move into, and out of, privately rented homes 
for cheaper rentals are also negatively scored, as current and previous addresses 
would also appear on the credit report. 126  Furthermore, if people are tied to 
someone who has a poor credit history in any joint form of credit, they will also 
be affected when it comes to the possibility of accessing credit. 127 ‘Traditional’ 
credit scoring technology easily rejects these people.  
 
Similar problems related to credit records exist in China, with some special 
features. The national credit rating system in China was only established in the 
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1990s, and official statistics show that the credit records of 837 million people 
were included in the system in November 2013. 128 This means that one third of 
the total population is still outside the system. Among those people who have 
credit records, 317 million have a history of taking out a loan. 129 It is unfortunate 
that official data do not give further details, for example, the regional distribution 
of people with credit records between rural and urban areas. However, one can 
still deduce some conclusion from other sources. The individual credit reference 
system in China was first piloted in Shanghai, the largest city in the country, 130 in 
1999, while it was only until recently that rural credit RCCs (which are the most 
widely spread rural credit institution in the country) were brought into the national 
credit reference system. Given the rural–urban segmentation in the financial sector 
of the country and the difficulty of rural residents to obtain mainstream credit, it is 
assumed that rural residents in China are faced with the problem of lacking an 
effective credit record. Moreover, the contents of credit records are also limited to 
information about previous loan records, as well as records of public 
accumulation funds, unpaid tax, civil judgments and so forth, 131 while other civil 
contracts (eg, public utility and mobile contracts) are not covered by the current 
system. For rural residents who have never owned a credit product, the problem 
they face is largely concentrated on ‘blank’ credit records, namely there is no 
useful information on their credit file, which has a further negative influence on 
their future loan applications, as banks need to consider such data to monitor the 
credit circumstances of prospective borrowers. The current way in which credit 
scoring is done is through automatic credit risk analysis, which is perhaps not 
appropriate in this case. 
 
1.3.4 Reasons for being excluded from mainstream credit: Lender’s 
perspective 
 
1.3.4.1 Unsuitable product design 
 
As discussed above, financially excluded people with respect to mainstream credit 
usually suffer from low-income or unconvincing credit records. Generally, the 
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credit risk is related to the amount of the loan, that is, the higher the loan amount, 
the riskier the loss a bank would suffer. Therefore, if a small-amount loan is 
available from mainstream lenders, the corresponding requirement of credit record 
and income level could also be reduced.  
 
However, such products are usually unavailable, or at least not targeted to the 
financially excluded group of people. This is because the fixed costs of lending 
would not reduce along with a decrease in the loan amount; on the contrary, 
dispersed small-amounts would raise the costs of banks, as the expected income 
from such small loans cannot cover the costs. As the DWP Credit Union 
Expansion Project Report puts it, ‘lending small sums to low- income (subprime) 
consumers is expensive, and carries a higher risk of default and eventual write 
off’. 132  It is understandable then that suitable small-amount loans are usually 
unavailable from banks. 
 
To ensure profit, commercial banks nowadays usually target the more well-off 
classes. From the criteria used to determine consumer credit listed, it is easy to 
find out which groups of people are targeted customers in the mind of commercial 
banks. For example, unsecured personal loans for consumption provided by one 
of China’s largest commercial banks, the BoC, are called ‘gong xin dai’,133 which 
means ‘a loan for the salary-earning class’, in Chinese. The length of loan 
repayments is usually set as one year and shall not exceed three years. Borrowers 
are allowed to use the loan in all legal transactions, including home decoration, 
car purchase, education and medical treatment. The size of the loan is set as two to 
three times that of the proposed borrower’s annual income. No collateral or 
pledge is needed for this product. This product is a typical unsecured personal 
loan available in the Chinese market. Targeted customers of this loan product are 
quite straightforward: ‘This revolving credit loan is provided for staff of 
enterprises and public institutions who have steady and continued income, 
including but not limited to civil servants, staff of state-owned enterprise, teachers, 
doctors, and police and army officers.’ 
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Other large banks have similar eligible standards for proposed borrowers of their 
personal loan products. The eligibility criteria for credit card and overdraft 
facilities have similar standards for targeted customers. The UK’s mainstream 
credit providers require similar conditions.134 
 
From the bank’s point of view, a steady and decent job means higher and secured 
income, while unemployment, part-time jobs or being a farmer, among other 
things, cannot support people’s repayment ability, since their income is neither 
high nor steady in order for them to be able to guarantee repayments. Based on 
occupation and income level, this would constrain low- income residents’ access 
to credit from commercial banks. Less-valuable customers would naturally be 
kept out of the mainstream credit sector, while banks design their products 
‘tailored’ for high-value customers.  
 
Furthermore, the amount of available credit tends to be high, which may exceed 
low- income people’s spending ability, as in the example cited above. For people 
with a low income, what they could obtain based on their economic level and 
repayment ability would be small-amount credit, which is better since it does not 
require collateral. As Kempson and Whyley suggest, ‘the types of short-term 
credit facilities needed are ones that offer small, one-off, fixed-term loans rather 
than revolving credit, fixed and automatic payments, and take advantage of 
developments in technology to allow much lower annual percentage rates 
(hereinafter ‘APRs’) than are currently available from moneylenders’. 135 However, 
the cost of handling a small loan is not lower than a large one and yields a small 
profit. Tailored products are therefore specially developed for high-value 
customers, while the lower end of the market receives less attention. Inappropriate 
products also exclude low-income borrowers from applying for loans and leads to 
self-exclusion, as this would result in people turning away from commercial banks, 
since they believe that they would be rejected. In general, the problem is, as 
Timothy Edmonds suggests, the ‘mismatch between potential customers’ needs 
and the products on offer’, while product diversity is ‘clearly part of the answer, 
for all underserved markets’.136 
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1.3.4.2  Deregulation of the banking industry 
 
On a macroeconomic level, the change in the regulatory environment could 
explain many issues: why banks close their branches or why they are targeted at 
wealth management businesses. This is, however, closely related to the change in 
the complex macroeconomic environment and cannot be fully d iscussed here. 
This section of the thesis only sketches the conditions based on previous research. 
 
In the UK, it is recognized that the deregulation in the banking sector since the 
1980s has led to higher competition, which forces banks to focus on high net-
worth businesses.137 Prior to the 1970s, the UK had adopted an ‘interventionist 
approach’ in regulating the banking industry by using banks as ‘a direct 
instrument of government macroeconomic policy’. 138  After the change in the 
regulatory environment, that is, the introduction of new legislation, including the 
Financial Services Act, in the UK in 1986, the competition in banking industry 
increased as a result of the new self- regulation regime, which also covers 
commercial banks’ investment business. Financia l institutions are therefore 
encouraged to compete across market sectors.139 To win competition, the banking 
market becomes more concentrated and banks have to become more profit-
oriented, which inevitably leads to the closure of bank branches to reduce cost.140 
To make higher profits, the main activity of commercial banks also changed, 
‘from the provision of credit-related services to investment-oriented products and 
fee-generation activities’.141 Therefore, targeted customers inevitably turn out to 
be high net-worth people with higher incomes, while non-profitable basic services 
are cut, reduced or charged fees.142  
 
The banking industry in China has also experienced tremendous reform in its 
equity structure since the 1990s.143 There are two dimensions that are relevant to 
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this issue. First, after the reform, commercial banks have now become a separate 
legal person responsible for their own profit and loss related to their property, and 
for taking responsibility for their stockholders. 144  The result of the financial 
system reform is noteworthy. They are operating in a Western style and using 
similar international regulatory standards, just like commercial banks operate in 
Anglo-Saxon countries which actually provided the model for the Chinese 
banking industry setting up its own business standards. 145 This, however, excludes 
less-affluent customers outside their ‘normal’ loan services due to their higher 
repayment risk and less profitability.146 
 
Second, in 1998 the State Council decided on reforming state-owned banks’ 
branch structure.147 This reform proposal was soon echoed by the PBoC and gives 
state-owned banks detailed requirements.148 The number of bank branches in the 
same region is limited to one, while other branches shall be closed and their 
licence turned in.149 Since then, commercial banks have gradually shifted their 
business to large and medium cities, and closed around 30,000 branches at county 
level or below.150  The trend of branch closure in China was initially aimed at 
cutting costs and improving state-owned banks’ performance, and transforming 
them into more competitive and profitable ‘modern’ banks. However, the closure 
of bank branches would inevitability limit rural residents’ access to bank services, 
which is often suggested in the research.  
 
Yeung gives reasons for bank closure in China from another side of the reform, 
which underlines the stimulating influence of the entrance of foreign banks on 
Chinese-funded banks. 151  Compared with Chinese-funded banks, foreign banks 
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have more mature experience in how to provide high-standard services to the most 
profitable part of the market but less so to branches, with the result that from the 
beginning of their market entrance, foreign banks have avoided competing with 
domestic mega-banks in less-profitable areas. Instead, they are ‘strategically’ 
providing personalised higher-end services to rich customers, who want more 
sophisticated services tailored to their needs. 152  With higher-quality services, 
foreign banks find it is easier to attract high-value customers. Yeung finds that the 
pressure of competition from sophisticated foreign banks in the high-end market 
stimulates Chinese- funded banks to refine their performances, ‘through reducing 
the high fixed and operational costs embedded in the branch networks by closing 
branches and making staff redundant’.153 In fact, 16% of the rural unbanked in 
China attribute the major difficulty of their getting credit to the lack of local 
financial institutions.154 The decrease in the number of commercial bank branches 
also limits access to credit of people who live in remote rural areas, which largely 
overlaps with the ‘low-income’ group in the Chinese context. Fewer available 
branches in service would also affect rural residents’ access to basic banking 
services. 
 
In general, although the Chinese banking market is dominated by mega-banks and 
followed by joint-stock commercial banks, their efforts are overwhelmingly 
concentrated in the ‘lucrative urban market’. 155 The unprofitability of the lower 
end of the market, as well as the pressure of cost reduction and competition in the 
new era, also drives commercial banks to leave the low-profit market. To some 
extent, this process has been the natural by-product of the reform and deregulation 
since the 1990s. Reform in the commercial banking sector in China has rapidly 
increased the availability of consumer credit since then. However, the lower end 
of the market is largely overlooked by commercial banks. This is similar to the 
case in the UK after its deregulation in the 1980s, as the increase in competition 
would inevitably lead to profit-oriented business tactics. 
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1.4 Influence of financial exclusion 
 
Life is never easy for underprivileged people who are struggling with financial 
issues. Education, housing, medical and other daily expenses cost more than 
before, and with limited financial access, people have to borrow money from a 
bank at some point in their lives. Characterized by lower incomes and lower 
education levels than the general population, the unbanked tend to be 
marginalized in socio-economic terms.156  
 
Those people who are less able to use banking services, are ‘at particular risk of 
being excluded from transaction banking (in the form of a current or basic bank 
account),’157 and they have to use cash instead of payment services, which means 
more inconvenience and higher costs. For example, in the UK where the use of 
payment accounts is more common, people without access to bank accounts 
means they have difficulty receiving their salary, which makes it difficult for them 
to be employed, which, in turn, leads to further financial hardships. 158  Bill 
payment is also less convenient and more expensive if banking facilities cannot be 
used.159  
 
Although in China cash is still widely used, carrying cash around is insecure. 
There are several aspects to this problem. First, since not all rural communities 
have bank branches, the majority of migrant workers usually use the post office to 
remit their wages to their rural homes.160 However, research finds that the transfer 
fee at around 1 to 1.5% of the whole amount161 charged by the post office in 
China is burdensome for rural migrant workers. 162  Since a common migrant 
worker usually remits roughly 3,000 yuan per year, the fee paid is 30 yuan, which 
is ‘equivalent to their monthly food allowance’. 163  Using a payment system 
through a commercial bank is cheaper and faster but this choice is less readily 
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available, 164  not only because of possible difficulties of the account-opening 
criteria, but also due to the relatively low education level of migrant worker who 
may not able to obtain useful information on banking services. 165 Some of them 
choose the informal way of remittance by carrying the money home, which makes 
them vulnerable to theft.166 Second, without easy access to banking facilities due 
to branch closure, rural residents may also find it hard to access nearby bank 
branches and post offices.167 This is due to the massive closure of bank branches 
and even post offices in remote areas in the late twentieth century.168 
 
Next, people who are excluded from mainstream credit, rely heavily on their 
informal support network (eg, family and friends), which is probably also quite 
limited, and on alternative lenders. From the alternative lenders the unbanked 
could get a loan, which is generally short term, small scale, single payment and 
more over-priced than a common consumer credit product.169 These features could 
be found in the products of payday lending, pawnbroking, auto title lending and 
other kinds of alternative lending services. Loans are generally used to cover daily 
expenses, although some of the borrowers are also small business owners.170  
 
The high cost of subprime lending and other features makes this market 
notorious.171 Taking payday loans as an example, the typical product in the US is 
a two-week loan for around US$250 to US$300 and the typical fees range from 
US$15 to US$20 per US$100 borrowed, which is a very high APR. 172 Higher 
rates can also easily be found in the market. In the UK, payday lending is included 
in the more general concept of ‘high-cost, short-term credit’173 in the FCA’s new 
regulatory regime. According to several market reviews of payday- lending 
practices and the Competition Commission and OFT, the typical payday credit 
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that most UK consumers borrow from payday lenders are: (i) amounts less than 
£1,000,174  at an average cost of between £265 and £270 if borrowed over 30 
days, 175  and the most common amount is £100; 176  and (ii) loan duration of 
between less than one month and a few months and a maximum of a year; on 
average 22 days.177 Research also shows that 90% of payday loan amounts were 
less than £570 and over 81% loans had a duration of less than 31 days. 178 Other 
characteristics include repayment either directly from bank account transfers or in 
cash paid to high street shops,179 the use of roll-over repayment, and the fast and 
easy loan approval process.180  
 
Except the high cost charged for the service, there is information asymmetry in 
relation to some citizens. Critics claim that payday borrowers are not well 
informed about the true cost of their borrowing, and those lenders engaged in 
deceptive and unfair practices, and made profit from repeated loan rollovers.181 
Lenders are also accused of encouraging customers to borrow frequently. 182 
Borrowers then become ‘chronic’ and are trapped in endless debt, which is where 
the lenders’ profit comes from. Some of them cannot repay the principle of the 
loan at the due time, but have to roll over their debt by just repaying the current 
interest. The reputation of these lenders is, at least to some extent, negative when 
considering their profit sources.  
 
However, the industry claims that it runs its business fairly enough. Since 
borrowers are generally weak in their financial status and are not required to 
provide collateral, the high cost of the loan is the price paid for default risks.183 
Lenders have to maintain their business and avoid these risks via higher fees. As 
the risks of their customers are much higher compared with those who deal with a 
bank, the high price of alternative financial service should be understandable, 
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since their business is not for a charitable purpose, and their services are indeed 
useful to the unbanked consumers. These lenders supply valued credit services to 
poor people; the customers also find they are easier to access than mainstream 
credit, because they are both time-saving and easier to access.184  
 
All the reasons cited seem rational and customer-oriented, but do these kinds of 
transactions agreed to by both parties correspond with business morals? The 
answer is not as simple as ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Indeed, the subprime market provides 
complementary services to those who are excluded by mainstream lenders, which 
are usually referred to as ‘gap- filling’ when considering their roles or functions. 
However, this cannot exonerate these lenders from being blamed for charging 
high interest. There is nothing wrong with credit- lending activities but the unfair 
business practices are criticized. The high costs of the loans, the inappropriate 
debt collection and the danger of trapping customers in unaffordable debt by 
encouraging them to roll over the loan185 could cause more problems to customers 
than other existing consumer credit products: according to the Financial 
Ombudsman Service (hereinafter ‘FOS’), the number of customer complaints on 
payday loan issues reported to FOS reached 794 by March 2014, which is up 46% 
from the previous year.186 If borrowing money is inevitable, then the price should 
also be expected to be reasonable. This is generally the ground for regulating the 
credit market, whether mainstream or subprime, no matter which country is 
involved.  
 
1.5 Theories of equal opportunities 
 
Whether regulations could be used in the recognition of financial exclusion, its 
manifestations and negative consequences will be justified in the following 
sections before any further analysis is made.  
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First, the efficiency of regulation may be queried, since it is assumed that the 
well- functioning free market could deliver resources to those who need them, 
while regulations may distort this order. Especially in Anglo-Saxon countries such 
as the UK and the US where the theory of the free market is more cherished, 
applying regulation to a social issue can raise questions as to its effect and 
whether there would be intrusion of the free market. 187  In addition, financial 
exclusion may be viewed as the consequences of lacking state social welfare or 
market competition, while solving it relies more on the self-adjustment of the 
market rather than law, financial regulation and regulators.188  
 
However, from the recent financial crisis experiences, the free-market theory in 
the financial sector is more or less indefensible in respect of maintaining market 
functioning and stabilization. The free-market theory is challenged by the 
recognition that the market structure is not shaped by itself, but heavily impacted 
by government regulations and law, as Ramsay argues, for example, 
 
Both these positions are, I believe, misleading and neglect the 
important, and often unrecognized, ways in which the ground rules of 
consumer credit law shape and influence market outcomes. The 
existing pattern of lending opportunities and forms and outcomes of 
credit transactions are not a natural consequence of some abstract 
concept such as a ‘credit market’ or ‘freedom of contract’. They are 
shaped by the existing ground rules which influence, and are part of, 
the contractual culture, which structures and influences market 
outcomes. Contractual culture, in the context of credit markets, 
includes norms and assumptions about creditors, debtors, and the role 
of credit, all of which may be shaped by legal norms of permission 
and prohibition, and differing institutional frameworks for lending. It 
is misleading therefore to assume that there is some ‘natural’ level of 
credit availability or market structure. This is an important point, since 
it is sometimes argued that state intervention ‘distorts’ credit markets 
through regulation, channelling transactions away from their natural 
course and requiring a ‘trade off’ between efficiency and equity 
goals.189 
 
Similarly, Sunstein also argues that the functioning of the market inevitably 
depends on ‘intervention’: 
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Some people think there is a deep opposition between ‘government 
intervention’ and ‘free markets.’ But the opposition is too simple. No 
one is really opposed to ‘government intervention.’ Markets depend 
for their existence on law, which is necessary to establish property 
rights and to set out the rules governing contracts and tort.190 
 
This is the idea that the market has never been free but always constructed by 
regulation.191 In fact, the free market itself is not guaranteed to be able to maintain 
a well- functioning market; it could ‘produce economic inefficiency and (worse) a 
great deal of injustice . . . [the] free market depends on a range of coercive legal 
interventions.’192 Besides, Sunstein also questions the free-market theory and the 
irrationality of people, as not everyone is rational or profit-maximization-
oriented.193 The market is not as perfect as assumed; empirical evidence for this 
can be found in the recent financial crisis. 
 
On this issue, the theory of Karl Polanyi could also be cited here. In Polanyi’s 
book The Great Transformation, the author demonstrates the view that the market 
is not self-generating and freely operated, but is heavily influenced by state power 
from a historical perspective. He criticizes the view of leaving everything to the 
market’s self- regulation, and argues that it would hurt both people and firms.194 
Furthermore, it is the impaired self-regulation that leads to government 
intervention. 195  Polanyi deems the interventionism as being ‘responsible’ for 
people’s real interests,196 in fact, regulation and intervention are not in conflict 
with market freedom; they are actually for the betterment of terms of freedom, as 
Polanyi writes, ‘[t]he road to the free market was opened and kept open by an 
enormous increase in continuous, centrally organized and controlled 
interventionism.’ 197  In order to set up and maintain the order of the market, 
intervention through law and regulation as the tool is essential: 
 
True, once such a system is approximately achieved, less intervention 
of one type is needed. However, this is far from saying that market 
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system and intervention are mutually exclusive terms. For as long as 
that system is not established, economic liberals must and will 
unhesitatingly call for the intervention of the state in order to establish 
it, and once established, in order to maintain it.198  
 
Using regulation of the market is therefore both essential and inevitable, and is not 
an enemy to market freedom. Whether this kind of ‘intervention’ is effective is 
based on the content of specific regulations, and some regulations or roles may be 
less effective or even become a ‘regulatory burden’. However, regulation itself is 
a reasonable way, and is not going to reshape or even distort the ‘natural’ markets.  
 
The next point is the justification for using regulation in the matter of financial 
exclusion. There are several levels to this question. First, the features and 
significance of payment services and credit decide that without access to such 
services, one may be faced with great inconvenience or even disadvantages. These 
services are, to some extent, essential, as Wilhelmsson argues, 
 
Many financial services and information society services are now 
central to the infrastructure of society, and the consumer cannot 
reasonably be expected to live without them. These aspects of those 
services can be treated as social rights in the same way that services 
provided by ‘traditional’ public utilities are.199  
 
This point of view holds that financial services are a new form of ‘social rights’, 
which shall be supplied by the state.200 Nowadays, payment services, for example, 
are widely used in daily life and thus no access to it means one cannot make use 
of cash dispensers if there are no bank branches nearby. This is also essential for 
customers’ free mobility such as those people from rural areas who work, study or 
reside in cities, or from one member state to another.  
 
Furthermore, this understanding of financial services as a social right relates to 
issues of social justice and equality. Equality as the basic legal principle is not 
always fulfilled between different classes, which is inevitable. Inequality, 
however, comes from an existing social structure, as Jacob argues, ‘inequalities 
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have their origins in the design of social circumstances’. 201  This leads to the 
recognition of the promotion of equality, which does not intend to provide the 
same and equal resources to everyone but offers equal opportunities. 202  As 
Fineman argues, this is the role of the state to its residents:  
 
True equality of opportunity carries with it the obligation on the state 
to ensure that access to the societal institutions that distribute social 
goods, such as wealth, health, employment, or security, is generally 
open to all, and that the opportunities these institutions provide are 
evenly distributed so that no persons or group of persons are unduly 
privileged while others are disadvantaged to the extent that they can 
be said to have few or no opportunities. This is not a call for equality 
of result or outcome. It does not ignore or deny that there are 
differences in individual ability or initiative, or that individuals have 
responsibility for themselves and their circumstances . . . Far from 
having equal opportunity, many individuals are caught in systems of 
disadvantage that are almost impossible to transcend.203 
 
Fineman’s explanation clearly outlines the essence and boundary of promoting 
equality. It is in this sense that financial exclusion is viewed as ‘a social and 
economic problem that involves a lack of equality of opportunity and which is a 
form of economic discrimination’.204 In the field of financial services, this means 
available access to affordable and convenient financial services for all residents 
without discrimination based on group characteristics, such as gender, race or 
residency, while financial institutions’ own eligible criteria on each specific 
customer still acts as the threshold. For example, HM Treasury points out that 
improving financial inclusion does not mean that the same extent of services 
should be given to everyone, but the barriers of free choice should be reduced.205 
How to facilitate this equality in access to financial services through the law and 
regulations will be answered, but this equality for all shall be protected by the 
state, based on the discussions above in this section of the chapter. This is not 
going to distort the nature of the market structure.  
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Last, but not least, Ramsay also highlights the distributive role of law, suggesting 
the use of consumer credit law in many aspects, such as mandatory information 
disclosure and cooling-off period, could ‘redistribute power and resources 
generally from creditors to consumers’. 206  Since there is a huge imbalance 
between borrowers and commercial creditors, borrowers can hardly bargain 
successfully on contract terms. After listing several changes in the legislation that 
gave borrowers more legal rights in the UK in the 1970s, represented by the 
Consumer Credit Act 1974, Ramsay argues that such legislative changes ‘could 
not only alter the distribution of power in credit transactions, but also the culture 
of the market, from an arm’s- length adversarial relationship to a more co-
operative relationship between creditor and borrower.’207 The distributive role of 
law shall not be neglected and is not the intervention of the private area.208 For 
people who are financially excluded from mainstream banks and have to borrow 
from subprime lenders, consumer credit law acts as the firewall or the minimum 
protection and rebalances the contractual parties’ power.  
 
1.6 Role of legislation or regulations in financial exclusion 
 
In recognizing the problem of financial exclusion and its negative influences, it is 
not surprising that governments in different countries are seeking solutions to the 
issue. There are, however, two dimensions to this problem; on the one hand, new 
access for basic banking services and affordable consumer credit should be 
provided to low-income people, which requires regulations to facilitate this social 
right of people, and, on the other hand, subprime lending should also be regulated 
to protect the vulnerable from being harmed by high interest rates or unfair 
business practices.  
 
The first dimension of this issue is that the role of law or regulation is essential. 
This is the ‘facilitating’ role of regulation with respect to the provision of 
financial services. To facilitate the provision of such services, regulations shall be 
fit and proper to remove any regulatory burden and mandatorily lower an 
inappropriate threshold to make use of banking services. Although the regulatory 
objectives of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (hereinafter ‘FSMA’) 
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do not cover issues related to financial inclusion (which would perhaps be a 
controversial issue to be fixed as a financial regulatory objective), the significance 
of providing banking services is not neglected by the regulator and the 
government. The new conduct regulator, the FCA, for example, continues to use 
the handbook Banking: Conduct of Business Sourcebook  (hereinafter ‘BCOBS’) 
of the previous FSA, which covers taking deposits, payment services and 
information disclosure on a detailed basis. It is mandatory for banks and building 
societies to abide by the FSA sourcebook, which sets up the minimum regulatory 
standards, thereby protecting customers’ interests. For example, when it comes to 
providing customers with information about basic banking accounts, banks have 
to abide by clear and understandable standards to communicate with customers 
who may be unaware of such services.  
 
The role of regulations in facilitating consumer credit provision is more essential. 
As this is usually related to alternative financial institutions, such as credit unions 
in the UK and rural mutual co-operatives in China, which are usually small and 
less sustainable, the role of regulation and legislation is to facilitate the growth of 
those small firms by giving them additional regulatory exemptions. For example, 
though years of law revision, the Credit Union Act, 1979 (hereinafter the ‘1979 
Act’) in the UK has gradually become more flexible and ‘deregulated’, and has 
removed many restrictive roles to support small credit unions’ growth. The Act is 
detailed by the Financial Conduct Authority and Prudential Regulation Authority 
Credit Unions Sourcebook (hereinafter ‘CREDS’). Another example of using the 
law to facilitate credit provision is the Community Reinvestment Act in the US, 
which obliges federally insured banks to meet the ‘credit needs’ of low- income 
communities.209 Although the Act is criticized, it is indeed an example of how 
legislation could intervene in financial institutions’ commercial activities.  
 
As to the second dimension of the issue, namely conduct regulation of consumer 
credit providers, the role of regulation appears more traditional or ‘direct’ 
compared to the first dimension: it aims to regulate subprime lenders to prevent 
unfair treatment of customers through measures such as mandatory information 
disclosure, responsible lending and interest rate caps. This is the case in both the 
UK and China. Under the inclusive legislation FSMA, the UK has established a 
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complex regulatory regime for the financial industry. The offering of both basic 
banking services and consumer credit belong to ‘regulated activities’. This 
conception refers to activities related to investments, including assets, rights or 
interests, that are specified by the Treasury, and carried on in the business way.210 
Only ‘authorised’ or ‘exempt’ persons may carry on the regulated activity. 211 To 
be able to provide regulated activities, an individual or firm has to seek 
permission from the regulator to do so,212 and the permission could be varied or 
cancelled if unsatisfactory conditions are identified. 213 In this sense, the regulator 
could use the power of variation and cancellation to regulate firms’ behaviour. 
Firms need to comply with the law and regulations included in the new 
sourcebook, the Consumer Credit Sourcebook  (hereinafter ‘CONC’), which 
provides the new regulatory regime, as well as the Consumer Credit Act 1974 
(hereinafter ‘CCA 1974’), which still works in many respects.  
 
Compared with the UK, the law and regulations in China are still sketchy as the 
consumer credit market is still in its nascent stage. However, customers’ interests 
are increasingly being protected in the consumer credit area through the 
recognition of the ‘financial consumer’ under the Consumer Protection Law of 
2013. Protecting customers in the financial sector is, in any sense, a basic role of 
the regulatory system. 
 
The role of regulation in facilitating financial inclusion is therefore mixed and 
complex. However, the effectiveness of the regulation shall also be considered, 
which relies on the determination and controlling power of government, and on 
the preciseness of law, since lenders are known to be good at finding legal 
loopholes.214 If not properly set, the effectiveness of regulations would reduce. 
Interest rate capping, for example, is at first glance very useful in protecting 
customers in the subprime lending market. It could, however, easily be evaded by 
lenders. For example, in the US, where every state has its own court system, by 
operating as an agent for banks in a state with no interest limit on consumer credit, 
lenders could then open branches in other states without being regulated by local 
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usury laws.215 In addition, Zywicki deems the ‘unintended effects’ of the usury 
cap, such as price increase and market exit, could deprive consumers of access to 
title loans, and force them to turn to more expensive lenders and even loan 
sharks. 216  Furthermore, it should be recognized that the law (and financial 
regulation) itself cannot solve the financial exclusion problem. More efforts from 
government departments and society are essential. It could be assumed that if the  
social welfare system is fully established, then low-income people are less 
financially stressed as they can benefit from social insurance and other social 
schemes. However, before alternative lenders such as credit unions take over the 
market, the gap-filling role of the subprime market is still meaningful in relieving 
the problem of financial exclusion. Financial regulation in this sense is not a 
catholicon; it is a way of promoting equal opportunities in financial areas by 
facilitating more available and affordable choices. 
 
1.7 Regulating credit: A historical perspective 
 
In fact, regulating the credit market has more profound roots in history and is not 
a purely modern product. Although this thesis is about current regulations, it 
would still be useful to look back at the evolutionary process of regulation and 
theory through history which, in turn, has influenced current regulatory methods 
and attitudes towards questions such as ‘what is usury?’ and how to define usury, 
which further leads to the legal or regulatory methods of using interest rate 
capping on the fee capping in the consumer credit sector.  
 
In general, the regulation of credit in the ancient world focused on the treatment of 
taking interest from an activity. This is closely related to the society’s economic 
condition and productivity level at that stage. Marx’s ‘economic base determines 
the superstructure’ theory could probably be used to explain these negative 
attitudes towards loan interest in the pre- industrial age. The theory is explicitly 
stated in Marx’s book A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy: 
 
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into 
definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely [the] 
relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development 
of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of 
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production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real 
foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure, and to 
which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of 
production of material life conditions the general process of social, 
political, and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that 
determines their existence, but their social existence that determines 
their consciousness.217 
 
In Marx’s theory, the ‘economic base’ refers to product relations that come from 
material life, such as relations of employment, labour, property; while the 
‘superstructure’ is the ‘superior relations of production’, 218  including all other 
relations such as culture, ideological forms, the state and the family, which 
represent the interests of the ruler and is decided by the base. 219 For the purpose of 
this section, the ‘base’ is the economic condition of a certain society, whether 
lending–borrowing is common and what is the development level of commerce; 
while the superstructure generally refers to the ruler’s attitude towards loans and 
loan interest, and the culture and the law; with less-developed commerce and trade, 
the requirement for business loans is also limited. In these cases, people borrow 
money mainly to sustain themselves through hard times, and usury prohibition is 
necessary for social stability. It is therefore common to see the rulers of the 
ancient agricultural world restrict loan interests for those subjects who were 
exploited during the written history of humankind. In a more commercialized 
society, borrowing money for commercial purposes was a normal practice and 
would not receive wide objections from the public or the ruler. 
 
The earliest known rate regulation was found in ancient Babylonia, and the code 
of Hammurabi is viewed as the first authentic official record of credit 
regulation.220 It set up maximum rates of interest for loans of grain and loans of 
silver by weight, and if violated, the principal of the debt would be cancelled.221 
Although brief, this represents the attitude of rulers towards lending with interest 
in ancient agrarian countries. It was argued as being ‘one of the very first writte n 
laws [that] differentiated between interest as a legal act when charged within the 
legally accepted rate’.222  
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A similar negative attitude towards moneylending and usury is also to be found in 
ancient China’s official documents and statutes. Regulating lending with interest 
rate capping has a profound history which can be traced back to the Western Han 
Dynasty (206 BCE to 24 CE). 223  Later in the Tang Dynasty (618–907 CE), 
interest charged by lenders was capped and did not exceed the amount of the loan 
principle (息不过本，Xi Bu Guo Ben), which was aimed at protecting the 
vulnerable from being harmed by high rates. 224  This principle was generally 
inherited by later dynasties from the Song, Jin, Yuan, Ming to the Qing.225 In 
more than a millennium, rules of ancient China maintained the regulating 
methodology of credit by setting up interest rate caps. Lending money was in 
general permitted but the rate was capped; in Xu’s view, the rationale for capping 
interest rates in ancient China comes from the Confucian school, which advocated 
altruism and humaneness. 226  This, however, also reflected conditions in the 
typical agrarian society of ancient China.  
 
On the other end of the spectrum, in ancient Greece, credit transactions were not 
regulated,227 and there were no interest rate limits.228 Recorded credit interest was 
reached up to an appalling 9,000%.229 This attitude towards moneylending and 
interest was underpinned by the commercialized social environment, ‘the Greeks 
of the seventh century B.C. developed an economic system that was commercial, 
urban, and monetary. Credit facilitated trade.’230  
 
In fact, the Athens approach is regarded as an ancient version of ‘laissez-faire’, 
that is, a free transaction that does not set any rule or control for moneylending.231 
It is therefore understandable that there is no definition of ‘usury’ in the Athenians’ 
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approach. However, some negative consequences of unlimited moneylending 
were also recorded. The personal loan interest was calculated on a monthly basis, 
and ‘small debtors in difficulty dreaded the end of the moon’. 232 Social struggles 
between classes were fierce and became the most serious problem for Athens. It 
was against this background that Solon appealed for reform in 594 BCE, when he 
probably cancelled many debts and freed debt slaves. 233 The reform was highly 
praised, as Lewis writes,  
 
Both Aristotle and Plutarch tell us that the amelioration of such debts 
was one of Solon’s most important achievements, although it is highly 
unlikely that he cancelled them outright. He set clear limits to debt 
contracts; it is likely that he made it illegal to enforce a default by 
turning the debtor into a slave (either de facto or by ownership). The 
wealthy could no longer enslave a debtor, and debtors could not 
pledge their own bodies as security for a loan.234 
 
Bankers were, however, also not reputable from Roman times to the medieval age, 
partly because the society was largely agrarian, 235 so were the conditions in most 
ancient and medieval societies. ‘Among most of the ancient agricultural nations, 
there was a prejudice against the taking of interest for the loan of money.’236  
 
However, based on scholarly research and statutes in the ancient world, from the 
perspective of law, the Romans had the most sophisticated understanding of 
moneylending and rate regulation. In Rome, loans for profit were allowed but 
were also regulated by rate caps.237 The Twelve Tables had already set up interest 
rate caps for personal debt.238 What is more significant in the Roman approach, 
was the distinction between loan and lease; by making a distinction between 
mutuum (consumable) and commodatum (non-consumable), Roman law provided 
a categorization distinguishing the lending of consumable and durable goods with 
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a solid theoretical basis.239 The definition of ‘loan in the digest’ – paraphrased by 
Paucapalea in the twelfth century240 – is quoted here: ‘A loan [mutuum] is so-
called from this, that mine [meum] becomes yours [tuum]. That is a loan, which, 
consisting in a quality, is offered by me, while from you I shall receive back only 
as much of the same kind.’241 
 
The ownership and right to use a consumable good (eg, wheat and money) cannot 
be separated; the good was consumed once in use. Similarly, one cannot keep the 
ownership of money while transferring the right to use; so, in order to use it, one 
had to own it. This is the case of mutuum, where the item is ‘lent’, both ownership 
and the right to use were actually transferred. 242 Lenders thus had no right to ask 
money for what did not belong to them. If they did so, they were selling one thing 
twice (ie. one for ownership, one for right of use which cannot be separated from 
the former), namely selling the right that belonged to others. The amount of 
money hence was to be returned in the exact same amount without any additions. 
A promise to pay more than received in such moneylending contracts (mutuum) 
was unenforceable.243 Only by a separate stipulation could the borrower pay the 
fees, but this was a distinct type of contract compared to the loan contract, and 
cannot be combined into a single one.244 However, the actual result of these two 
contracts means the allowing of loans for profits. It was just the profit of another 
separate contract.  
 
However, in later medieval times, the attitude of the church towards loan interest 
was negative. Unlike Romans’ permission regulation approach, lending for profit 
in medieval times was viewed as a ‘sin of injustice’245 and violated the natural law 
philosophy. 246  In his book, The Scholastic Analysis of Usury, John T. Noonan 
noted the difference between the early middle ages and later Renaissance. 
Christian tradition itself condemned usury.247 People in early times accepted the 
usury theory not because of mundane interests, but because the Church taught 
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them to do so. Theological decisions were more important than economic facts, 
and the chief source on usury analysis was the Church’s teaching.248  
 
However, throughout history, loans, or usury, did not vanish, not even in 
European medieval times when it was forbidden by the Church. It survived 
throughout history until today. In addition, medieval states were not as keen to 
forbid usury as the Church was. This was partly because the economy in Western 
Europe was revived and accelerated from the twelfth century, and with increased 
consumer demands, trade was assisted by the growing supply of money. 249 In the 
fourteenth century in Florence, only rates of interest exceeding 20% were 
regarded as usurious, and 15–20% were in a ‘grey zone’.250  
 
For example, in England loan for profit was first prohibited by Edward the 
Confessor.251 Later, in the year 1126, usury was prohibited only to the clergy, who, 
in case they practised it, were to be degraded. In 1189 the interest rate was fixed at 
10% until the time of Henry VIII, in the year 1546, when the taking of interest on 
money was made legal in England, and the rate was fixed at 10%. 252 In the next 
few centuries, legal interest rates were adjusted several times, and the word ‘usury’ 
was no longer regarded as simply taking interest from loans, but referred to the 
rate higher than the legal limit allowed. 253  This re-acknowledgement of the 
interest rate should partly be attributed to the slow but tidy revival of commerce 
and other kinds of economic activity after the Dark Ages. 254 Loans for profit were 
finally not being considered as usury after long debates, which established the 
basis of the contemporary credit system or the base of the economic world today. 
Many modern countries reaccepted the Roman approach of capping the interest 
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rate. ‘Usury’ no longer refers to any increase in the principle, but a higher rate 
than allowed by the law. That was, to some extent at least, similar to what is 
regarded as loan interest today. 
 
Later in the UK, the attitude towards ‘usury’ was reflected in the theory of Jeremy 
Bentham,255 who defended the freedom of moneylending without legal limits and 
criticized anti-usurious laws, arguing that a usury cap was going to exclude people 
‘from being precluded altogether from getting the money they have occasion for’. 
256  This laissez-faire approach in moneylending was financially accepted by 
Parliament in 1854, when the Usury Act 1660 was repealed as corresponding to 
the market requirements. During the second reading process in Parliament it was 
argued that 
 
[p]eople could not be brought to believe that money was as much a 
commodity as any ordinary article of produce—that its value must be 
regulated, such as the value of any other commodity, by the ordinary 
principles of demand and supply—and that it was as impossible to fix 
the rate of interest at which it should be lent as to fix the price at 
which corn and butter should be sold… The usury laws, in fact, did no 
good whatever, but they produced great inconvenience; they affected 
to do what all the powers of the Legislature could not do—to apply a 
different principle to one description of commodity from that which 
was applied to every other—and they interfered with the principle of 
supply and demand.257  
 
Since then, the UK did not have a legal usury cap for moneylenders for a long 
time. Regulation of consumer credit focuses on other aspects such as information 
disclosure. In this sense, the concepts of ‘usury’ and ‘usurers’ also did not exist 
for a long period, as there was no legal limit on how much a lender could take 
from a customer. 258  However, the concept of ‘loan shark’ is used instead to 
describe those unlicensed lenders who charge very high rates. 259 The repealing of 
the law does not mean the disappearance of such lenders. Those lenders are illegal 
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due to lack of licences. Licensed lenders were regarded as ‘subprime lenders’, 
although they also lent money at high rates without legal limits until most recently. 
However, the FCA set up a new price cap for the payday lending industry in 
2014.260 To some extent, this is the modern version of the usury cap, as the rule is 
mandatory for all regulated firms.  
 
Financial regulators in the modern age are accustomed to using legal methods to 
regulate moneylenders. The outdated idea of ‘loan for profit is usury’ had become 
unfashionable and is no longer feasible in modern society. Yet this widely 
accepted conception has a long history. Behind it was a sophisticated system of 
theories and ideology, including natural law, divine law, scholastic analysis of 
usury, and economic and legal theory in early modern periods. All these factors 
define what one understands about credit and usury today from deep moral, legal 
and historical perspectives.  
 
1.8 Summary 
 
This chapter discussed the background to the thesis. When the use of basic 
financial services became increasingly significant in modern days, the inability to 
access to such services meant great inconvenience and possible detriment to 
sections of society. This is reflected in the use of payment accounts and consumer 
credit, where the majority of society does not find such services unfamiliar but 
some low-income people are still denied access to mainstream service providers. 
The concept of ‘financial exclusion’, which became frequently mentioned in 
recent years is used to describe a condition in which some people are unable to 
use a basic payment account or borrow money from commercial banks due to 
their own vulnerable status.  
 
Both internal and external reasons lead to financial exclusion. Although reasons 
for limited access to basic payment accounts and consumer credit are different, 
some of the reasons are common to both financial services. First, low-income 
level is found as strongly related to the condition, no matter whether it is in the 
UK or China. For the use of a basic payment account, this reason is more invisible 
and indirect. However, since many low-income people live in remote areas or 
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deprived communities, they may find no available bank branches within reachable 
distances. This factor is more direct in the consumer credit exclusion, as income 
level is a decisive factor that banks would consider before making any loan. 
Second, and closely related, since mainstream banks use the credit reference 
system to screen ‘valuable’ customers who have the capacity to repay, many 
potential borrowers are also limited by this procedure, no matter whether or not 
they have detrimental credit records or do not have any previous credit records. 
Although banks are doing everything reasonable to control the possibility of bad 
debt, the lack of appropriate small-amount loan products means there is no 
capacity to reduce creditworthiness assessment requirements, since the provision 
of small credit is less profitable for banks. At the macro level, the deregulation of 
the banking industry leads to competitive pressure, making banks pay more 
attention to investment products rather than ‘traditional’ banking services for 
ordinary people; the closure of bank branches echoes the deregulation, which 
further exacerbates the conditions of people living in remote or rural areas. 
Altogether, these completed but interrelated factors lead to financial exclusion. 
Both the UK and China have similar problems in this regard. 
 
To alleviate the exclusion, it is not surprising that governments try to use financial 
regulation to facilitate the provision of financial services and regulate improper 
business practices. This attitude is explicitly clarified in HM Treasury’s 2007 
report: ‘Everyone should be able to plan for the future with a reasonable degree of 
security. Therefore, affordable credit, saving accounts and simple insurance 
products should be available to all who need them.’261 Although regulations (and 
legislation) are not the catholicon for the issue, further social welfare is also 
needed to relieve the condition. Regulations could, however, at least not become a 
burden on banks and other lenders, while subprime markets shall, under proper 
conduct regulation, protect vulnerable customers’ interests. Some of the 
regulatory methods even have profound roots in history: the usury cap, for 
example was used in different jurisdictions throughout history. Although social 
and economic circumstances have changed substantially since ancient times, the 
historical perspective helps to shape what is thought today.  
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Finally, one thing that should be noted is that promoting financial inclusion does 
not equate to providing financial services to all people, regardless of their 
circumstances. It is, in fact, an issue of equal opportunities, which means people 
shall not be discriminated against simply because of their adverse economic 
conditions, but should be given a chance to choose appropriate products that fit in 
with their real need. This is the role of regulation that will be discussed later in 
this thesis, as well as whether current regulations have performed this role. 
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Chapter 2:  Banks, regulation and financial exclusion  
 
Introduction 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, access to payment services is regarded as a basic 
financial need that is essential in many aspects of daily life. No access to these 
services means inconvenience and additional costs. The provision of a payment 
account to customers is essential, since it is convenient to use.  
 
However, the situation is different in the case of consumer credit, which could 
also be supplied by the alternative subprime market. Payment services are usually 
exclusively provided by mainstream financial institutions, and mainly include, for 
example, commercial banks, building societies in the UK, RCCs in China and 
post offices. Although both countries have considerable coverage of account 
holdings, there are still some really practical issues related to vulnerable 
customers making use of the payment services of commercial bank. These issues 
include information asymmetry, improper eligibility criteria and service fees, as 
discussed in section 1.2, making it difficult for some customers to use the 
payment system.  
 
Whether current rules and regulatory standards in the UK and China could relieve 
the problem will be discussed in this chapter. First, whether commercial banks 
have some social duties to provide basic payment services to less-profitable 
customers is discussed, based on theoretical grounds. Second, regulatory rules in 
the UK and China are discussed respectively. Third, the content of the new EU 
Directive is also analysed. The final section is a summary of this chapter. 
 
2.1 Theoretical basis for banks’ duty to promote inclusion 
 
Before discussing regulatory standards for commercial banks to observe in the 
provision of payment services to vulnerable customers, it is essential to clarify 
first whether banks are obliged to comply with the duty to do so.  
 
From the point of being firms, commercial banks are profit-oriented and 
shareholder-responsible corporations. There is, in essence, no difference between 
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a bank that provides deposit, loan and investment products in the financial sector 
and a manufacturing company that sells cars or lawnmowers, as both are selling 
products to the general public and have to uphold certain quality and safety 
standards. Whether banks have the responsibility to serve certain banking services 
for the low-income, unbanked group of people is therefore disputable, so is the 
role of modern banks in social interests. 
 
However, the provision of payment services has special features that make it a 
‘social responsibility’, rather than a pure business activity. The banks’ role in 
modern society is also extended. There are several aspects at a theoretical level 
that support this basic recognition. 
 
2.1.1 Banks’ special status in the financial system 
 
From the perspective of banks’ role in the financial system and to society, there 
are different views on this basic question. Some argue that ‘financial institutions 
are not used to dealing with poverty’, and attribute this duty to state or non-profit 
institutions. 262  Others have argued for a long time that banks should also bear 
some responsibility to the general public,263 which idea was particularly accepted 
after the recent financial crisis had begun in the US mortgage subprime market.  
 
From this point of view, Cartwright makes an outstanding analysis. In 
Cartwright’s view, owing to banks’ central role in the financial system and their 
significance for financial stability, they receive government protection in case of 
liquidity. 264  Moreover, empiricism shows that insolvency of major financial 
institutions was usually the prelude of more serious market collapse and economic 
crisis, and the closure of one bank may consequently cause risks in the whole 
system.265 This is the saying; ‘too big to fail’; some of the largest banks are under 
potential guarantees of the government in case of any liquidity risk and the 
government has to save banks for the sake of system stability.266 To enjoy this 
privileged position, banks have to do something in return. Indeed, governments 
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have a duty to protect the market confidence of the public in the financial system, 
but this does not mean banks can take this special protection for granted. 
Cartwright argues that banks have to take social responsibilities, which is the quid 
pro quo (exchange) for this privileged status compared with ordinary companies 
who do not enjoy as much importance in markets and have to bear their own risk 
of bankruptcy.267  
 
In this sense, anticipating banks to provide basic services to society therefore 
would not violate the free-market theory; if banks are free from any regulatory 
duties, and are fully competing and operating on the basis of commercial interest, 
they should also bear the possible consequence of competition or business failure. 
With the guarantee and protection from government in case of systematic risk, it 
is hard to regard the financial market as totally ‘free’. In this sense, major banks 
have more social duties as they receive higher levels of protection during crises 
compared with smaller firms; this is evident from the recent financial crisis that 
originated in the United States (hereinafter ‘US’), during which many smaller 
banks were acquired or bankrupted,268 while what the government seeks to rescue 
are mainly larger financial institutions. There is an intangible contract between the 
government and banks from a more macro perspective, making it reasonable for 
governments to attribute some social duties to large commercial banks. 
 
2.1.2 Banks’ social duty as corporations  
 
In addition to banks’ special status in the financial system, debates were also 
concentrated on the scope of duties of banks as corporations.269 In the traditional 
free market theory represented by Friedman, what duty a company should bear is 
to increase its profits. 270  The corporation only needs to be responsible for its 
shareholders’ interests by paying dividends on time. In Friedman’s theory, only 
individuals have responsibility, not the firm; directors of a company are only 
responsible for their employers and meeting their desire to make profits. They 
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may not use shareholders’ money for ‘social’ purposes,271 which actually belongs 
to the agency problem as directors do not work to increase shareholders’ benefits, 
but reduce firm owner’s returns for their (the directors’) own sake of reputational 
or for political purposes.272  
 
However, criticism of this theory always exists, and especially so after the recent 
financial crisis when the duty of corporations came under renewed scrutiny. 
Except for making profits, the firm has other dimensions of duties to society. This 
is the theory of corporate social responsibility (hereinafter ‘CSR’), defined as 
‘actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm 
and that which is required by law’. 273  The corporate is expected not only to 
concern itself with shareholders’ profits, but also to take care of the stakeholders 
which include, for example, customers, employees, suppliers, community groups 
and governments.274 According to Donaldson and Preston, the stakeholders of a 
corporation are the following: 
 
(a) Stakeholders are persons or groups with legitimate interests in 
procedural and/or substantive aspects of corporate activity. 
Stakeholders are identified by their interests in the corporation, 
whether the corporation has any corresponding functional interest in 
them. (b) The interests of all stakeholders are of intrinsic value. That 
is, each group of stakeholders merits consideration for its own sake 
and not merely because of its ability to further the interests of some 
other group, such as the shareowners.275 
 
Based on this understanding, the assumption could be made that the provision of 
basic payment services to vulnerable customers belongs to the scope of ‘social 
good’, because it is concerned with life conveniences. These customers may not 
be able to bring direct profits to the bank in the future, but their interests should 
also be of concern because their vulnerable status is, to some extent, influenced by 
banks’ expanding business, since the increasingly wide use of bank accounts 
means more inconvenience to themselves if they are excluded. This recognition 
corresponds with the recognition of the UK’s major commercial banks and 
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banking association in their responses to the Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills’ (hereinafter ‘BIS’) inquiry into a bank branch in relation to people’s 
basic banking needs. It was acknowledged that banks should ‘reflect on their 
wider social responsibilities and provide vulnerable customers with access to 
banking services to ensure they are not financially excluded’.276  
 
In fact, CSR now, to some extent, goes beyond merely the theory. In the UK’s 
newly revised Companies Act 2006, the director of a company is required by 
section 172 to act in good faith and to promote the success of the company for the 
benefit of its members as a whole. The director must take the following factors 
into consideration: 
 
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, (b) the 
interests of the company’s employees, (c) the need to foster the 
company's business relationships with suppliers, customers and others, 
(d) the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the 
environment, (e) the desirability of the company maintaining a 
reputation for high standards of business conduct, and (f) the need to 
act fairly as between members of the company.277  
 
Since the directors are required to consider ‘the impact of the company’s 
operations on the community and the environment’, a commercial bank in this 
sense should take care of the community. Such approach was labelled in the White 
Paper on Modernising Company Law as ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value’, which 
asks (but does not force) directors to consider the relationship with other 
stakeholders.278 This requirement is definitely a sign of progress.  
 
However, as Cartwright points out, when bank directors’ judgement is in the 
banks’ interests, ‘it is unrealistic to expect it to be challenged’. 279 It is hard to 
blame banks for not offering some sort of services or products, because this is a 
commercial judgement. In Keay’s view, section 172 only has an educational 
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function and hardly gives any direction or guidance for directors to follow.280 
Keay views the amendment as ‘a general statement of principle hopefully 
encouraging directors to aim for the long-term success of the company and to 
demonstrate enlightenment’ and is sceptical about enforcement.281 Similarly, in 
China’s Company Law (2005), firms are also required to ‘comply with the laws 
and administrative regulations, social morality, and business morality. It shall act 
in good faith . . . and bear social responsibilities’. 282  There is also no further 
statement on how to enforce the CSR in this Chinese primary legislation.  
 
In this sense, although banks are expected to be socially responsible and are, to 
some extent, under government pressure, provision of basic banking services is 
still largely a CSR rather than a legal duty under the law. However, this means a 
‘responsible’ bank could be anticipated to bear some social duties. 
 
2.1.3 Essence of basic banking products: Service of general interest 
 
The third point is based on the essence of banking products and whether they 
belong to the scope of public utilities. In a general sense, public utilities refer to 
those services that provide everyday basic services to the public, and usually 
include services such as telecommunications, water, gas and electricity. Whether 
owned through state investment (as in the case in China) or privatisation (as in the 
UK), public utilities are under government regulations to ensure no one is 
discriminated against and the public can afford them. The UK’s Utilities Act 2000, 
for example, requires that ‘all reasonable demands in Great Britain for gas 
conveyed through pipes are met’.283 If some (not all) financial services could be 
regarded as essential, as are common public utilities such as gas and electricity, 
then it could be assumed that people should reasonably expect to have access 
without discrimination due to their low income or rural residency. However, 
whether the essence of banking services is comparable with that of public utilities 
needs further demonstration. 
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On this question, more detailed analysis can be found in the work of T. 
Wilhelmsson, who proves the necessity of banks’ duty to provide such services 
for general interests.284 In an important essay, he argues that for public services 
that were traditionally provided by the public, citizens in welfare states have 
grown to expect that these services would be offered by the public sector and have 
legitimate expectations of such services being offered, although the industry 
contracted these services out to private bodies during privatisation or 
marketization. 285  Owing to this anticipation, the price of services would be 
relatively fixed, companies must exercise their duties for the well-being of their 
customers, and it should be less possible for companies to quit the market only 
because of profit earnings. Those services, in Wilhelmsson’s essay, were referred 
to as ‘services of general interest’, which are very relevant to consumer’s basic 
life demands, and should therefore be viewed in Europe as social rights.286  
 
The basic features of such services, as Wilhelmsson quoted in his essay, are (i) the 
service fulfils a basic need of its users; (ii) there is often no reasonable alternative 
to the service; (iii) there are few producers of the service; (iv) the service is based 
on a long-standing relationship.287 Since these services are of public interest and 
expected by the public naturally, every citizen therefore has the right to receive 
the services on the same terms as others.288 The author hence argues that, though 
privatisation took place in the public utility sector, consumers could still expect 
the same standard of service not only because they grew up with the services in 
welfare state and have subjective expectations, but they may also objectively be 
unable to maintain their livelihood without reasonably priced services or 
products.289 Because of these reasons, Wilhelmsson concluded that there should 
be no discrimination towards consumers no matter what their economic status 
was; to put it simply, ‘the weak consumers should receive services equally as 
easily as those who are better off’.290  
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However, to what extent should banks also carry out this equality and non-
discrimination principle, and provide unprofitable facilities for the poor? Are 
financial services vital to maintaining life just like electricity, gas and heat? It may 
be possible that day-to-day banking services before the 1960s when the first credit 
card was used were not as essential as today and so they are not a ‘traditional’ 
need when compared to gas, water and electricity; in other words, they are not as 
vital as other public utilities at first glance. People could use cash transactions and 
would not face severe trouble, compared to their supply of electricity being cut 
off.  
 
Wilhelmsson accepts this difference between traditional public utilities and 
banking services, but also argues that the scope of ‘essential needs’ is not a fixed 
concept; instead, it varies from time to time, and is largely determined by social 
and technological innovation.291 Wilhelmsson summarizes two basic purposes of 
financial services, namely (i) payment and (ii) receipt of payments, and concludes 
that in the credit card industry the provision of means of payment is also essential 
for life.292  The significance of basic banking services arises in modern society 
since automatic transactions are more widely used. Without bank accounts money 
management would be ‘more complex, time-consuming, more costly and less 
secure’.293  
 
Four features of the social rights mentioned above can hence be applied to the 
financial sector. First, basic banking services fulfil everyday needs. Without a 
bank account people cannot use direct debits when paying their bills, but have to 
choose more expensive and time-consuming ways such as paying cash at a post 
office or bank branch, using pay-as you-go methods or buying savings stamps.294 
Second, the number of bank branches (suppliers) in an area is low and, third, 
people intend to have long-term relationships with their banks once they have 
opened accounts at a certain bank. Though people could use cash instead, this 
alternative method usually costs more than using payment services. With such 
features, basic bank services can be regarded as a sort of ‘public utility’ and are 
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essential for the citizens of modern society to keep a ‘decent life’.295 It was for 
these reasons and logic that Wilhelmsson believes financial services should also 
be treated in the same way as other life essentials; and the right of having basic 
banking services lies within the scope of social rights.296  
 
In addition to its life necessity feature, Wilhelmsson points out that customer’s 
legitimate expectation of a right to public utilities can also be extended to 
financial services, which were traditional privately run, because they may be 
unable to tell the difference between public utility companies and banks, and may 
expect the same standard of services from both kinds of enterprise.297 He gives 
several reasons why public utility companies and banks should provide services 
for the less privileged people from the point of view of CSR:  
 
[T]he enterprises and bodies that provide the types of services . . . are 
well suited to bearing certain social responsibilities. Because they are 
usually (at least partially) former public bodies, they still have a 
special standing with consumers, and consumers have legitimate 
expectations that they will carry a public responsibility. They are 
usually large and powerful corporations which have the ability both to 
carry the liability and to disperse their risks among a sufficiently 
broad collective of consumers.298  
 
This strong analysis clearly provides the reason why banks should bear this 
responsibility: not from the standpoint of corporate law, but from the real 
capability and social duties of banks, as well as from the reasonable expectations 
of customers.  
 
2.1.4 Difference between transaction banking services and credit 
 
From the above analysis, it could be concluded that payment services belong to a 
kind of ‘general interest’, and it is banks’ CSR to provide payment services to all 
possible customers in need without income or price discrimination. However, this 
recognition of payment service as a public utility cannot simply be extended to the 
provision of consumer credit. Indeed, in a consumer society in which borrowing is 
either inevitable or even encouraged, access to affordable credit shall be regarded 
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as normal, as the Lord Bishop of Durham observes, ‘one of the most significant 
aspects of modern life is that accessible finance and affordable credit have 
become as much a basic utility as many other areas that we considered to be 
utilities’.299 Government may advocate that commercial banks lend small-amount 
loans to low-income people as a response to financial exclusion, however, there 
are several central differences between the provision of payment services and 
consumer credit when examined from the essence of both.  
 
First, there is a difference between the provision of payment services and 
consumer credit. In general, account holders using payment services through a 
basic bank account will not expose banks to risks. Although banks may not be 
able to make profits from basic bank accounts, there is also no underlying risk that 
would directly reduce these firms’ interests. Financial exclusion in this regard has 
little connection with the potential risk and certain customers’ own economic 
status. The financial regulator could therefore anticipate banks to remove 
improper eligibility criteria of account-opening, reduce transaction fees for using 
banking services and properly disclose information to unbanked customers as a 
whole group, as this would not expose banks to risks. While, in contrast, 
repayment risk is closely related to the income level and credit records of every 
borrower. It is both impossible and improper for the regulator to require banks to 
reduce their assessment standards of consumer credit. Although repayment risk 
could be reduced by offering small-amount loans, banks usually lack incentives to 
do so because of high operational costs. The capacity and resources of banks are 
limited; it is hence ‘unrealistic and undesirable’ to require banks to offer all kinds 
of financial services to all customers, regardless of the customers’ economic 
status.300 
 
Second, although banks are anticipated to bear CSR to offer basic bank accounts 
to low-income customers, this duty could not be extended to the area of consumer 
credit. For commercial banks, CSR in the consumer credit sector means 
responsible lending, considering customers’ needs, and provide the ability to 
repay, so that customers are not trapped in financial difficulties. This would 
benefit both the bank from the repayment ability and the customers from 
unaffordable debts. Banks are required to sell appropriate products to appropriate 
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customers, 301  in other words, comply with responsible lending and selling 
standards, since some customers are simply ineligible for some high-risk services 
or products due to their income or financial literacy levels. Providing appropriate 
products for the poor, in this sense, includes offering basic financial services at 
reasonable prices and protecting consumers from over indebtedness, rather than 
offering consumer credit without case-by-case assessment. 
 
In addition, although potential borrowers could be regarded as a kind of 
stakeholder, there are, however, also different levels of stakeholders. The ‘primary’ 
stakeholders’ interests should have higher priority; in the context of commercial 
banks, it is the depositors’ deposit safety that should be considered in the first 
place. Deposit safety in this sense takes precedence over the aim of financial 
inclusion, since the latter may expose banks to bad debt risks. 
 
Third, different from payment services, consumer credit does not belong in the 
scope of public utility and ‘general interests’. The view that everyone should have 
access to public utility services, including the use of basic banking services, 
makes it worth noting that banking services are divided into different tiers: the use 
of bank accounts lies at the base and acts as a threshold for all other subsequent 
services, while the use of credit is higher up on the ladder and has more complex 
terms. According to Wilhelmsson’s definition, in order to be identified as ‘public 
utility’, the service has to satisfy several conditions. Unlike with payment account 
usage, consumer credit could hardly meet the features of public utilities. First, 
using credit is not a ‘life necessity’ as in the case of payment accounts, gas or 
water; many people could rely on their savings and do not need credit. Second, 
public utility providers are generally referred to as ‘companies that provide 
essential or important services to the public as monopolistic or near monopolistic 
providers’. 302  However, there are also plenty of alternatives available in the 
market; not only subprime lenders, but also affordable choices such as credit 
unions. Third, there are also no ‘legitimate public expectations’ in this case, as 
banks are not ‘public companies’ (not understood in a technical- legal sense) as are 
utility companies, and consumer credit is not offered as a basic life need as in the 
past. Consumer credit in this sense does not belong to the scope of public utility. 
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Although commercial banks are anticipated to offer easy, accessible payment 
services to release financial exclusion, which is the banks’ social responsibility 
and in the public’s general interest, this social duty can hardly be extended to 
consumer credit. 
 
2.2 Law, regulation and government perspectives of bank’s duty to 
promote financial inclusion 
 
From the analysis and literature review above, one may safely draw the 
conclusion that banks have a duty to offer basic banking services to less-
privileged people no matter whether they are a social responsibility, the 
corporations’ duty or in answer to customers’ reasonable expectation. Apart from 
theoretical reasons, governments would usually advocate or encourage banks to 
be involved in the financial inclusion progress, although banks may have different 
reactions towards their government’s proposals. 
 
In general, government’s willingness could be reflected by the financial 
regulatory objectives, which are usually set in the basic legislation or rules 
governing the financial sector. For example, the basic statute of banking 
supervision in China, the Banking Supervision Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (2006 Amendment), clearly states the statutory objective in its Article 1 as 
follows:  
 
The present Law is formulated to strengthen the supervision over the 
banking industry, regulate the activities of supervision, prevent and 
eliminate banking risks, protect the legitimate rights and interests of 
the depositors and other clients and promote the sound development of 
the banking industry.303 
 
The statute also sets the basic working principles of the banking regulator of 
China, the CBRC, as including the protection of deposits and consumers, 
maintaining market confidence, enhancing public financial education and 
reducing financial crimes. 304  Similarly in the UK, the basic legislation, the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (hereinafter ‘FSMA 2000’), sets its 
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regulatory objectives as maintaining market confidence, financial stability, 
protecting customers and reducing financial crime.305 Obviously, in China both 
the statute’s and the CBRC’s objective are in the same regulatory model as that of 
developed countries such as the UK.306 Up to now, none of the statutes has set up 
mandatory requirements for commercial banks to exercise a duty of financial 
inclusion. The legislator obviously shows a cautious attitude that is reasonable, 
because offering basic banking services does not fully fit in with banks’ 
commercial interest; after all, banks are corporations with normal commercial 
objectives. Theoretically, what is central in the authority’s mind is to keep 
financial stability, maintain market confidence and promote competition; it is not 
the mainstream approach for banking law to have ‘financial inclusion’ in its 
statute or regulatory objective. 
 
In fact, Cartwright poses the question whether it is desirable for banks to be under 
an obligation to provide appropriate services to all consumers. 307 Although ‘the 
access to financial services’ was argued to be inserted into the broad consumer 
protection objectives of the FSMA 2000 at the time of law making, it was finally 
decided that such objective would put too much pressure on the financial regulator 
beyond what the FSMA 2000 already empowered it. 308  Gong and Zhou also 
mention China’s reluctant attitude towards setting up regulatory objectives to 
reduce the problem of financial exclusion, explaining that ‘financial inclusion is 
regarded as the responsibility of the government rather than that of the banking 
regulator’.309  
 
Indeed, financial exclusion is too complex to be solved in one section, one chapter 
or one single statute; it involves issues from all aspects of governmental efforts, 
including social welfare, which goes beyond the scope of financial legislation. 
However, it is important to note that the gap in legislation does not mean neglect 
of the issue. As the reaction speed of the law-making progress is usually slower 
than the implementation of regulatory measures due to more complex legislative 
processes, it is worth noting this developing process when the regime is in 
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progress, especially when regulatory change has already taken place at the EU 
level towards access to banking services, which could possibly have influences in 
the UK if the direction is implemented domestically.310 In addition, the prudential 
attitude of legislation leaves space for the financial regulator to promote financial 
inclusion through specific regulatory methods.  
 
In the UK, the use of basic bank accounts has been regarded as one of the primary 
ways to reduce exclusion in the area of banking service since the 1990s. A basic 
bank account in the UK provides essential features as current accounts do, but 
does not have an overdraft facility and chequebook in order to minimise 
unexpected charges for being overdrawn. These basic bank accounts were 
designed for low-income customers, and the UK government highlighted their 
importance311 and the ‘shared goal’ was set up with the industry in 2004 with the 
aim of halving the unbanked people in the country.312 According to the report of 
the Financial Inclusion Taskforce (hereinafter ‘FIT’) this goal was met in 2009.313 
All major high street banks are now offering basic bank accounts to people who 
have financial difficulties. 314  The DWP Credit Union Expansion Project 
Feasibility Report published in 2012 recognises the achievements banks have 
made, referring to the nearly 4 million new basic accounts opened by banks and 
building societies in a decade.315 However, the DWP report also points out that, 
without mandatory or compulsory measures, the coverage of account-holding is 
unlikely to expand continually;316  for example, since basic bank accounts can 
hardly bring banks profit, banks are criticized for not recommending this product 
to customers. 
 
To further promote the progress made, the UK Treasury came to an agreement 
with several major banks on the issue of basic bank account holding in December 
2014.317  This is, to some extent, in response to the EU Directive on payment 
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accounts, which was approved in the same year, although the UK Parliament had 
not approved the implementation of the directive domestically until now. The 
agreement, however, recognizes future influences of the directive in the UK 
market. Although the agreement is only between the government and selected 
banks, and is not a mandatory regulation to the industry, banks signed the 
agreement taking a majority market share in the UK’s basic banking sector.318 
Therefore, the industry is de facto coordinating the provision of basic banking 
services with the government’s proposal before it becomes a mandatory duty.  
 
Similar progress can also be found in China, where the central bank, the PBoC, 
started prompting major commercial banks to provide ‘migrant workers’ bank 
card services’ to ease their problem of access to money withdrawal services if 
they had a bank account at or near their workplace but wished to withdraw money 
in their hometown.319 Features of this bank card include the maximum withdrawal 
amount of 5,000 yuan per day, and the fee charged for money withdrawal being 
reduced from 1% of the withdrawal amount to 0.8%.320 Furthermore, the PBoC 
requires that commercial banks provide appropriate customers with migrant 
worker bank card services and, according to the PBoC’s report, all card issuers in 
China have currently started offering this card product.321  
 
In the basic banking services sector, commercial banks usually prefer to do what 
the authority wishes or requires them to do since there is little risk involved. 
However, owing to the potential repayment risks, consumer credit usually does 
not belong in this scope. When the government wishes to reduce low-income 
people’s difficulty in accessing mainstream credit, banks are usually more 
reluctant to respond to the government in this regard.  
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This is more evident in China where major large banks are actually in tight 
relationships with the government. In order to relieve the poverty distress of low-
income people, the Chinese government has taken a series of measures to 
facilitate access to financial services and tries to include commercial banks into 
the inclusion attempt. Although commercial banks in China are now joint-stock 
companies and enjoy their business autonomy in many aspects, it should be 
emphasized that the controlling shareholders of the ‘big four’ are still the state, 
specifically, the Minister of Finance and state-owned investment enterprises. 
Moreover, the influence of government is also reflected in the nomination of 
senior officers of mega-banks by the governing party. It is therefore hard to 
estimate the extent of government influence over commercial banks.322  
 
This leads to a special condition, namely when the government wants to ‘include’ 
more low-income residents into the mainstream financial system, the banking 
regulator, the CBRC, would then give details to commercial banks and other 
financial institutions on how to put the government’s intention into practice. 
Ideally, commercial banks would therefore respond to the CBRC and provide 
special products and services to certain groups of vulnerable residents. The role of 
government, the regulator and commercial banks therefore forms a chain, with 
blurred lines between government’s administrative power, the banking regulator’s 
duty and commercial banks’ position. The CBRC’s measures mainly focus on 
rewarding commercial banks for providing services to low-income people. 
However, the CBRC measures are usually voluntary suggestions rather than 
compulsory requirements for commercial banks to abide by. Although anticipated 
to be involved, commercial banks are found still lacking enough incentive to 
provide such products or services to low-income people or in remote areas.  
 
For example, in a 2007 Guiding Opinion, 323  the CBRC provides commercial 
banks with opinions on how to develop small- loan products for rural residents, in 
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order to encourage banks to expand such services, and the CBRC promises that it 
would give priority to commercial banks who wish to open new branches and get 
licences for new products on the basis of their performance. A 2012 CBRC Notice 
again encourages commercial banks to open more branches in remote and poor 
areas, set up village and township banks (hereinafter ‘VTBs’) with the reward of 
permission to open new branches in urban areas.324 Although the CBRC does not 
have ‘financial inclusion’ in its regulatory objectives, apparently it has taken some 
inclusive-oriented measures aimed at facilitating rural residents’ access to 
financial services.325 
 
However, as to the real effect, research shows that large banks are less energetic 
in setting up VTBs. A report of Deloitte China on VTBs notes that medium and 
small financial institutions are more positive in setting up VTBs, while large 
banks and joint-stock commercial banks are less involved in this process.326 
Considering the market share of large banks and joint-stock commercial banks in 
China, it is obvious that they do not have enough incentive to further develop the 
less profitable rural market than their small-size counterparts.327  
 
Another example is more straightforward. Encouraged by CBRC and PBoC, 
commercial banks are involved in providing services to rural residents and 
enterprises. Data on ‘rural loans’ are listed in the annual report of several mega-
banks; these loans are inclusive-oriented loans specially offered to the rural 
market. However, it mainly flows to rural small and medium enterprises, and 
infrastructure construction rather than direct lending to rural residents. 328 
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Although in close relationship with the government, large and medium 
commercial banks in China may still lack inherent incentives to offer small loans 
for low-income rural residents, which is both less profitable and highly risky 
because of their unstable income and lack of collateral. Commercial banks in 
China are involved in rural loan projects because the government and CBRC 
expect them to do so, or from the consideration of taking social responsibility to 
earn a good reputation. Without enough incentive or rewards, it is less possible for 
commercial banks to provide residents who live in remote or poor areas with 
unprofitable services in the long run. 
 
The relationship between banks and the financial regulator in the UK is not as 
tight as in the case of China, since the latter used to have state-owned commercial 
banks that still hold state investments and have invisible (or visible) 
administrative relationships in the context of officer nomination. However, 
commercial banks in the UK are also reluctant to fill the gap between mainstream 
banking and the low-end market.329 The small-amount loans, high transaction fees 
and the relatively higher default risks make small-amount and short-term 
consumer credit expensive for banks. To serve this market, banks have either to 
raise interest rates or bear the loss. None of these results is satisfactory, as raising 
interest rates may cause moral criticism and be labelled ‘modern usurer’.330 In this 
situation, Cartwright suggests that ‘it appears unlikely that pressing mainstream 
lenders to provider credit to less affluent consumers will be a viable solution 
without some degree of compulsion.’331 Without enough incentives set out in the 
regulatory rules, it is hardly possible that commercial banks would likely 
participate in this unprofitable market. 
 
On this issue, an example from the US could be cited here as a simple reference. 
The Community Reinvestment Act (hereinafter ‘CRA’) passed in 1977 intends to 
promote depository institutions to ‘help meet the credit needs of the local 
communities in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound 
operation of such institutions’.332 The Act highlights the credit needs of low- and 
moderate income communities, 333  and a regulatory regime is set up to assess 
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institutions’ record of meeting such needs, which were ‘traditionally underserved 
by lending institutions’.334 Four grades – from ‘outstanding’, ‘satisfactory’, ‘needs 
to improve’ to ‘substantial non-compliance’ – will be made after each assessment, 
and if the federal agency regards an institution as not serving the low- and 
moderate income community, measures can be taken, including delaying or 
denying an institution’s request to merge, open new branches of expand 
services. 335  Large, medium- and small-sized lending institutions are under 
different levels of examination, depending on the size of their assets.336 The often-
cited underlying philosophy of the CRA, according to many researchers, is the 
‘quid pro quo rationale’ (doing something for something);337 banks need to serve 
the local community in return for the government’s protection, including deposit 
insurance. As reflected in the CRA, this means that although banks are privately 
capitalized, they are under the obligation to serve the credit needs of local 
communities.338 Furthermore, the Act treats the rigorous levels of tests of large, 
medium and small banks differently based on their asset size. If the test result is 
unsatisfactory, the regulatory agency could delay or refuse the merger, branch 
opening or service expansion requests of that bank. This gives the regulator more 
regulatory power than simply promising future rewards for banks who participate 
in the process. 
 
However, despite the good intention of serving low-income communities, the Act 
has been widely criticised since it was passed. Although it provides a rating 
system that assesses commercial banks’ performance, it is criticized for not 
providing banks with enough incentives, which is merely the result of an 
examination, since an unmet rating result could lead to the turning down of a 
merger request. However, the benefit for banks of being rated as ‘satisfactory’ is 
difficult to quantify and therefore the rating system is criticized for lacking 
effective rewards.339 For example, Quercia and others point out that ‘it is hard to 
gauge the marginal value of obtaining an Outstanding grade rather than a 
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Satisfactory’,340 therefore, banks may stop at a ‘satisfactory’ result and abide by 
other regulatory standards. Moreover, since the main force of the Act is to control 
merger requests, as the financial services industry is increasingly being 
consolidated, the real effect of this enforcement tool is said to be ‘dwindling’.341 
Some therefore argue that ‘banks that achieve an Outstanding rating could be 
allowed some sort of financial (perhaps lower deposit insurance premiums) or 
regulatory relief (eg, more time between examinations, a safe harbour when 
applying for new powers)’ 342  as additional regulatory rewards in order to 
stimulate further incentives. 
 
From the bank’s perspective, offering low-income customers access to credit is 
not their main task. Not only because they are profit-oriented companies, but also 
because of the risk management standard with which they must comply, which 
means banks should not lend to people who are assessed as a high repayment risk 
in terms of creditworthiness. This is a requirement of responsible lending which 
protects both the customer and the bank, as responsible lending could prevent 
customers suffering from over-commitment or unaffordable debts. Banks 
therefore consider the financial exclusion problem from another perspective, as 
Barclays’s Corporate Responsibility Report 2005 mentions, for example, 
 
A high street bank like Barclays is not always the most appropriate 
organisation for some types of loans. For example, high volumes of 
very low value loans, particularly for those with limited credit 
histories, do not fit easily into our business.343 
 
What Barclays recommends to solve the access problem is to allow banks 
financing community finance organisations to include credit unions, rather than 
directly taking the duty of offering small credit upon themselves. In the UK, credit 
unions are actually viewed as an alternative way of promoting financial inclusion, 
as Ramsay concludes,  
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Banks, notwithstanding their public relations efforts, are not strongly 
committed to cultivating lower income clients or branches which 
serve lower income areas which do not generate sufficient profits in 
this age of shareholder-driven capitalism. The existence of the 
alternative sector may be partly a consequence of the practices of 
mainstream financial institutions.344 
 
However, whether banks could have enough incentive to finance small 
community financial institutions is also questionable. In China, for example, 
major banks show little interest in investing in setting up VTBs.345  
 
However, the boundaries of legislation shall not encroach too much on banks’ 
commercial activity. Using the regulatory regime to encourage commercial banks 
to meet the credit needs of low-income communities shall be cautious. Without 
existing regulatory instruments, simply introducing foreign statutes into the 
domestic legal or regulatory system could hardly be effective. Before any 
legislation such as the CRA is introduced, regulators usually choose to use 
specific techniques to promote financial inclusion from different angles, for 
example, by encouraging the setting up of alternative lenders and regulating the 
subprime lending sector. This will form the main contents of the next chapters of 
this thesis and will be discussed later. 
 
2.3 Regulatory techniques to promote banking services inclusion 
 
As discussed in section 2.1, commercial banks are usually anticipated by the 
government to provide easy access to basic transaction services for low-income 
customers as a duty to society. Although in both the UK and China the coverage 
of bank accounts and cards involves the majority of residents, whether current 
regulations would benefit or become barriers to unbanked customers obtaining 
access shall be overviewed. This section discusses three main aspects that are 
regarded as essential for low-income customers to get access to banking services.  
 
2.3.1 Information disclosure 
 
In order to facilitate the use of transaction banking services among vulnerable 
people, the first issue is to increase people’s knowledge about them. For 
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customers who suffer from financial illiteracy, the lack of information on basic 
accounts and other transaction banking services or misunderstanding of the 
eligible criteria of account-opening could leave them remaining unbanked because 
of self-exclusion. 346  Knowing the available access to bank accounts is also 
actually the start of using further transaction services. Furthermore, fee charges 
shall also be disclosed to avoid possible misunderstanding of the cost of using 
banking services. 
 
2.3.1.1 The United Kingdom 
 
Designed for low-income customers, basic bank accounts in the UK are 
specifically suited to the targeted customer groups’ needs. These bank accounts 
provide basic features such as that of current accounts but do not have an 
overdraft facility to avoid possible overdraft charges.  
 
From the supply side, however, banks are sometimes criticized for their reluctance 
to recommend basic banking services to their customers because of the little 
added value.347 There are also de facto examples of this criticism. The Financial 
Services Consumer Panel’s basic banking research conducted in 2002 tested the 
availability of opening basic accounts for low-income people, by choosing several 
bank branches as samples. They found that only one bank out of ten referred 
information about basic accounts to customers when customers expressed concern 
about debt or being overdrawn to the bank. 348 Although the industry questioned 
the accuracy of this research,349 this investigation could reflect at least part of the 
problem. The most extreme case here is the case of a customer who has never 
been informed of basic bank accounts and remained unbanked; and if customers 
are unaware of the possible charges of accounts, they may suffer losses due to the 
lack of information during account-holding. 
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i Duty of recommendation 
 
Indeed, banks would provide the necessary information if customers demanded it. 
However, this means transferring the responsibility of acquiring information to 
the customer. This is less effective because customers are less familiar with 
financial knowledge and possible existing products. Disclosure of information to 
them is therefore essential to help customers make informed choices. In this case 
it means banks should recommend basic bank accounts to appropriate customers. 
 
There is currently no mandatory requirement in legislation on this issue. However, 
with regard to the aspect of general information disclosure, the customer 
protection objective of the FSMA 2000 requires the authority to consider it, as set 
out as follows in section 5(2)(C):  
 
(1) The protection of consumers’ objective is: securing the appropriate 
degree of protection for consumers. (2) In considering what degree of 
protection may be appropriate, the Authority must have regard to  . . . 
(c) the needs that consumers may have for advice and accurate 
information.350  
 
This is the general requirement for the authority in the statute, which empowers 
the FCA to decide the appropriate degree of mandatory disclosure. If some 
consumer protection standards are set down by the regulator, this means the 
regulator deems it as ‘appropriate’ at this stage.  
 
Since there is no specifically designed regime for the problem of financial 
exclusion in the FSMA 2000, it is reasonable to seek further details in regulation 
and rules.  
 
According to the FSMA 2000, the authority is entitled to issue a code of practice 
to determine whether an approved person’s conduct complied with the statement 
of principle,351 in this circumstance, the up-to-date code of practice is the BCOBS.  
 
In section 4.1.4 of the handbook, in order to meet the requirement of information 
rule, banks are required to provide information on ‘(9) basic bank account but 
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only if the firm offers a basic bank account and the banking customer meets the 
firm’s eligibility criteria for such an account’. This provision underpins the duty 
banks shall have to provide information on basic accounts. The eligibility criterion 
here refers to those most basic requirements that opening an account will need.  
 
However, the BCOBS does not provide detailed rules. It does not explain what the 
‘eligible’ criterion is; this is left to the commercial judgement of banks to give 
them enough space to make decisions. Furthermore, under what conditions will 
bank staff considering the customer as possibly ‘eligible’ for the account with a 
basic feature and provide information to that customer? This is still a problem that 
some customers may be unable to ask for information that they would actually 
want. 352 As regards information not being provided, the BCOBS does not answer 
this question, since this is too detailed to be fixed in a regulatory handbook. How 
to judge an ‘eligible condition’ is illustrated in the self-regulatory Industry 
Guidance which gives examples for member banks on how to put the BCOBS into 
practice.353  
 
The Industry Guidance was issued by the self-regulatory body, the British 
Banker’s Association (hereinafter ‘BBA’), together with the other two industry 
associations, (i) the Building Societies Association and (ii) the Payment Council 
in 2011. It is non-mandatory and only sets up minimum standards for their 
members to follow voluntarily. As the guidance points out in its introduction, ‘this 
Guidance only applies where BCOBS applies’ .354 Being issued by the industry 
association and confirmed by the regulator, the Industry Guidance provides firms 
with examples on how to comply with the regulatory standard in the handbook.  
 
To help customers make informed choices, the guidance first generally requires 
banks to behave in a ‘fair, clear [manner] and not [be] misleading’ when they 
promote their products or communicate with customers. 355  To achieve this 
standard, it is suggested that banks present information in an ‘understandable’ 
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manner for the average customer; at the same time, the bank shall take special 
care of vulnerable consumers.356  
 
For conditions to be positive to recommend products to customers, section 4 of 
the Industry Guidance suggests to banks that they can (not ‘must’, since this 
would depend on every different case) do the following: 
 
If a customer wants to know about current account options and the 
firm assesses that a basic account is likely to be appropriate, then the 
firm should inform the customer that it offers a basic account and how 
it can be opened. Customers for whom a basic account might be 
appropriate include those:   
 Who express an interest in opening a money transmission 
(current) account which does not allow them to go overdrawn;  
 Whose main source of income appears to be state benefit; 
 Who are content to accept the limited money transmission 
functionality of a basic account (eg, no cheque book).357  
 
This provision is a good example of what the appropriate way is to protect the 
consumer in this case. It could also underpin the BCOBS’s information 
requirement.  
 
It is important to note that the confirmed Industry Guidance is non-mandatory. Its 
legal status is to illustrate the requirements of the BCOBS and the Principles for 
Businesses with examples of minimum standards. 358 Based on good faith and the 
regulatory aims of customer protection, banks can make their own judgements on 
every different case, with reference to the examples given in the Industry 
Guidance. When customers are eligible, the BCOBS requires that they be 
provided with information on basic accounts.  
 
ii Contents of information disclosure 
 
According to the BCOBS, information that shall be disclosed to customers about 
bank accounts mainly include (i) similar products provided by the firm, (i) terms 
and conditions of the product, (iii) rates of deposits, (iv) charges for banking 
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services, (v) right to cancel the contract, and (vi) how to make a complaint.359 
This is aimed at relieving the problem of information asymmetry in the financial 
market to assist customers with making informed choices or avoiding unnecessary 
costs; for example, banks need to disclose possible charges for using basic bank 
accounts, since it is not totally free of charge but customers may have the wrong 
impression in this regard. A charge would usually be incurred, for example, if the 
bank has to refuse a direct debit due to insufficient funds in the account.360  
 
Since the BCOBS is mandatory for commercial banks, it provides minimum 
protection of customer’s interests. As to the effectiveness of the regime, however, 
whether customers could be properly protected is still dependent on the level of 
regulatory power. Theoretically, breach of the handbook will empower customers 
to sue their banks for unfair treatment, which is, however, hardly practical due to 
the cost of a lawsuit for ordinary customers. 361  For example, when customers 
argue they are not informed of the true charge of using bank accounts because the 
contract does not clearly state it and bank staff did not clearly explain the charges, 
their first remedy is to solve the issue with the bank, then report it to the Financial 
Ombudsman Service (hereinafter FOS) or instigate a lawsuit if the result is 
unsatisfactory. However, considering the vulnerable status of low-income 
customers, the level of customer protection largely relies on the regulator’s effort 
to set up appropriate conduct of business regulations. 
 
On this issue, the BCOBS refers to the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1999 (hereinafter ‘UTCCR’). 362  According to the UTCCR, the 
language used in written contracts shall be plain and intelligible to avoid customer 
misunderstandings.363 The Director General of the Office of Fair Trading would 
have the power to assess whether or not the contract terms are unfair. If the terms 
are regarded as unfair, then they will not be binding on the customer. OFT has 
been replaced with the FCA and Competition and Markets Authority (hereinafter 
‘CMA’), and the duty of assessing unfair financial contracts is now that of the 
FCA. 
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However, the FCA as the conduct regulator does not intervene in individual 
conflicts between single customers and firms; it only challenges unfair terms if 
many customers are affected or the potential risk or harm to customers is 
considerable. Customers are still anticipated to lodge complaints with FOS on 
their individual disputes with firms. Furthermore, according to the UTCCR, if the 
contract language is regarded as ‘plain intelligence’, then the unfairness test 
would not be applied to the ‘definition of the main subject matter of the contract’  
or the ‘adequacy of the price’, which de facto assumes that ordinary customers 
would read and understand the risk of the core content of the contract and the 
product price, given that the contract terms have listed enough information in 
plain and intelligible language. However, as Chen-Wishart criticizes, ‘consumer 
protection law should take cognisance of the fact that rational consumers do not 
read lengthy and complicated standard form contracts for the goods or services 
they need, whether or not in plain intelligible language.’364 Even if a contract has 
made a disclosure, ordinary customers may still be unable to figure out the risk. In 
a UK supreme court case, the Supreme Court decided that all price terms were 
covered by the exclusion term of the UTCCR, which therefore means the price 
term will not be assessed as being ‘unfair’ under the rule.365  This approach is 
criticized for being an ‘anti-consumer decision’ because it actually means that if 
the contract term about the price discloses all useful information in 
understandable language, it will be regarded as fair, whether or not the customer 
really understands it, therefore high charges are still possible under the UTTTR, 
unless there is a charge cap in other rules.366 
 
iii Appropriate form of information: time, medium and language 
 
In addition to the content of information, there are also requirements on the form 
of information, which also forms part of the appropriate standard for disclosure. 
According to BCOBS, banks’ duties include the following: 
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[P]rovide or make available to a banking customer appropriate 
information about a retail banking service and any deposit made in 
relation to that retail banking service: (1) in good time; (2) in an 
appropriate medium; and (3) in easily understandable language and in 
a clear and comprehensible form; so that the banking customer can 
make decisions on an informed basis.367  
 
Further details are left to the Industry Guidance. For example, the appropriate 
time includes both an ex ante and ex post contractual time,368 which means the 
bank has a duty to give useful information to customers before they are bound by 
the terms, as well as after the contract has already been established. In basic bank 
account cases, this means that banks have to give such information to customers.  
 
For the use of understandable language, in the High Level Standard Handbook of 
FCA and the Prudential Regulation Authority (hereinafter ‘PRA’), several 
principles are set up for all firms under the regulatory system which need to be 
obeyed. According to Principle 7 (Communications with Clients), banks must 
communicate information to their clients in a way that is clear, fair and not 
misleading. 369  To illustrate this requirement from the regulator, the Industry 
Guidance suggests that ‘information should be in plain language and avoid the use 
of technical or legal terms’, which may cause difficulties for common people to 
understand.370 The UTCCR also requires that language used in contracts be ‘plain 
and intelligible’ to protect customers against unfair treatment by banks. 
Furthermore, if the meaning of contract terms is in doubt, then they shall be 
explained in favour of the customer.371 
 
For the medium of information, the Industry Guidance lists several channels to 
make information available, including in branch, and by post, electronic mail, 
Internet, telephone or text message.372 It also requires that the medium should be 
durable. This means customers should be able to look them up multiple times.  
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A leaflet published by the FSA to inform customers about basic bank accounts 
contains the basic features and application notices of basic bank accounts, gives 
explanations and provides advice for customers.373 The FSA distributed copies of 
the leaflet to a wide range of organisations to promote public understanding of the 
financial system. In 2006 the Personal Finance Research Centre evaluated the 
effect of the leaflet,374 and concluded that the leaflet was successful in providing 
information for customers to help themselves in making informed decisions and 
comparisons between appropriate service providers. The table listing basic bank 
accounts available in major banks is praised in particular375 and also welcomed by 
the interviewed customers. This leaflet is a good example of the medium of 
information, it uses understandable language, which ‘alerted people to the 
existence of the accounts, (and) . . . enabled them to work out which account best 
suited their requirements.’376 It contains all the significant information but without 
information overload, since too much information could also be a problem for 
people who are financially illiterate. 
 
2.3.1.2  China 
 
Rules about information disclosure of bank accounts and cards in China mainly 
focus on the content of information that shall be disclosed. Basically, there are 
two main regulations about bank accounts or bank cards in China. The first is the 
PBoC’s Measures for the Administration of RMB Bank Settlement Accounts 
(2003) which, however, has no requirements about the conduct of business 
requirements on information disclosure. The second regulation is the PBoC’s 
Measures for the Administration of Bank Card Business (1999). Since in China a 
bank card would only be issued to customers after an account has been opened, 
this regulation could be regarded as the rule of regulating commercial banks’ 
regulated activities in the sector of account and card services.  
 
In chapter 7 of this 1999 measure, commercial banks are obliged to offer 
information to bank card applicants, include bank card use rules, information on 
how to use the card and charging policies. Complaint procedures and complaint 
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hotlines should also be open to all customers, and customers should be provided 
with bank statements.377 Card holders and applicants are entitled to the right to 
know the function and charge of the card.378 Although the measures of the PBoC 
or CBRC are not statutory, in China’s legal system these measures are included in 
‘rules’ that are also mandatory and enforceable.379 Banks must comply with these 
rules and therefore customer’s right to know could be protected at a minimum 
level, if the rules are carried out properly.  
 
However, there is no requirement about the plain language used in explaining 
terms and conditions in these regulations. Simply disclosing selected information 
would not fully fulfil the aim of reducing information asymmetry; it relies on 
whether customers could understand the contract terms. However, regulation is 
not a free good and cannot be pursued without limit, and banks are limited in their 
capacity to communicate with every customer to ensure he or she has understood 
all the contract terms and risk, even if the contract is in plain language. 
Nevertheless, since there is no overdraft function attached to the common bank 
account, risks underlying this kind of financial product is also lower than others.  
 
In addition, it appears that China pays less attention to using regulatory rules to 
facilitate commercial banks to market their available accounts than the UK does. 
Not only because of the close relationship between the government and 
commercial banks, which makes the promotion of bank card usage a kind of 
official or political task to which commercial banks must usually respond,380 but 
also because ‘migrant workers’ bank card’ still belongs to personal current 
account services, and in China there is no distinction between ‘current account’ 
and ‘basic bank account’ based on the overdraft feature as in the UK, there is also 
no risks of becoming overdrawn for the account holders. Without the need for a 
creditworthiness check in an application for an overdraft, commercial banks in 
China usually need not specially market their bank account to low-income 
customers because it is natural for customers who wish to open an account for 
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deposit and remittance to be offered the appropriate account, if they meet the 
bank’s requirements for eligibility. Therefore, the issue of customers’ risk is less 
problematic in China than in the UK, which could possibly explain why in China 
financial regulations about the duty of commercial banks to recommend their 
account products to potential customers is almost inconsequential.  
 
However, the boundary of information disclosure also exists in China, although 
there is still no reported dispute between bank account customers and commercial 
banks on the information issue, judicial cases about investment products hold the 
view that if the language used in contracts is plain and understandable, and all 
possible risk is disclosed before customers sign a contract, then local courts would 
not support the customers’ argument that they had not been properly informed 
about the potential risks of the investment products.381 It is possible that courts in 
China would usually hold a prudential attitude on how far banks’ duty of 
information disclosure should go, and ordinary customers are regarded as also 
having a duty to pay proper attention, and understand the contract terms and risks. 
 
2.3.2 Account-opening eligibility criteria 
 
The second regulatory technique of promoting financial inclusion that could be 
taken by regulators is to set the primary eligibility criteria of account opening. 
Nevertheless, whether or not certain customer’s account-opening application 
should be approved remain at the banks’ own commercial discretion. Although 
banks indeed have a social duty to provide basic banking services to the general 
public, this does not mean it shall be unconditionally provided to all. For 
commercial banks, using their eligibility criteria is generally to fulfil the identity 
check needed in order to comply with other legal purposes, such as anti-terrorism 
activities or money laundering. However, economic conditions shall not become 
the barrier to customers’ access to banking services. 
 
2.3.2.1 The United Kingdom 
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The BCOBS does not set up mandatory requirements for eligibility criteria for 
banks to abide by. However, as to which kind of criteria is appropriate, the BBA 
requires banks to comply with the Handbook of Senior Management 
Arrangements, Systems and Controls (hereinafter ‘SYSC’) for anti-money-
laundering purposes. SYSC requires banks to take ‘appropriate measures’ when 
taking new customers on board but, at the same time, the handbook also stresses 
the measures taken by banks shall ‘not unreasonably deny access to its services to 
potential customers who cannot reasonably be expected to produce detailed 
evidence of identity’. 382  This is the regulatory source of banks’ duty to 
mandatorily check customer’s identity (hereinafter ‘ID’).  
 
As to the question of which sort of ID is acceptable, since ID requirements are 
designed to identify who the customer is, various kinds of ID shall be accepted 
other than passports, driver’s licences and statement of billing. This is meaningful 
for some vulnerable residents who may not have valid proof of address who wish 
to open a basic bank account. Based on this understanding, BBA’s Industry 
Guidance requires that member banks publish a ‘non-exhaustive’ list of identity 
documents they would accept. Banks could then use their own eligibility criteria 
for opening bank accounts and, once the criteria are met, BBA’s Industry 
Guidance requires banks to allow the customer to open an account. 383  It is 
important to note that for customers who cannot present a common ID such as a 
passport, driver’s licence or statements of billing, there is no legal duty on banks 
to take on this new customer.384  
 
Apart from the ID requirements, the FSA’s leaflet also shows that a history of 
fraud, undischarged bankruptcy or record of bad debts may cause the application 
to be declined.385 Banks may check the applicant’s credit report to decide whether 
or not the account should be opened, for example, HSBC has set up its ‘eligibility 
requirements’ for basic account applications as follows: the customer has to be 16 
years or over, would prefer to undertake a credit scoring search, have 
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identification and proof of address, and a UK correspondence address to open an 
account.386  For vulnerable customers with a low income, this might become a 
barrier for them to access banking services, as customers may not want their credit 
records be further damaged by unsuccessful account applications. Both the FCA 
and the Industry Guidance currently only require banks to explain the main reason 
why if asked by the customer to do so, unless there is suspicion of fraud or money 
laundering.387  
 
An important change to be noted, however, is the recent agreement signed 
between the UK government and several major banks. According to the 
agreement, customer’s economic difficulty will not be used by banks as a reason 
to reject account-opening applications. Unless there are reasonable reasons, banks 
that make commitments in the agreement shall provide basic bank accounts to 
eligible customers. 388  Those reasonable reasons to reject only include the 
suspicion of unlawful use of the account, customers who display a ‘threatening, 
abusive or violent manner towards bank staff’, have no valid ID or do not 
authorize banks to check their credit record. 389  The last reason is of most 
significance, because it only sets the criterion as ‘do not give banks authorization’, 
rather than ‘the result of credit record check meets with bank ’s anticipation’. 
Specifically, the agreement stresses that customers, whether banked or unbanked, 
who need a new account or wish to switch providers but are ineligible for a ‘full-
service account’, shall be offered opening or switching to a basic account.390 
Furthermore, people with undischarged bankruptcy will also be eligible to open 
accounts. 391  Although the real effect of this agreement is still to be seen, this 
regulatory technique is real progress in reducing the unbanked problem and 
promoting financial inclusion.  
 
2.3.2.2 China 
 
Generally, the eligibility criteria for opening accounts with Chinese banks are 
similar to international common practice. 
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First, according to several regulations issued by the PBoC,392 to be eligible for an 
account application, customers have to be 16 years or over. This requirement is in 
accordance with Chinese civil law. 393  Although the age limit for opening an 
account has been relaxed to 16 years rather than 18, the authority has taken the 
civil law into consideration, namely a Chinese citizen who has reached 16 years, 
but is younger than 18, and lives on his or her own income shall be regarded as a 
person with full capacity for civil conduct.394 This requirement means customers 
have to be able to take responsibility at the time when they apply for an account. 
For customers under the age of 16 years, but who need a bank account, currently 
there is no special provision for this exceptional case in regulation. However, 
business practice usually permits guardians to open accounts on their behalf with 
a valid ID of both the guardian and the person under guardianship.395 Therefore, 
age limit does not become a regulatory barrier for customers who need to open an 
account with formal financial institutions. 
 
Second, there are also legal requirements for identification. Banks are under a 
legal duty to check the ID of their clients based on the anti-money laundering law 
of China. According to the law, financial regulations are first required to establish 
the clients’ ID system; they shall also not provide any service with any client who 
cannot clarify his or her identity. 396  As regards the customer, the anti-money-
laundering law also requires that individuals who wish to establish a business 
relationship with any financial institution shall provide his or her authentic and 
valid identity certificate or any other identity certification document. 397 Moreover, 
since China is also a member of the Financial Action Task Force (hereinafter 
‘FATF’), which is an intergovernmental body set up to combat money laundering, 
banks’ practices are supposed to be in compliance with the good practice 
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standards recommended by FATF. 398  All international standards, and domestic 
law and regulations on ‘real name’ issued by the State Council and PBC form the 
legal and regulatory basis for identity check procedures when opening bank 
accounts.399  
 
As to what sort of ID is required, the PBoC lists several documents that could 
prove applicants’ identity in its Measures for the Administration of RMB Bank 
Settlement Accounts (2003) which shall be mandatorily presented for account 
opening. Banks are, however, flexible when it comes to choosing a proper ID, 
including but not limited to national identity card, household register (户口本, Hu 
Kou Ben), passport. 400  Banks will check the ID documents and assess the 
potential risk of the customer using the information they collected. The authority 
has labelled this requirement the ‘real name’ standard under the ‘know-your-
customer’ principle, with the purpose of preventing money laundering and crimes 
related to terrorism, among other things.  
 
Nevertheless, these legal and regulatory requirements (and banks’ eligibility 
criteria) are not as strict as they appear. The basic proof of ID, ID Card of 
Residents is legally issued to all citizens who are 16 years or older,401  hence, 
customers who wish to open bank accounts are ‘naturally’ provided with the basic 
ID document. For vulnerable customers in the country, the ID card is likely the 
only legal proof of identity they possess.  
 
Since there is no distinction between personal accounts based on overdraft 
function and, moreover, the personal credit reference system in China is still in its 
nascent stage, in general, people’s negative credit history is less likely to have an 
obvious influence on bank account applications. However, this does not mean 
commercial banks in China will not use their own eligib ility criteria when 
                                                 
398
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assessing account-opening applications; for example, there are news reports that 
commercial banks in Shenzhen Special Economic Zones (hereinafter ‘SEZs’) are 
required by local authorities to mandatorily check customers’ evidence of local 
residence before opening an account, which may influence migrant workers’ 
access to banking services, since the authority’s Amending- in-Process Regulation 
of Residence Permits of Shenzhen SEZs is proposed to set ‘12 months of social 
insurance payment’ as the essential criteria for obtaining the residence permit.402 
Therefore, it is argued that many rural migrant workers will hardly meet the 
criteria. However, since there is no regulatory objective of banks’ duty towards 
financial inclusion in statutes, vulnerable customers can hardly challenge this. 
 
In general, both the UK and China share similar account-opening eligibility 
criteria in their regulations and mandatorily require banks to check customers’ IDs 
but also permit banks to choose flexible documents. Commercial banks that do 
not obey the ID-checking rule would break rules related to anti-money laundering 
legislation and regulations. This is another kind of social duty that banks have to 
undertake; in other words, banks shall not make it convenient for possible crimes 
to be committed.  
 
As long as regulation does not set up barriers for people to access bank accounts, 
it can be regarded as being appropriate. In general, there are no legal or regulatory 
barriers to ID requirements for low-income customers to open accounts in both 
countries. Although in the UK the agreement has not become regulatory rules, it 
does remove barriers in banks’ eligibility criteria for people in financial difficulty 
in part of the industry and is therefore an early sign of progress made with 
financial inclusion. While in China, since there are no such rules in regulation, 
banks’ additional eligibility criteria for opening accounts could still become a 
problem of access for some migrant workers.  
 
2.3.3 Charge limits on banking services 
 
Considering the vulnerable status of low-income customers, the charges for using 
banking services shall also be monitored. The use of bank accounts must not lead 
                                                 
402
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to further financial difficulties for low-income customers. This is possibly the 
most direct way of facilitating low-income customers in using banking services, 
as they are sensitive to the charges and are usually unable to defend their interests 
through ombudsman services or lawsuits. 
 
2.3.3.1 The United Kingdom 
 
Since current and basic bank accounts in the UK are distinct based on the 
overdraft facility, the fees charged for two types of accounts are also different. For 
customers who use basic bank accounts there is usually no overdraft choice and 
therefore they are free from overdraft charges.403 However, using basic banking 
services is still not totally free of charge; unarranged overdrafts or failed payments 
may still cause unexpected charges.  
 
On this issue, the recent agreement between the UK government and several 
major banks is proposed to provide truly cost- free basic bank accounts. First, by 
confirming that a basic account will not have arranged overdraft facilities, the 
agreement minimizes customer’s chances of suffering from overdraft charges.404 
Customers will not be charged for overdrawn balances in their accounts. Unpaid 
payment will also be free of charge; failing to pay a direct debit or standing order 
through a basic account,405 for example, will no longer penalise customers with 
high charges. However, apart from the overdraft facility, customers could still 
make full use of basic bank account with the same standard features (transacted in 
pounds sterling) of current accounts free of charge. Therefore, banks will not 
discriminate against customers with basic accounts and limited account functions 
or will not charge additional fees. The protection of vulnerable customers is 
clearly the intention as reflected here. 
 
2.3.3.2 China 
                                                 
403
 Although basic bank accounts do not have an overdraft facility, there is still a chance of 
customers being overdrawn. For example, customers may be faced with an unarranged overdraft 
when withdrawing money from an automated teller machine due to note denominations. See HM 
Treasury ‘Revised Basic Bank Account Agreement’ (n 317). As a reference, overdraft charges 
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Since bank accounts or common debit cards do not have an overdraft feature, the 
consideration of the regulator is mainly focused on the charges for using banking 
services.  
 
In 2011, several authorities issued a regulation to waive several types of charges 
on banking services.406 Although the starting point of this fee waiver decision is to 
‘raise the efficiency and quality of bank’s service and take social responsibility on 
the basis of marketisation’,407 it could indeed benefit low-income account holders. 
Under this regulation, several services of RMB personal accounts are now free of 
charge; this covers account opening and closing, making deposits, withdrawing 
and transferring money within the same city, changing a personal identity number 
or ‘PIN’, account annual fee, management fee of social security accounts, 408 
receiving bank statements and so forth.  
 
Although all clients would benefit from this regulatory change, it improves the 
availability of banking services among the vulnerable group. This is especially the 
case in the waiving of ‘management fees of social security account[s] with small 
balance[s]’, as the previous industry practice was to charge 3 Chinese yuan 
(UK$0.5) for accounts with balances less than 300 yuan (US$50) every quarter.409 
The accusation was levelled that profit was being made from those who lived on 
government transfer payments with little savings in their accounts. Earlier than 
this regulation, the industry association urged its member banks to waive fees for 
social security accounts but received little response. 410  Furthermore, for card 
holders of ‘rural migrant bank cards’, the PBoC has capped the fee charged for 
money withdrawal. 411  A mandatory regulation rather than voluntary conduct 
standard in this case is therefore more effective, it is compulsory for all the 
banking institutions in the country to abide by the CBRC Notice.  
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However, this notice also has drawbacks. The management fee it has waived only 
includes social security accounts rather than general personal accounts. There is 
therefore still a regulatory vacuum to a large degree. People would still be charged 
for their RMB savings or settlement account with a small balance. Although the 
industry association argues that this management fee for personal accounts with 
small balances is aimed at cutting down on the unused account number and hence 
save the resources of commercial banks, 412  it would indeed harm vulnerable 
customers who could not save more money in their accounts.  
 
2.3.4 Geographical access 
 
In general, since the commonly used bank accounts available in China do not have 
overdraft facilities, the regulatory techniques that the regulator would apply are 
usually also more simplified than in the case of the UK; for example, commercial 
bank need not make special efforts to market their accounts to potential customers. 
Furthermore, because of the features of China’s personal bank accounts, there is 
no risk of being charged for an overdraft, and the eligibility criteria for opening an 
account used by Chinese banks is usually also less related to customers’ financial 
difficulty or residency. However, this does not mean China could easily expand its 
residents’ use of banking services and reduce the exclusion level. On the contrary, 
the penetration level of account holding in China is still significantly lower than in 
the UK.  
 
In fact, problems with accessing the banking services in China do not totally lie in 
the banks’ discrimination against low-income customers or regulatory barriers; 
rather, it is the lack of rural banking facilities that blocks rural residents from 
using these services. Setting up more bank branches and bank outlets would be 
more effective in remote rural areas. The newly issued No. 1 Central Document of 
the Chinese Central Government requires that ‘[l]arge and medium-sized 
commercial banks should ensure presence in counties and extend their networks 
to townships. Banks should also reinforce their capability of providing services to 
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rural areas.’413 Both credit and basic banking services are covered by this official 
proposal. By setting up new styles of small banks in rural areas, theoretically, 
local residents could benefit from the increased availability of banking services by 
reducing the cost of time and transportation. This is a fundamental way of 
alleviating the rural–urban imbalance of financial resources. However, as 
discussed above, although being encouraged by the government, China’s major 
banks are reluctant to open branches in rural areas due to lack of incentives. 
 
Realizing this problem, the Chinese government also chooses to encourage small 
banks to serve the unbanked in remote areas; for example, according to a CBRC 
Notice, the regulator encourages rural medium to small financial institutions 
(including rural business banks and VTBs) to set up new branches, provided that 
the banks have a good regulatory grade and is prudentially managed.414 This is a 
good way of rewarding those small banks for managing their businesses 
prudentially which, in turn, could benefit more residents if new branches were 
allowed to open in remote areas. Such rewards are less attractive for major banks, 
as they have already set up national-scale branches.  
 
In order to fill the gap in rural residents’ access to financial services, since 2006, 
the Chinese government has launched a series of measures aimed at facilitating 
inclusive-oriented small community financial institutions to be set up at county 
level or below, where the residents have suffered from branch closure of large 
commercial banks since the reform of state-owned banks in the 1990s. The 
intention of this round of reform is clearly stated in a CBRC Opinion. 415  The 
general goal of the reform is proposed to ‘relive the problems that exist in the 
rural financial market such as the low coverage of bank branches, low supply of 
financial resources and insufficient competitions by using regulatory measures.416 
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By relaxing the limitation on market entry, brand-new community financial 
institutions are allowed into the county and rural market.417 To some extent, the 
encouraging attitude of the Chinese government and the CBRC of setting up new 
branches is a response to the reluctance of large and medium commercial banks to 
serve the lower end of the market. In the design of the CBRC, setting up new 
financial institutions at local level allows residents in the area easier access to 
both basic banking services and, more importantly, access to credit. Increased 
competition in the county and rural banking market would also benefit local 
residents, if properly regulated.  
 
Similarly in the UK, the alternative type of mainstream service provider, namely 
credit unions, also have facilities to provide basic banking services to their 
members. If a credit union is set up in a deprived community where bank 
branches are closed, then it could also serve local residents by providing deposit 
and payment services.  
 
Whether the current legal and regulatory environment could support alternative 
financial institutions to grow forms the main content of Chapter 3. After all, if the 
legal and regulatory environments could lower the entry and operation barriers to 
small rural banking institutions, it could also widen access to basic banking 
services and credit. 
 
2.4 European Directive on Payment Accounts (Directive 2014/92/EU): A 
reference  
 
After analysing the current legal and regulatory techniques to promote bank 
account use in both the UK and China, it is also essential to look at the new 
legislative change at the European Union level, which provides an important 
reference to the research on financial inclusion regulation.  
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2.4.1 Introduction 
 
From the perspective of the EU level, restricted access to basic banking services 
in its member states could be an obstacle to fulfilling the single market objective, 
as the use of payment services is essential for customers’ free mobility to work, 
study or reside in other member states.418 Furthermore, since there are many other 
services attached to payment accounts, owning a bank account is also of great 
significance as it fulfils customers’ basic demands, especially in countries of 
higher bank penetration, which could further promote social and economic 
inclusion.419  
 
However, the use of payment services in the EU has not yet reached its potential; 
for example, a 2011 Eurobarometer survey found that one in ten citizens in the 
EU did not own a bank account.420 According to the European Commission, there 
are about 30 to 68 million EU citizens who have no bank accounts based on two 
surveys conducted in 2009 and 2011 respectively. 421  The World Bank’s 2012 
survey deems this number to be 56 million.422 Although the majority (56%) of 
people choose not to have an account (eg, less-educated or older people), a 
significant number of people are refused access to bank accounts by the local 
banks. 423  As the Single Market Act II (2012) states, ‘[A]ccess to payment 
accounts and other banking services have become essential for participation in 
economic and social life, but discrimination, for instance on grounds of residence, 
nationality or low level of resources, does still occur.’424 
 
Generally, there are two groups of people who have been refused access to bank 
accounts in the EU. The first group includes people with a vulnerable economic 
status due to, for example, low income, incorrect documentation or bad credit 
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history, while the second group are people of non-residence in the current 
country.425 Two kinds of consumers are classified here, namely (i) ‘vulnerable’ 
consumers and (ii) ‘mobile’ consumers.426 The former includes people who are 
vulnerable because of their mental, physical or psychological infirmity, age or 
credulity, and low income, while the latter refers to consumers who move across 
borders for various reasons, including work, study or retirement.427  
 
The European Commission concludes that there are several reasons for the 
problem of why EU customers face difficulties in accessing accounts from a more 
macro perspective: 428  they can be grouped into three: (i) member countries’ 
regulatory framework, (ii) the banking industry and (iii) the customers 
themselves.  
 
2.4.1.1 Restrictive regulatory framework in member states 
 
Owing to the significance of payment accounts, several member states are already 
aware of regulation in this area. However, the levels of regulatory framework in 
EU member states are different, ranging from mandatory regulation 429  and 
voluntary industry code 430  to no framework in place. In the UK, for example, 
there was no mandatory regulation in place prior to 2015. Since there is no unified 
regulatory framework across different countries, compliance costs of banks with 
varied regulation are also increased, which are finally transferred to customers.431 
Moreover, some member states also have discriminatory rules on basic bank 
accounts; for example, in Belgium the right to access basic bank accounts is 
confined to its residents.432 Similar rules can be found in the Netherlands, where 
the conditions of opening basic accounts include a permanent residence or an 
address with a recognised aid agency in the Netherlands.433  
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Moreover, without mandatory regulation, it is less easy for customers to obtain 
basic payment accounts. Data from the European Commission show that member 
states with a legal framework in place on this issue have lower levels of financial 
exclusion than those who only have a self-regulatory framework or those who 
have no frameworks in place.434 Self-regulation through a voluntary industry code 
is also criticized as less effective. Without mandatory requirements the industry 
code may not reach its full effectiveness.435  
 
2.4.1.2 Banking industry’s reluctance to provide information and service 
 
The summary of responses to the European Commission’s consultation on bank 
accounts published in July 2012 relates to customers’ limited access to bank 
accounts due to insufficient income, poor creditworthiness and unpaid overdrafts, 
among other reasons for rejected applications for bank accounts. 436  Banks are 
criticized for ‘picking up customers’ based on customers’ different margins of 
profitability. Some banking industry associations also admitted that those factors 
were reasons for financial exclusion, although most respondents in the financial 
sector maintained that there were no obstacles to consumers’ access to bank 
accounts.437  
 
2.4.1.3 Customers’ low awareness and confidence levels 
 
From the demand side, customers’ low awareness of the availability of basic bank 
accounts also blocks them from being financially included. This unawareness 
could be partly attributed to the banks’ reluctance to market their basic services 
because of low profitability, especially in EU member states where banks are 
obliged to open bank accounts under the regulatory framework. Other reasons 
include the relatively low financial literacy of the vulnerable group, who may not 
see the benefits to using banking services. Complex information on banks’ 
products will cause misconceptions in this case. There are also factors of mistrust 
of banks and the financial system. The Impact Assessment of the 
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Recommendation mentions that due to lack of financial education or bad past 
experiences, people may feel that they cannot control their personal finance using 
bank accounts (which have an overdraft facility).438  
 
2.4.2 Previous efforts to address the problem of access at the EU level  
 
Given all the considerations above, the European authorities have already adopted 
several measures to address the issue.  
 
2.4.2.1 The Recommendation on Access to a Basic Payment Account (2011) 
 
As mentioned above, the regulatory frameworks on the problem of access in EU 
member states are far from unified. The European Commission has realized the 
fragmentation and its consequences, and after several years of consultation, it 
published a recommendation on a basic payment account for all citizens in July 
2011.439  
 
In the recommendation, the commission requires member states to ensure the right 
of a legal resident in the EU to open and use a basic account, no matter what the 
customer’s financial circumstances are.440 Member states should also make sure 
that there are at least one or more providers in charge of offering basic bank 
accounts. 441  It also defines characteristics of a basic payment account, 442  and 
requires member states to enhance public awareness on the availability and 
specific features of basic accounts.443 With most aspects on basic bank accounts 
covered, this recommendation sets out general principles for member states on 
how to establish their own regulatory framework within the jurisdiction, and 
invites all member states to take measures to apply this document within six 
months after its publication.444  
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However, the European Commission regards the real effect of this 
recommendation as disappointing.445 In August 2012, the commission published 
the follow-up report on the recommendation and overviewed the measures the 
member states had taken. According to the report, only three member states have 
a legislative framework with binding measures,446 seven countries have partly set 
up such legal frameworks that followed the recommendation,447  five countries 
only have partly established self-regulation, while the remaining twelve countries 
have no framework at all. Since EU recommendations have neither binding force 
nor legal consequences according to the Treaty of Lisbon,448 Member states are 
not obliged to follow this kind of non-binding Act. Hence the commission 
considers that it is necessary to take measures of ‘a legislative nature’ due to the 
importance of guaranteeing access to basic bank accounts.449 
 
2.4.2.2 The Single Market Act I (2011) and II (2012) 
 
The Single Market Act I adopted in April 2011 has a clear objective, namely to 
boost growth and reinforce citizens’ confidence. 450  In section 2.10 (Social 
Cohesion) of the Act, with the realisation of the insufficient use of bank accounts 
which is an essential condition of participating in economic and social life, the 
Act therefore commits the European Commission to ‘present[ing] an initiative 
concerning access to a basic payment account for all citizens at a reasonable cost, 
wherever they live in the EU’.451 
 
The Single Market Act II adopted on October 2012 further stresses this issue, and 
states that all EU citizens should be given access to a basic payment account, the 
assurance should be given that bank account fees are transparent and comparable, 
and that switching bank accounts should be made easier. It also declares that the 
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European Commission will make legislative proposals to address issues, including 
access to payment accounts, the clarity of banking fee information and the account 
switching.452 
 
However, although both documents stress the importance of access to banking 
services, they have no legal force and are merely recommendations to member 
states. The ‘Act’ here is distinct from the ‘Act’ in the UK’s domestic legal system. 
They are also too sketchy to be implemented in member states. 
 
2.4.3 Directive on the Comparability of Fees Related to Payment 
Accounts, Payment Account Switching and Access to Payment 
Accounts with Basic Features (Directive 2014/92/EU) 
 
In May 2013, after years of consultation, the European Commission published its 
proposal for a directive on payment accounts, which concerns the comparability 
of payment account fees, switching and equal access to payment accounts. This 
proposal came into force in 23 July 2014 and was implemented in the UK in June 
2015. 
 
The directive, as highlighted in its title, has three main sections: (i) comparability 
of fees connected with payment accounts, (ii) switching, and (iii) access to 
payment accounts. It aims to protect customers’ interest from the time (or even 
earlier) when they became a bank’s client, to setting up minimum standards for 
member states, and to protect the equal right of EU citizens to access bank 
accounts. The directive is customer protection-oriented, while it also tries to 
promote competition in the retail banking market by mandatory information 
disclosure and free account switching, which could, in turn, benefit the customer 
with a better regulated, highly competitive market. 
 
Although, in general, EU directives have a binding force on member states,453 this 
directive on payment accounts permits member states to decide not to apply all or 
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part of it. 454  The current agreement between the government and major 
commercial banks generally accepts the principles of the directive. However, they 
are still not mandatory and depends on member state’s implementation. Although 
UK government once shown some prudential attitudes, 455  the directive was 
implemented in the UK in June of 2015, with some negotiations to protect the 
customer as well as reduce ‘any negative impact’ of the directive.456 The directive 
will be reviewed below, with comparisons made with the UK’s current regulations 
and approaches on implementing the directive. 
 
2.4.3.1 Raising public awareness 
 
Provision for information on basic bank accounts is made in Article 20 of the 
directive. In this article, member states are required to raise the public’s awareness 
about the availability of payment accounts, the pricing conditions, procedures to 
open accounts and access to alternative redress resolutions. 457  Second, the 
directive also requires that member states shall ensure banks make available to 
customers information on their basic accounts. Third, member states shall also 
ensure customers know that they do not need to purchase additional products to 
access basic bank accounts. Owing to its results-oriented feature, the directive 
does not provide the means for the application but only sets out the ‘result’, 
namely public awareness of basic bank accounts shall be raised through various 
methods. 
 
In the UK, the BCOBS requires banks to provide information about basic bank 
accounts to eligible customers. However, the FCA handbook is also sketchy and 
leaves many gaps in the Industry Guidance, which is non-mandatory and has no 
binding force on members. Whether the eligibility criteria are met is left to banks’ 
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commercial judgement on a case-by-case basis and there was no mandatory 
recommendation duty in this case. Nevertheless, the agreement between the 
government and industry promises to make basic bank accounts ‘visible to 
potential customers alongside full-service accounts’ to fulfil this requirement, 
which corresponds with the requirement in the directive.  
 
2.4.3.2 Comparison website 
 
Article 7 of the directive also requires member states to set up independent 
comparison website free of charge for customers to compare fees charged by 
banks for payment accounts. The language used shall be plain, the website shall 
be operationally independent of any bank and provide up-to-date information, and 
provide a sufficiently broad overview of the payment accounts market.458  
 
In the UK, the Money Advice Service (hereinafter ‘MAS’) currently undertakes 
such duty to provide comparisons of bank accounts.459 On its website, it gives 
detailed information on current accounts and basic accounts, and gives advice on 
how to choose the right bank account, and lists the requirements on proof of the 
ID of high street banks. The MAS’s board is appointed by the FCA, but acts 
independently of the FCA, nor is the website operationally controlled by any bank. 
Hence, in this part of the directive, the UK has already set up an eligible website 
that meets the requirements and needs no change at this stage.  
 
2.4.3.3 Basic bank accounts features 
 
The directive also gives clear characteristics of basic bank accounts in Article 17. 
The basic features of a ‘payment account’ include deposit, cash withdrawal, direct 
debit, the use of payment cards and online payments, and cash transfers.460  In 
contrast to the previous Proposal of Directive, which explicitly excludes an 
overdraft facility, the directive chooses to permit member states to allow banks to 
provide an overdraft facility with a basic payment account at the request of 
                                                 
458
 Ibid art 7. 
459
 Money Advice Service, ‘How to Choose the Right Bank Account’ 
<https://www.moneyadviceservice.org.uk/en/categories/choosing-the-right-account> accessed 11 
November 2014.  
460
 Directive of Payment Accounts, art 17.1. 
118 
 
customers, giving more flexibility to the customer. 461  These features of basic 
accounts were reconfirmed in the recent agreement between the UK government 
and major banks, but do not cover the arranged overdraft feature to avoid the 
possibility of unexpected charges in the customers’ situation. 462  Also, using 
standard features of the basic bank account, unpaid payment and overdrawn 
balance would be free of charge according to the agreement.463 
 
In addition, the directive allows member states to decide whether permit banks 
charging ‘reasonable fees’ on using of basic bank accounts, while the UK 
government finds this would go against the ‘free if in credit’ principle within the 
UK retail banking market. This is regarded as the less advantageous part of the 
directive to UK customers, therefore the UK government change to choose not to 
implement this specific point, instead to maintain the 2014 industry agreement.  
 
2.4.3.4 Equal right of access to basic bank accounts 
 
The directive also proposes to protect EU customers’ equal right of using payment 
services in Chapter IV.  
 
First, the directive requires member states to ensure that payment services are 
provided by all or ‘a sufficient number’ of credit institutions in their territory.464 
Second, consumers who legally reside in the EU are not to be discriminated 
against based on nationality or place of residence.465 Third, banks could refuse an 
application for payment accounts but only in limited cases such as the consumer 
already holds a payment account with a credit institution in their territory, 466 or 
the application goes against the anti-money-laundering or terrorist financing 
conditions established in Directive 2005/60.467 Furthermore, banks shall inform 
the customer whose application is declined immediately in writing and free of 
charge, unless this declination is related to money- laundering or terrorist 
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financing. 468  Fourth, the basic bank account shall not be conditional on the 
purchase of additional services.469 Under this directive, the conditions of refusal 
(ie, already has a bank account; anti-money laundering or terrorist financing) 
together with the non-discrimination requirement (ie, nationality and place of 
residence) de facto setting up EU citizens’ legal rights to access to payment 
accounts. Although the directive does not explicitly highlight the requirement of 
providing original documents as proof of ID (eg, in the UK it includes passport, 
UK or foreign driver’s licence, EU or EEA national ID card), article 16.4 of the 
directive has implicit requirements for personal ID under the requirements of 
Directive 2005/60.  
 
In the UK, although prior to the directive there was no legal duty of offering basic 
accounts attributed to commercial banks, 470  there are 16 banks (and building 
societies) already offering the product. The requirement set in Article 16.1 has de 
facto already been met.  
 
As to the non-discrimination rule about eligibility criteria, the agreement between 
the UK government and major banks promises to provide basic accounts to 
eligible customers in financial difficulty, which is, however, not a regulatory rule 
applicable to the whole industry. While in response to the directive, the proposed 
UK secondary legislation intends to require banks that participated in the 
agreement to offer basic bank accounts to EU residents who either have no bank 
account from any UK credit institution, or are ineligible for all bank accounts 
offered by those banks that are not basic bank accounts.471 This new standard is de 
facto a re-confirmation of the customer’s equal access to bank accounts and is 
actually the biggest shift in the UK’s current regulatory framework about basic 
bank accounts. It changes the banks’ freedom of commercial judgement when 
opening payment accounts, and replaces it with the unconditional duty to open 
basic payment accounts for anyone who holds no account and wants one, even if 
they are ‘ineligible’ to bank’s ordinary current accounts, the only exceptions are 
eg the unmet identity criteria and being suspected of money laundering or terrorist 
financing.472 
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For the purpose of anti-money laundering and terrorist financing, banks are 
prohibited from keeping anonymous accounts. Banks are hence obliged to carry 
out customer due diligence measures, which include identifying the customer’s ID 
based on documents or data or information obtained from a reliable and 
independent source. 473  Customers who cannot provide such documents are 
generally regarded as failing to meet the qualifying criteria, and banks can 
reasonably refuse to open an account. Considering the necessity for measures 
against money laundering and terrorist financing, it is reasonable for banks to 
refuse someone’s application who does not produce any valid documentation, but 
they cannot discriminate against customers due to nationality or for other reasons. 
 
In other words, there are two tiers of the ‘qualifying criteria’: the first and basic 
tier is valid proof of ID, and the second tier is the other requirements, namely 
nationality, place of residence and income level which will no longer be 
applicable under the new directive. Moreover, as the impact assessment of the 
directive argues, the EU anti-money laundering directive in itself does not create 
any barrier to account opening; it does not set up mandatory requirements for 
customers who want to open an account to present an ID card or passport.474 No 
new regulatory barrier will be created after the directive has been implemented in 
this case. 
 
After the Directive be implemented in the UK, it is most proper to set up a new 
regulation (and this is the most frequently used way), 475  while adding several 
details to the FCA handbook, the BCOBS. The Industry Guidance will also need 
to be revised to comply with the new regulation, introducing the contents of the 
agreement into it. Based on the analysis of the directive and the UK’s current 
regulations set out in the previous section, the substantive changes mainly include 
two parts: (i) banks will have a mandatory regulatory duty to inform customers of 
information about basic payment accounts, and (ii) discriminatory qualifying 
criteria in account-opening processes would be explicitly prohibited, and 
customers would not be refused by banks for reasons such as nationality, 
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residence or economic status. Both changes focus on protecting customers’ 
interests, so it depends on the government’s attitude on whether or not to accept 
this new directive into the UK’s legal and regulatory frameworks. Nevertheless, 
from the agreement between the UK government and major banks, it could be 
assumed that the UK may choose to approve the directive, as it largely 
corresponds with what is set up in the directive. 
 
Since the directive will set up a new mandatory duty for commercial banks, the 
question might well be asked whether this legislative change would conflict or 
correspond with the basic principles of commercial law. In general, commercial 
law is about a contractual relationship, it is about ‘rights and duties arising from 
the supply of goods and services in the way of trade ’;476 what are central to the 
commercial law are the two contractual parties, namely the seller and the buyer.477 
In the case of financial services, the banks and the customers are the two parties to 
the contract. The freedom of contract shall be protected by law as the contract is at 
the centre of commercial law, which means both parties shall be willing to enter 
into the contract. The incentive to exchange the equivalents, as Goode writes, with 
regard to both the seller and the buyer in the deal is worth it; otherwise they would 
not sell or buy the product.478 Contract law will not pre-decide whether the deal is 
worth entering but leaves this to the parties to form their judgement.479 In this 
sense, using regulation to mandatorily require commercial banks to sell a certain 
product (ie, basic bank account) to a certain customer group who are hardly 
profitable appears, to some extent, unreasonable, as this is an infringement of 
contractual freedom by administrative measures. 
 
In answer to this problem, it is important to remember the essential feature of the 
object of the contract. Being essential in modern society means that a basic bank 
account is indispensable for ordinary customers, just like other public utilities. 
Therefore, in the general interest, commercial banks shall and could be required to 
provide this utility- featured product to all eligible customers without 
discrimination. As to the question of ‘freedom of contract’ in the market-oriented 
economy, in Nybergh’s view, it is a contractual obligation that public utility 
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companies shall bear. In contrast to the traditional view of compulsory contracts 
as a violation of contractual freedom, Nybergh argues that it is some kind of 
‘positive contractual freedom’ since everyone should have the right to 
consume.480 It is a wider concept than the narrowly defined ‘contractual freedom’ 
in which companies can choose their customer. Discrimination on the basis of 
gender, age, race, nationality and religion in contract terms is unacceptable.481 
However, Wilhelmsson does not deny the rationality of different treatments based 
on risks and costs customers may incur.482 Indeed, some customers pose higher 
risks, hence public utility companies are entitled to adjust their prices to within a 
reasonable range. This is the balance of rights between the supply and demand 
sides in which the interests of both parties are considered. However, the supply of 
service shall not be discriminatory and the opportunity of using the service should 
be equally offered to all residents in need. In this sense, this approach extends 
rather than violates the traditional commercial law principle which justifies the 
necessity for the mandatory rule in the directive; it de facto provides an external 
incentive for commercial banks to offer this unprofitable product to customers and 
protects their ‘positive’ contractual freedom to be served by banks. 
 
2.5 Summary 
 
This chapter mainly discusses commercial banks’ role in facilitating financial 
inclusion in respect of basic banking services. For vulnerable customers, being 
able to open bank accounts and use banking services is essential nowadays to 
reduce living costs and increase life convenience. Since banking services are 
usually mostly provided by commercial banks, they are, however, sometimes 
criticized for being reluctant to offer these unprofitable services. Whether the 
current statutory or regulatory environment would help low-income customers to 
get access to banking services needs to be reviewed.  
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Section 2.1 suggests a point of view that commercial banks should be tasked with 
the duty to serve vulnerable customers. The special status of banks in the financial 
system, the CSR of banks and the public utility feature of basic banking services 
prove the theoretical foundation of the view. In reality, although there is usually 
no explicit statutory objective of financial inclusion, governments would usually 
choose to encourage commercial banks to serve this market by offering bank 
accounts. Indeed, there are other institutions that could play a role in financial 
inclusion, for example, post offices in both the UK and China are viewed as an 
effective alternative way to serve customers’ financial needs in remote areas; in a 
recent government inquiry in the UK, for example, major commercial banks’ 
responses admit to the need for collaborating with post offices to provide banking 
services to vulnerable consumers.483 However, taking commercial banks into this 
progress is still meaningful as they are the leading players in the financial market. 
 
In general, the common measure of promoting banking service inclusion is to use 
regulatory rules or standards in different aspects to require banks to conduct their 
business properly. In order to facilitate the process of low-income customers 
making use of bank accounts and related services, the eligibility criteria for 
opening accounts and the fees charged shall be carefully set. These aspects are 
essential because they matter when it comes to vulnerable customers being able to 
use banking services as others do. Information disclosure is also central to this 
discussion. By properly disclosing information about available bank accounts and 
reducing customers’ misunderstandings, the progress of financial inclusion could 
also be accelerated by introducing more customers to using banking services. 
 
The UK in general has made good progress in these aspects. Being the first 
country to put forward the concept of financial exclusion, the UK has more 
concerns about, and regulatory experiences with, the issue. The detailed 
regulatory sourcebook, the BCOBS, provides the basis for mandatory rules, while 
the Industry Guidance gives a good example of self-regulation. However, since 
the issue of promoting financial inclusion is not a statutory objective, but is more 
likely to be influenced by the relationship between the government and the 
industry, commercial banks’ lack of incentive could hardly be solved if there is no 
duty to do so. 
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In contrast, China does not set up detailed rules on this issue. Current rules about 
banking service conduct generally do not distinguish between ordinary and 
vulnerable customers, and give the latter extra protection which, to some extent, 
stops banks from paying more attention to the issue. Furthermore, although the 
relationships between government and banks are close in China, banks are still 
reluctant to open more branches in remote areas because the rewards from the 
regulator for doing so are not enough.  
 
Moreover, since offering banking services or credit is hardly profitable, 
commercial banks’ lack of incentive in promoting financial inclusion cannot be 
overlooked. This is more problematic for the issue of credit than banking services 
as the former has inherent repayment risks, which inevitably holds commercial 
banks back from offering a little, affordable credit to high-risk customer groups 
with limited income or living in deprived areas.  
 
As regards the problem of lacking incentive, two examples were used to get the 
regulatory power to urge commercial banks to provide enough services. The 
newly approved EU directive on payment accounts is, to some extent, radical; 
under the directive, banks in member states would not be able to reject account-
opening requests because of customers’ economic status, which de facto sets up a 
new duty for commercial banks to serve every customer in need, just like common 
utility companies. The real power of the directive is, however, dependent on 
whether member states would choose to apply it. Although UK has implemented 
the directive into its legal system, the effect of the directive is still too early to be 
seen, though. Another example with a longer history of application is the 
Community Reinvestment Act of the US, which provides a practical way of 
assessing banks’ performance in serving the deprived community by setting up 
series of assessment standards, rewards and punishment in the statute; providing 
incentives for banks to be involved in financial inclusion progress. If the UK and 
China wish to facilitate financial inclusion through banks’ efforts, setting up 
similar regimes is essential by linking banks’ financial inclusion duty to proper 
regulatory reward and minimum conduct standards.  
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Chapter 3:  Alternative credit facilities: Testing of the role 
of law and regulations in supporting them to 
grow 
 
3.1 Introduction: The alternative role of community-based 
lending institutions in financial inclusion 
 
The second and more complex part of the problem of financial exclusion lies in 
access to affordable credit. Commercial banks, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, 
are reluctant to provide low-income customers with small-size and affordable 
credit. Before there is any statutory duty for commercial banks to do so, the 
alternative way is to set up new, community-based, small lending institutions to 
serve the local customers’ need for credit. This chapter finds that the regulatory 
environment for credit unions in the UK is generally favourable for the firms to 
develop, while there are many regulatory barriers in China for rural mutual co-
operatives (RMCs), and VTBs. The ‘one-size-fits-all’ regulation model in China 
needs to be revisited in future for alternative lenders to grow. 
 
In May 2012, the Department for Work and Pensions (hereinafter ‘DWP’) 
published a report on the feasibility of credit union development in the UK. 
Commissioned by the Secretary of State, the team managed to study the way to 
‘provide suitable financial services for up to a million more consumers on lower 
incomes’ by modernising and expanding the service of credit unions to achie ve 
financial sustainability within five years.484 It reveals that 7 million low-income 
people in the UK were affected by the lack of access to affordable credit – 
referred to as ‘paying a poverty premium’ – and were forced to use high-cost 
credit from ‘predatory lenders, such as home credit and payday lenders’.485 Credit 
unions’ role in facilitating low- income customers’ access to affordable credit is 
therefore highlighted and regarded as a useful way to relieve the problem. 
 
Similarly, in China, in order to fill the gap in rural residents’ access to financial 
services, the Chinese government has launched a series of measures since 2006, 
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aimed at setting up small community financial institutions at county level or 
below, where residents are suffering from the branch closure of large commercial 
banks since the reform of state-owned banks in 1990s. The intention to reform is 
clearly stated in the opinion pieces by the CBRC, in which it proposed to ‘relieve 
the problems that exist in the rural financial market, such as low numbers of bank 
branches, low supply of financial resources and insufficient competition’ 
(translated by author) by using regulatory measures.486 By relaxing limitations on 
market entry, brand-new kinds of community financial institutions are allowed in 
the county and rural market. These markets mainly include VTBs, and rural 
RMCs. Private and foreign investments are also permitted, joining the setting-up 
procedure of those small financial institutions. As of June 2012, there were 
already 817 new rural financial institutions serving the financial needs of rural 
residents and enterprises in rural areas.487 
 
No matter whether it is in the UK or in China, the practical significance of setting 
up such alternative lending facilities is obvious. As discussed in Chapter 2, low-
income customers are usually unable to borrow money from mainstream 
commercial banks. If they are in urgent need of money, the only possible solution 
is to deal with subprime lenders, or worse, unlicensed underground usurers. 
Small-size, community-based lenders have the advantage that mainstream banks 
do not have processing applications for loans, which makes it possible to relieve 
the credit exclusion that exists among low-income residents and in deprived 
communities. 
 
First, since the new kinds of lenders are usually community-based, the costs of 
assessing the creditworthiness of residents living in the community could be 
reduced. For low-income customers with an impaired or no credit history, this 
means they would not be directly rejected by the automatic credit assessment 
system, but could have a chance to be interviewed by bank staff in person. In the 
case of mutual-style lenders such as credit unions in the UK, customers of the 
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lender are at the same time owners of the firm, making it more possible for 
customers to have a chance to prove their creditworthiness to the staff. 
 
Second, since these community-based firms are usually of small asset size, have 
an inclusion-oriented objective and their oriented customer group tends to be local 
residents, making small amounts of credit available to personal customers is 
usually inherent in the firms’ business model. Since their business scope is usually 
limited by statutes or legislation from stepping into, for example, the area of 
investment, extending credit to local residents is therefore usually the firms’ main 
source of profit source. Large commercial banks, in contrast, make more profit 
from, for example, wealth management services, and tend to overlook the lower 
end of the credit market. In this sense, those small community-based financial 
firms are an alternative to commercial banks. 
 
The third advantage of setting up new lenders in tackling financial exclusion 
comes from their substance as economic firms. At the government level, there are 
indeed other official regimes that aim to offer small amounts of affordable credit 
to vulnerable residents. In China, for example, regional women’s federations 
provide guarantees for local women residents, helping them to apply for credit 
from local commercial banks.488 For unemployed urban residents who wish to use 
a small-amount loan to start their businesses, there are also similar official 
regimes to provide government guarantees for them. 489  Indeed, these regimes 
provide other available credit sources for low-income customers from mainstream 
banks and cannot be overlooked, since the essence of the regime is to supplement 
borrowers’ creditworthiness with governmental credibility. However, these 
regimes usually need to co-operate with one or more commercial banks that are 
the appointed credit source.490 However, since for commercial banks provision of 
this kind of loan is like undertaking an official task rather than profitable 
businesses, commercial banks still lack the incentive to do so and rely on the local 
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Bureau of Finance to provide interest subsidies to avoid losses. Moreover, to be 
able to receive government guarantees, borrowers are still required to meet 
complicated application criteria and sometimes the provision of a counter 
guarantee is also essential. If the policy ends, then the special benefits for certain 
groups would also stop. Community-based alternative lenders are economic firms 
and have daily businesses, making them more solid than the government’s policy 
unless the firms close down, which is a central problem for small firms and there 
is therefore a need for some regulatory exemptions.  
 
In China, for example, the required deposit reserve of VTBs is lower than that of 
large commercial banks,491 so that VTBs could have more capital to lend out. A 
recent Administration Measure of the Ministry of Finance gives well-operated 
VTBs, RMCs and small- loan companies financial subsidies from the central 
government. 492  There are also tax cuts for those ‘new’ small financial 
institutions. 493  To some extent, the encouraging attitude of the Chinese 
government and the CBRC is a response to large and medium commercial banks’ 
reluctance to serve the lower end of the credit market. Increased competition in 
the county and rural banking market would also benefit local residents if the 
competition is properly regulated. Similarly in the UK, credit unions are also 
found unsustainable and there is a need for some special regulatory exemptions to 
be able to compete with subprime lenders.494  
 
This chapter hence discusses whether the current legislative and regulatory 
environment is suitable for those small alternative lenders to survive and develop 
in both the UK and China, and looks at the regulatory barriers that could be 
removed in future. 
 
3.2.  Possibility of mutuality 
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Recent years have seen the increasing recognition of the role credit unions play in 
the UK.495 As mutual firms, the advantage of credit unions is explicit: low interest 
rates, easy saving facility, accessible location in local community, self-help and 
mutual-aid spirits – all features that could distinguish credit unions from 
‘traditional’ financial corporate public limited company (hereinafter ‘plc’). This 
leads to them being praised officially as the main solution to low-income 
consumers’ debt problems and lack of access to mainstream financial 
institutions.496  
 
However, compared with other countries, such as the US and Ireland, the credit 
union industry in the UK is described as in its early development stage;497 for 
example, it has a smaller customer base,498 lower market penetration499 and there 
is an over-reliance on external subsidies from local authorities. 500  The basic 
statute, the Credit Union Act (1979), is also criticized for being too restrictive and 
constraining the expansion of the industry. 501  The Act was amended slightly 
during the following decades; several limitations were removed to support credit 
union growth. The most recent amendment of the legislation is to raise the interest 
rate cap on loans that credit unions can charge from 2% monthly to 3%, which is 
aimed at the sustainability of credit unions.502 
 
Similarly, in China there has also been official recognition of mutual-style 
financial organizations in recent years. Although the word ‘co-operative’ is 
contained in the name rural credit co-operatives, they have been criticized for 
losing their co-operative feature over decades. By transforming RCCs into 
corporations, the government and financial regulator have de facto given up on 
keeping their mutual feature; instead, rural residents are permitted to set up a new 
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kind of mutual financial organization, RMCs without any state-shareholding or 
commercial bank promotion. The essence of RMCs represented in the CBRC’ 
regulations indicates that this sort of mutual financial organization shares most of 
the principles of its foreign counterparts, although with some special features. 
They are also at a very early stage of development, and only make up a negligible 
part of the total personal loan amount in the country. Up to now there has also not 
been a specific statute that has regulated RMCs; only several regulations from the 
CBRC are in place. Regulatory methods for RMCs are similar to general banking 
regulation, using methods such as capital adequacy ratios to judge their risk 
levels, which is criticized for being too simple and not tailored enough for small 
mutual organizations.503 
 
This part of the thesis is therefore divided into three parts. First, why mutual-style 
credit facilities could play a role in financial inclusion will be discussed on a 
theoretical basis. Second, the legislative and regulatory reforms for credit unions 
in the UK are examined, looking at what is the proper way of regulating this sort 
of financial institution. Third, China’s rural RMCs are then analysed. 
 
3.2.1.  Mutuality, co-operative and mutual organizations: Why mutual  
co-operatives could be a solution 
 
Mutuals or co-operatives are not modern products. Co-operatives in the modern 
sense first emerged in the middle of the nineteenth century in Europe, when the 
working class in vulnerable conditions joined together to set up co-operatives as a 
response to the harsh life in the industrial revolution.504 The earliest mutual group 
is identified as the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers established at 1844 by 
a group of impoverished weavers in England, 505  which was a mutually owned 
shop that provided members with affordable basic necessities. Some of its features 
are considered the predecessor of later co-operative principles, for example, 
member ownership of the firm, election of officials and open membership, which 
were inherited by later co-operative firms.  
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Soon the idea of mutuality spread into other parts of the world, and evolved into 
more mature organizations in diversified sectors, from agriculture to retailing. 
Similarly, in the financial sector, mutually owned credit co-operatives provided 
members with basic but special products, namely credit and saving.506 The first 
known credit union in the world saw the light in Germany in 1869.507 In the next 
few decades it was transformed into two types in different regions : (i) co-
operative banks that now exist in Europe that usually serve the general public, and 
(ii) the more locally related credit unions that exist in North America. The 
distinctive name ‘credit union’ was later adopted by mutual credit firms in many 
jurisdictions that have common bond requirements. 508 It is well recognized that a 
credit union under the 1979 Act in the UK is a mutual (or co-operative) financial 
firm that provides affordable and convenient services to its members. 509 This is 
also the case with rural RMCs that newly emerged in China, whose name partly 
reveals their essence, which differentiates them from commercial lenders.  
 
In fact, it should be noted that co-operative firms with a similar mutual nature 
could have different forms: in the UK, for example, there are several other mutual 
form firms, including co-operative societies, community benefit societies, friendly 
societies and building societies,510 which cover different financial sectors such as 
saving, insurance and healthcare.511 All these mutual societies, including credit 
unions, are registered under the FCA regime. Prior to 2014, the basic legislation 
for these mutual societies was complex, and mainly included the Industrial and 
Provident Societies Act 1965 (IPSA), Friendly and Industrial and Provident 
Societies Act 1968, and the Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies Act 
2003. The legislation was criticized for being too complex and has now been 
consolidated into the Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies Act 2014 
(CCBSA). Therefore, the name ‘Industrial and Provident Society’ was also 
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replaced with ‘Co-operative’ and ‘Community Benefit Society’, with a new legal 
name of ‘registered societies’.512 According to the Act, a co-operative is run for 
the interests of its members, while community benefit societies ‘operate for the 
benefit of the community in which they work’, 513 with the purpose of serving the 
local community rather than only for the benefit of members. Although credit 
unions are also registered under the CCBSA (and previously, the IPSA 1965), it 
follows with the 1979 Act as the basic statute for other detailed rules.  
 
As long as both kinds of firms exist in the same jurisdiction, a mutually owned 
credit firm is different from its stockholder-owned counterparts in many aspects.  
 
First, the ownership mechanism of a credit union is special. A credit union is a 
customer-owned credit firm whose members are its customers and vice versa. By 
purchasing certain shares of the credit union, one could join in the membership of 
a credit union and become one of the owners of the firm, entitled to the right to 
vote and, at the same time, one could also use the credit union’s services and 
become a customer. In the case of a plc, the identity of shareholder and customer 
is divided. However, even in customer-owned mutual firms such as credit unions, 
the firms are also managed by a board of directors and managers, not by the 
owners’ assembly.  
 
Second, mutuals are often regarded as ‘not-for-profit’’ firms that provide 
affordable credit services to people outside mainstream commercial lending 
practices. Mutual-style lenders therefore enjoy a better reputation and are usually 
linked with social values such as community development and combating 
financial exclusion. All these features distinguish a mutual from a corporate type 
of firm (in this case, a credit union and a commercial bank), which leads to the 
different legal and regulatory treatment of different types of lenders. 
 
However, a mutual is still one type of economic firm that is equivalent to other 
firms in the market, for example, private company, public limited company (plc) 
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or a partnership.514 This classification is meaningful because the essence of an 
economic firm is to provide products or services to customers and add value to the 
firm itself.515 Added value – value of the firm’s output that exceeds its input – 
could then be distributed to stockholders or members as a dividend, or accumulate 
to the firm’s own reserves. While other elements include scale, asset size and 
ownership of the firm are secondary. Therefore, a credit union and a commercial 
bank are equal participants in the personal banking market in this sense. Both of 
them are credit intermediaries, and provide saving and borrowing products. In the 
US where credit unions have reached a large scale, the industry as a whole could 
compete with the commercial banking industry in the personal finance market. 
Moreover, from an ordinary customer’s point of view, there is no essential 
difference in products between a credit union and a commercial bank. The key to 
explaining the special legal and regulatory treatment is the mutual feature rooted 
in the organizational form and ownership structure, which differentiates a mutual 
from a company. 
 
3.2.1.1. Features and benefits of member ownership 
 
A mutual organisation (or a co-operative) is owned by its members. The owners 
are at the same time the customers of the co-operative. In its original sense there 
are no ‘internal’ shareholders and ‘external’ customers in a mutual organization; 
instead, the customers of a mutual are its shareholders who have voting rights at 
its annual meeting. Ownership of a mutual organization, hence, belongs to all its 
customers, since to become a customer of a credit union one has to join its 
membership in the first place. While in the case of a plc, such as a commercial 
bank, customers are not necessarily its shareholders: stockholders and customers 
are separate and different groups although there is no barrier to a customer 
purchasing stock and becoming a stockholder.516  
 
This feature of ownership is linked to another feature of a mutual organization. A 
credit union is often regarded as a ‘not- for-profit’ firm, which is not very precise, 
or only meaningful in a limited sense. As economic firms rather than charities, co-
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operatives have to make profit from income (eg, loan interests) minus expenses 
(eg, fees from daily transactions and dividends paid to members) to become 
sustainable. If a mutual cannot add positive value, it would face failure. More 
practically, they need to become self-sustainable and not merely rely on 
government subsidies or public donations. Instead of being ‘not for profit’, mutual 
organizations are actually non-profit-maximizing firms. This means that they do 
not only focus on making profit and distributing it to stockholders, although they 
also have members based on purchased shares and would receive dividends. 
 
To demonstrate this difference between mutuals and plc’s, Kay highlights ‘the 
objective of any business activity’ as adding value.517 However, how these added 
values are distributed in mutuals or plc’s is different. In the case of plc’s, 
stockholders enjoy a primary claim to those profits because they ‘own’ the firm, 
although a successful firm would also benefit employees, customers and the 
community.518 A plc is profit-maximizing because the interests of stockholders 
(‘owners’) are protected. The interests of customers are secondary, as the firm has 
first to meet stockholders’ interests before offering added value to its 
customers, 519  which, however, is not in conflict with stockholders’ interests 
because in a plc owners and customers are separate groups; the former holding the 
ex parte decision-making power. For example, in a most simplified theoretical 
case, stockholders of a commercial bank may wish to maximize the profits of the 
plc by, for example, raising the loan interest rate and lowering the savings rate. 
Customers of that bank have no choice but to accept the new rate or turn to other 
suppliers.  
 
However in a mutual, shareholder and customer groups overlap de facto. 
Therefore, the demands of members and customers are also mixed. As members 
collectively own the mutual, they may wish to earn higher dividends from the firm 
and that the firm is profit-maximizing. Yet as they are at the same time customers 
of a mutual firm, they would demand better-value products and to pay less. There 
are no ‘external’ customers in a mutual as there are in a plc. A simple subtraction 
here could explain this role overlap: profits of the firm come from members’ own 
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pockets and a significant part of the added value of the firm goes to the firm’s 
reserves rather than being paid out as dividends to shareholders. Hence, members 
of a mutual will not benefit from the firm if the mutual becomes profit-
maximizing. In fact, Kay notes that the added value of a mutual is usually 
distributed to consumers;520 for example, in the form of favourable rates, rather 
than directly paid to shareholders as in the case of a plc. 521  The customer 
orientation and special ownership decide that a mutual will not become as profit-
maximizing as a plc, although it indeed derives added value through transactions.  
 
3.2.1.2  Relational contract and trust in a mutual 
 
The role overlap of members and customers in a mutual has another impact, 
namely that its distribution of added value is more blurred than in a plc.  
 
In a profit-maximizing plc, shareholders (or stockholders) naturally enjoy the 
profits and bear the losses, no matter whether the structure is that of a plc or a 
mutual, but how these profits or losses are distributed is different in these two 
types of firms. In a plc, returns are distributed to stockholders based on clear 
clauses of contracts, therefore, stockholders would have clear knowledge of 
whether and how much they could earn as dividends annually, or receive no 
returns because the plc bears financial losses and there is no profit in a year, 
which is clearly based on the proportion of stocks they hold in hand.522 In Kay’s 
view, this clarity in stockholders’ rights and duties in a plc makes it an efficient 
way of doing business.523 In a mutual these factors are not as clear as in a plc, 
especially when the profit of a mutual is distributed in the form of more 
favourable terms of the product.524 Hence, in a credit union, one member cannot 
guarantee his or her distributed added value if he or she has neither savings nor 
taken loans in the year, and even if he or she had used such services, the rate of 
interests is normally not pre-promised.  
 
Why, if a return is not certain, would people still join together to collectively use 
their money? To explain this special feature of mutuals, Kay (1991) views a 
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mutual as the reflection of a relational contract, 525  quoting relational theory 
contract developed by Ian Roderick MacNeil, whose theory was developed in his 
representative article ‘Contracts: Adjustment of Long-term Economic Relations 
under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law’. 
 
In MacNeil’s theory, a relational contract is in contrast to a discrete transaction, 
which is defined as a contract made among strangers absolutely separate from 
present, past and future relationships.526 To describe the situation, MacNeil uses 
the phrase of ‘near discreteness’ rather than pure sense ;527 in other words, it is a 
present exchange of existing goods without anticipation o f a future relationship, 
but the focus is on the immediate exchange.528 A relational contract is on the other 
end of the spectrum as it requires no-present but future exchanges based on 
promise,529 as MacNeil notes: 
 
Discreteness is lost even in the simple promise situation, because a 
basis for trust must exist if the promise is to be of any value. Trust in 
turn presupposes some kind of a relation between the parties. Whether 
it is that created by a shared morality, by prior experience, by the 
availability of legal sanction, or whatever, trust depends upon some 
kind of mutual relation into which the transaction is integrated.530 
 
In short, trust is rooted in the pre-existing relationship (which is not necessarily a 
relational contract). This gives contractual parties a promise of future benefits at 
the time of joining the relationship, as they trust each other or one another. It is 
both impossible and unnecessary to clarify every future promise in a relational 
contract. 
 
In this theory, a relational contract could exist in many types of relations, for 
example, mutual, marriage and employment.531 These relations are rooted in trust, 
rather than contract clauses. There are several features of such a relational 
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contract; for example, Bird concludes these aspects in his analysis of employment 
as a relational contract, which includes (i) the relatively long-term of the contract; 
(ii) open term that comes from uncertainty of the future; (iii) flexibility of contract 
implementation upon a possible change in the needs; (iv) sharing, not division of 
the cake; (v) in order to fulfil the contract people may make further investments; 
(vi) the contract would promote personal relationships with others, as well as 
altruism; (vii) inherent dispute resolution, and (viii) more values, including 
friendship and goodwill would emerge from the contract, which go far beyond 
merely the exchange of goods.532  
 
A mutual generally fits into this type of contract, although compared to a marriage 
contract, it has more contractual characteristics than merely interpersonal trust. 
Taking a credit union as an example, when a person joins the membership of a 
credit union, he or she has chosen a long-term relationship with the firm. 
Members of a credit union share its profits and losses without dividend-sharing 
uppermost in their mind. When uncertainty comes about, a credit union usually 
tends to be more flexible, shows sympathy to the borrower who cannot repay on 
time and puts forward an alternative repayment arrangement. In this regard, 
mutuals are based on trust and good will, and when people join them they are 
seeking a long-term relationship with the firm and future benefits. 
 
It is perhaps in this sense that the mutual could survive in the real economy where 
other types of firms exist. As to its feasibility, Fama and Jensen argue that 
mutuality is particularly suited to the financial sector due to its special ownership 
structure. 533  In their observation, mutuals are suitable for relatively long-term 
personal financial services such as life insurance and mortgages, while 
commercial banks are more suitable for business banking. 534 Customer ownership 
provides mutual financial firms with the possibility of a long-term relationship 
with customers, which would benefit both the firm and customers in the long 
term. The governance of a mutual is based on ‘one person one vote’ rather than 
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‘one share one vote’ as in the case of a plc, which further emphasises the human 
aspect rather than the capital in the firm. 
 
As regards the relational contract, Kay further argues as follows,  
 
The special value of mutuality rests in its capacity to establish and 
sustain relational contract structures. These are exemplified in the 
most successful mutual organisations, which have built a culture and 
an ethos among their employees and customers, which even the best 
of plc structures find difficult to emulate.535 
 
In Kay’s view, the mutual could promote long-term relationships and trust 
between contractual parties, which is necessary in the personal finance sector, 
including life insurance, home mortgage, and saving and loans. When people join 
the relationship, what they are seeking is the future benefit of staying in the 
contract. This anticipation of future benefits leads to the relatively stable customer 
base of a mutual; for example, Amess and Howcroft note the stability of customer 
loyalty and scarcity of opportunistic customer behaviour in a mutual – not only in 
the short term, but also in the medium to long run – which means people tend not 
to quit a credit union and withdraw their deposits to invest in a bank, just because 
it provides slightly higher saving rates.536537 
 
However, there is a problem in Kay’s relational contract theory, which argues that 
steady customer base provides mutuals with essential stability. In the process of 
setting up and operating the business of a mutual, there are de facto two separate 
contracts. The first one is made by the members to set up the mutual entity, at the 
time when people join together and become members of a new firm, while the 
ensuing contract only happens when members of the mutual start buying products 
from, or using the services of, the firm and become customers of the mutual. 
When Kay’s intention is to discuss both contracts to demonstrate the superiority 
of mutuals over plc’s, in fact, he only discusses the second contract between the 
customer and the firm. Is there any essential difference in the relationship between 
a credit union and its customers, and the relationship between a commercial bank 
and its customers, if the customers enjoy the same kind of service such as savings 
                                                 
535
 Kay (n 517) 317. 
536
 Kevin Amess and Barry Howcroft, ‘Corporate Governance Structures and the Comparative 
Advantage of Credit Unions’ (2001) 9 Corporate Governance 59.  
537
 Bird (n 531) 153.  
139 
 
and loans? The answer should be ‘no’ because whatever form a firm takes, 
customers choose the better products from better firms, and there should be no 
baseless loyalty before a customer establishes his or her relationship with a certain 
mutual or a bank. Although in a mutual members are also the customers and vice 
versa, the two identities are de facto two different ones. Customers of a firm do 
not necessarily remain constant and loyal to the firm; it is their position as firm 
members or shareholders that provide the stability. Therefore, the difference and 
advantage of a mutual over a plc lies in the special ownership structure of a 
mutual, which actually provides the firm with customers’ (in essence, the entire 
shareholder body) loyalty. There is also no market for mutual members to sell 
their membership to others such as in the securities market, which further 
stabilizes a mutual’s membership base. The relational contract indeed supports 
mutuals to grow, but it is the stability of members who stay in the firm that 
provides this loyalty and trust in future benefits. 
 
3.2.1.3 Agency problems in mutuals 
 
As discussed above, the ownership structure of a mutual gives it a special 
strongpoint, including the loyalty of long-term customers; but it also has an 
inherent weakness. Viewing a firm as a nexus of contracts, Fama and Jensen 
argue that 
 
[a]gency problems arise because contracts are not costlessly written and 
enforced. Agency costs include the costs of structuring, monitoring, and 
bonding a set of contracts among agents with conflicting interests, plus 
the residual loss incurred because the cost of full enforcement of 
contracts exceeds the benefits.538  
 
In short, agency problems stem from the inefficiency of corporate governance that 
forces one party (the principle) to pay additional resources to control the agents. 
In principle–agent literature, the agency problem may happen in any organisation 
that separates decision–making from risk-bearing, and the former (the agent) 
could make decisions on his or her own interests for the other party (the 
principle), and deliberately making high-risk decisions without bearing the risk of 
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failure. 539  This separation of decision-making (‘control’) and risk-bearing 
(‘ownership’) in a firm is usually the source of agency problems. The cost 
occurred in this process is called agency cost. 
 
Although collectively owned by its customer group, a mutual still has a group of 
‘shareholders’ and team of managers who act as decision-makers, which is similar 
to a plc. Customer ownership of the mutual does not mean a member has power in 
the internal decision-making process. Decision-makers could hence make use of 
their power. In a Final Notice made by the FSA, the decision-makers of the credit 
union involved violated regulations on lending practice,  that is, they lent to 
unqualified external borrowers and were faced with the failure of repayment.540 
The agent in this case exercised its power against the customers’ interests, and the 
members suffered from having to bear the costs of that credit union although the 
regulator had interfered after the failure.  
 
To avoid agency problems, members must protect their own interests as they are 
the owners of the mutual, as in the case of companies. However, shares of a 
mutual are usually more dispersed. Some argue that the degree of dispersed 
ownership has some influence on the agency problem, as in large financial 
institutions (irrespective of whether they are banks, large building societies or 
credit unions) the power of one shareholder is too weak to threaten the 
managers. 541  Amess and Howcroft hence suggest that the dispersed ownership 
structure and the management control are less severe in small institutions such as 
community credit unions. However, as pointed out in the example mentioned in 
the last paragraph, even in a small credit union agency problems could still occur. 
 
In addition, Drake and Llewellyn suggest that members of a mutual are either 
unable or have no incentive to monitor management performance, as getting 
involved in monitoring is both time- and money-consuming; if there are not 
enough rewards for doing so, an ordinary member is less likely to voluntarily get 
involved in monitoring the decision-making.542  
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Amess and Howcroft further note the ‘1/n’ problem among mutuals, namely the 
one-member-one-vote principle could not provide enough incentive for a member 
to monitor the mutual decision-making, as he or she has to bear in mind other 
fellow members sharing the benefits from his or her personal endeavour.543 The 
problem of ‘free-riding’ also exists, which means members would also expect 
others to take such responsibility but do not take action themselves.544  
 
In short, the ownership structure of the mutual cannot avoid agency problems, nor 
can it effectively control the on-going risk in decision-making processes. It is not 
the mutual feature but the separation between decision-making and dispersed 
ownership that causes agency problems in mutuals. 
 
For the problem of the lack of controlling stockholders who have power to 
influence decision-makers, a possible solution to the agency problem in a mutual 
rests in the legally redeemable shares. Fama and Jensen suggest a particular 
feature of the mutual firm, namely that members of a mutual are able to exit the 
firm when they choose to do so.545 Unlike common stocks of a plc, which are not 
redeemable and can only be transferred between stockholders, in a mutual its 
members are able to redeem their shares and deposits. For example, according to 
the Credit Union Act 1979, members of a credit union could withdraw their shares 
and take out deposits if the liabilities are paid up.546 This feature makes it possible 
for members to exert some influence on the firm, as Fama and Jensen suggest:  
 
There is a special form of diffuse control inherent in the redeemable 
claims of financial organizations. The withdrawal decisions of 
redeemable claim holders affect the resources under the control of the 
organization's managers, and they do so in a more direct fashion than 
customer decisions in nonfinancial organizations. The decision of the 
claim holder to withdraw resources is a form of partial takeover or 
liquidation which deprives management of control over assets. This 
control right can be exercised independently by each claim holder. It 
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does not require a proxy fight, a tender offer, or any other concerted 
takeover bid.547 
 
Put another way, in Fama and Jensen’s view, the withdrawable shares of a mutual 
force the managers to be more sensitive to customers’ claims, since in a mutual 
the customers are themselves the owners. If they are dissatisfied with the firm’s 
service, they are able to withdraw their shares and deposits, and turn to other 
suppliers. With a significant part of shares being withdrawn in a short time, a 
mutual would be faced with a liquidity problem since its buffering money is 
depleted. However, in a non-financial corporation, similar action has only an 
indirect influence on the firm, because neither the departure of customers nor the 
transfer of common stocks would directly influence the firm. 548 This is perhaps 
partly a solution to the agency problem in a mutual. Yet it still relies on the 
involvement of members, and is an ex post measure that members could take 
against manager’s decision-making. To become more efficient in avoiding such 
problems, efficient regulations should be in place to provide some ex ante control. 
 
3.2.2  Credit unions in the United Kingdom and China: An introduction 
 
3.2.2.1  Definition and features 
 
A credit union in the UK is a mutual financial organization that can take deposits 
and make loans to its members.549 According to the Credit Union Act 1979, a 
society could be registered as a credit union if its objects are promoting members’ 
thrifts, creating sources of credit, helping members to save and giving them 
training and education, its membership is restricted with specific qualification, it 
has proper rules and its registered office is in Great Britain. 550  People with a 
common bond could join a credit union. After one share of the credit union has 
been fully paid-up, the person then becomes a member of the union. A credit 
union could provide services such as basic banking, saving and borrowing to its 
member free of charge or at affordable rates. Matters of a credit union are decided 
by its members, on a one-member-one-vote basis.  
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Similarly, according to the definition given by the CBRC, an RMC in China is a 
community mutual financial institution that is set up by rural and township 
residents, and rural small enterprises, and provides deposit, loan and settlement 
services to its members.551 The definition underlines its two features, namely the 
mutual and community feature. The mutuality feature distinguishes an RMC from 
other financial institutions, namely an RMC is owned and controlled by its 
members. The community feature indicates its customer group, namely an RMC’s 
role is to serve local residents within a certain small community, and there fore 
people living outside the locality are not eligible to join the membership. 
Members of an RMC can join the mutual by purchasing a share and then begin to 
use the services. The affairs of an RMC are decided by the board of directors, 
elected by all the members on a generally one-member-one-vote basis. When 
most credit co-operatives (RCCs) were demutualized and transformed into 
commercial banks or semi-banks in recent years,552 RMCs were regarded as the 
only form of ‘pure’ authorized mutual financial organization in China. 553 It shares 
most features with credit unions in the UK, although there is no evidence on 
whether the regulator would follow experiences from other jurisdictions such as 
the US, where the credit union industry is already mature. 
 
It is apparent that both credit unions in the UK and RMCs in China share many 
similarities. They are mutual financial institutions owned by customers, and are 
equal to other types of firm in the sense of economic organizations. A mutual firm 
for credit and saving services has its own features distinct from a commercial 
bank or a subprime lender. In fact, it appears that in both countries a mutual 
solution is regarded as, at least one of, the main solutions to relieve financial 
exclusion.554 As Ryder notes, the self-help echoes the ability to provide affordable 
access to credit, which is the decisive reason that leads to recognition by the 
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government. 555  By permitting a new type of financial institution that has an 
inherent inclusion purpose, those who were previously excluded from mainstream 
financial services could have more affordable access to credit, and reduce their 
chance of becoming trapped in high-cost debt.  
 
3.2.2.2  Development stage and route choice 
 
The first credit union in the UK was only set up in 1964 in Wimbledon by 
members of ethnic minorities.556 However, the growth of the credit union industry 
in the country was slow in the years that followed. Many researchers criticize the 
progress made with development for being slow. Lack of proper statute was 
regarded as part of the reason before the 1979 Act came into force. Besides, it is 
noted that local authorities showed less interest in supporting credit unions until 
the late 1980s.557  
 
This attitude of neglect in political policy has changed since then.558 Ryder notes 
the measures taken by the UK Labour government since 1997 were aimed at 
reducing financial exclusion and increasing access to affordable credit. Since then, 
the industry has received support from the government and local authorities, ‘from 
political obscurity to the top of the government’s financial exclusion policy’.559 
However, after more than a decade’s development, the penetration level of credit 
unions in the UK is still at a low level. Data show that total membership in both 
Britain and Northern Ireland increased from 232,137 in 1991 to 697,560 in 2001, 
to 814, 538 in 2004,560 to 953,000 as at February 2012, which is only 4% of the 
lower- income population.561 The size of individual credit unions also increased, 
but the majority (75%) of credit unions is still small in size with an asset size of 
fewer than 0.5 million. 562  While in the US, about 30% of the population are 
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members of credit unions.563  Many researchers also compare the UK with the 
Republic of Ireland, where credit unions serve local communities adequately with 
a high market penetration.564 Moreover, credit unions in the UK are also found to 
be non-sustainable and without external support.565  
 
RMCs have emerged in the Chinese market more recently566 and were recognised 
by the banking regulator only after 2007. Both the industry and the relevant 
regulations are still in their early development stages. It is unfortunate that there is 
no national-scale data on the RMC industry in China, there are also no market 
penetration statistics. However, the industry scale is still small. At the end of June 
2012, there were only 49 licensed RMCs in the whole country. Most of them are 
small in size and have only a few hundred members.567 Compared with the credit 
union industry in the UK, the status quo of China’s RMC industry is similar to the 
credit union industry in the UK in the 1970s and 1980s. For example, RMCs are 
generally small, their locations are mainly in deprived rural communities, the 
common bond is strictly limited to locality, they rely on members’ deposits and 
external grants, their products are limited to savings and loans, there is no specific 
statute that governs them, the regulator lacks regulatory resources, and there is no 
mature licensing and supervisory regime. At present, the industry is still too small 
to be able to compete with other lenders.  
 
Sibbald, Ferguson and McKillop identified several stages of the credit union 
industry development, and suggest that there are three stages: (i) nascent, (ii) 
transition and (iii) mature. 568  The different stages may be divided into many 
features, including asset size, common bond, the management style, customer 
target, product variety, sustainability and regulation level.569 This typology paves 
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the way for credit union industry development. Credit unions in their nascent 
stage are more likely small, mutual help groups in a deprived community, while in 
the mature stage they are large, experienced financial institutions operating across 
regions. When this typology is applied, it appears that the industry in China could 
be placed in its nascent stage, based on the sectors listed above; while the industry 
in the UK ranks in the transition stage.570 The credit union industry in the US is 
perhaps a more vivid example of the mature stage with the size of the total 
industry exceeding 10,000 credit unions in total, serving more than half the 
country’s population.571  
 
As the typology is the path for the development based on real conditions in some 
typical countries, it is therefore assumed that if well supported, the credit union 
industry in a country could ‘evolve’ into a higher stage of development, as Jones 
argues, ‘wherever credit unions have grown significantly, they have all been 
established as professional financial institutions able to operate effectively within 
an increasingly competitive market place’,572 
 
There is, however, concern that the ‘modernization’ of credit unions may cause 
the loss of their financial inclusion feature and transform into another sort of 
mainstream lender. Berthoud and Hinton (1989) suggest two approaches on this 
issue: the first is the idealist approach, which means credit unions shall keep their 
original focus of serving only poor people in deprived communities.573 To avoid 
losing this feature and becoming yet another commercial financial institution, a 
credit union shall remain small in size and be managed by voluntary members. 
The second approach is the instrumentalist approach, namely credit unions are 
only one type of intermediary of credit and need to be large in size and have more 
members. The choice of approach would have a direct influence on the industry 
foreground.  
 
In many respects, the credit union industry in the UK has experienced a 
deregulation process which gives the industry more flexibility to expand and 
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support its growth. In this sense the UK takes the instrumental approach. The 
relaxed common bond criteria during the past few years are one of the examples. 
As regards the size of individual credit unions, Lord Stoneham of Droxford 
argued for larger credit unions in Parliament in December 2012:  
 
The small, area-based credit unions need to move to a bigger scale, to 
the counties or the regions, to be viable and have the capacity to 
expand. To be sustainable, they must also expand their services; they 
simply will not be viable if they are concentrating on small loans, 
although that will be a major part of their work.574  
 
In the case of the US, the largest credit unions are found mainly to be serving 
middle-class employees within one or more occupational common bond who have 
a stable job and income. However, community development credit unions 
(hereinafter ‘CDCU’) in the US are community-based and still focus on low- and 
medium-income customers. A CDCU enjoys more regulatory advantages and 
government subsidies due to its community-serving feature, including the use of 
the Community Development Financial Institutions (hereinafter ‘CDFI’) Fund. To 
support the small, community-based credit unions’ development, the law has to 
make some compromises on credit union’s ‘traditional’ feature and remove the 
legal restrictions, which were originally viewed as representing the mutual and 
prudent spirit of credit unions.  
 
3.2.3  Deregulation process in credit unions: United Kingdom experiences 
 
Although still small in scale, the credit union industry in the UK has experienced 
a noticeable increase in institutional numbers, membership size and total loan 
amount.575 Apart from natural size increases during the years of accumulation, the 
development could partly be attributed to the legislative amendments, which give 
the industry capacity to grow.576 Legislative amendment, together with gradually 
relaxed regulatory requirements that take the different sizes of credit unions into 
consideration, are supposed here as the basic reason for the UK credit unions’ 
growth. 
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The basic statute that regulates credit unions in the UK is the 1979 Act, which 
provides the fundamental legal framework for the industry. Prior to that, the credit 
union industry in the UK was regulated under the Industrial and Provident 
Societies Act 1965 and the Companies Act 1948, which were regarded as not 
appropriate for the industry to develop.577578 
 
Indeed, before the 1979 Act, the credit union industry in the UK was tiny and 
regarded as a failure. It is well recognized that the lack of an appropriate 
legislative framework is one of the major reasons why credit unions did not 
develop.579  
 
However, before later amendments, the 1979 Act was also criticized for being too 
restrictive which constrained industry develop; 580  for example, the maximum 
number of members was 5,000 people,581 the limit of loans available to a member 
was £2,000,582 the unsecured loan had to be repaid in two years,583 and the interest 
rate cap that a credit union could charge was 1% per month.584 The main content 
of the 1979 Act focuses on the registration procedure, rather than specific 
provisions that can facilitate industry growth. As Ryder (2002) notes, the 1979 
Act ‘was relatively simple in form and content and, despite seeking to encourage 
the growth of the credit union movement, sought to limit the s ize of membership, 
of shareholding and of loans for individual unions to the small amounts consistent 
with the formative years of credit unions.’585 Such highly regulated legislation is 
characteristic of the nascent stage of the credit union industry if using the 
typology coined by Sibbald, Ferguson and McKillop.586 
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The 1979 Act has since then been amended several times and gives more space 
for credit unions to develop. It was regarded as a deregulation process.587  
 
3.2.3.1  A gradually relaxing process of common bond criteria 
 
To be eligible to join the membership of a credit union, people need to meet some 
eligibility standards. This is the requirement of common bond between members 
of a credit union that was first set in s 1(4) of the 1979 Act.  
 
Common bond restrictions on membership originated in the co-operative essence 
of the credit union, since a co-operative is set up by people ‘to meet their common 
economic, social, and cultural needs’.588 As discussed previously, a credit union is 
not only a financial institution, but also a co-operative firm; people who use its 
saving and borrowing services are also members of it, rather than merely 
customers. This requires certain boundaries for eligible members, rather than 
indiscriminately accepting the general public as customers. 
 
Many researchers in economics also explain the purpose of setting up this 
common bond requirement in legislation. Generally, the common bond is 
regarded as a way of reducing information asymmetry, because members of a 
credit union are linked together by something that they have in common and are 
assumed to be familiar with one another; for example, Black and Dugger are of 
the view that common bond is ‘assumed to reduce the cost of gathering credit 
information, reducing bad debt and manifests itself in many ways’’589 Griffiths 
and Howells further explain the essence of common bond as ‘the tie that binds the 
members together’, and suggest that it is the knowledge of other members in the 
credit union that replaces the traditional way of assessing creditworthiness used 
by commercial banks.590 This is meaningful as customers of credit unions may 
experience some difficulty proving their creditworthiness and getting credit from 
a mainstream lender, while if someone else in the credit union knows about a 
person’s honesty and personal status, then people can assess that person’s 
                                                 
587
 For further details , see Timothy Edmonds, ‘Credit Unions’ (2013) para 3.2. 
588
 International Co-operative Alliance, ‘Co-Operative Definition’ <http://ica.coop/en/whats -co-
op/co-operative-identity-values-principles> accessed 8 April 2014.  
589
 Harold Black and Robert H Dugger, ‘Credit Union Structure, Growth and Regulatory 
Problems’ (1981) XXXVI The Journal of Finance. 
590
 Griffiths and Howells  (n 579). 
150 
 
creditworthiness and provide credit. Amess and Howcroft regard the existence of 
common bond as an informal way of deciding creditworthiness,591 compared with 
the formal way of using personal information and credit record databases. As to 
the effect of this familiarity, Ward and McKillop suggest that members of a credit 
union are able to get to know one another better and could share the ‘sense of 
loyalty and commitment to a joint enterprise’,592 which is essential for community 
development. It could also provide some pressure for repayment, since this is 
related to a person’s reputation in the community. All these well-documented 
suggestions give reasons why legislation on credit unions has the common bond 
requirement.  
 
However, what must be kept in mind is that the general trend of the credit union 
industry development is the gradual relaxation of common bonds, or 
deregulation.593 Common bond restrictions tend to be the tightest in the nascent 
stage, and become more flexible after the industry has matured. When the industry 
develops into the mature stage, large credit unions may have very flexible 
common bonds.594 It would not be limited to a certain community or a workplace, 
but would combine the two or more common bonds together. This gives a small 
credit union more space for a larger membership, which is essential for the firm to 
become self-sustainable and rely on fewer external grants.  
 
More flexible common bonds would, however, inevitably influence the familiarity 
between members. For example, if a credit union serves customers in multiple 
localities, then members have less opportunity to get to know one another. 
Therefore, the informal creditworthiness assessment based on members’ 
familiarity of others also loses its effectiveness. On this issue, Black and Dugger 
argue that, as credit unions grow and become more complex, the personal nature 
of credit unions is influenced.595 When multiple common bonds are permitted and 
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different groups of people are allowed into the same credit union, the chance of 
getting to know one another is decreased. Furthermore, in most mature conditions 
such as in the US, common bonds in large credit unions are regarded as loose 
criteria that eligible people could join. The original intention of common bonds 
has gradually decreased. 
 
Why, if the criteria are relaxed continually, would legislation still have the 
common bond requirement rather than directly abolishing it? This query could 
perhaps be partly answered using the ‘instrumentalist approach’ of the credit 
union development model. The regulator wishes to keep credit unions mutual, 
which, as discussed in previous sections, is suggested as suitable to relieve 
financial exclusion. However, at the same time, the regulator also lists the 
sustainability of the firm as a priority. Broadening of common bond criteria is 
hence a legislative compromise between old traditions and firm development. 
Maintaining the common bond in legislation is still meaningful: for large credit 
unions, the common bond requirement could distinguish them from commercial 
banks, which gives legitimacy to, if there is any, regulatory exemptions. While for 
those small community credit unions, permission for multiple common bonds is 
essential because it gives them more space to expand. 
 
Griffiths and Howells explain this question in more detail: they divide common 
bond into two types, namely the (i) ‘community’ type and (ii) the ‘occupational’ 
type. 596  The former is usually chosen by credit unions located in deprived 
communities and serve low-income members.597 The problem is that simply to 
rely on poor customers would limit the growth of the credit union, as the customer 
it serves cannot collectively save enough funds to be used in the community.598 
Such credit unions are more vulnerable to risks and are forced to determine to 
whom to lend more carefully, using similar assessment standards to those used by 
commercial banks.599 Apparently, this is not desirable for industry development. 
In contrast, the latter type, namely occupationally based common bond, could 
provide a more solid base for development, as the members who have a regular 
income are linked by occupation.600 Griffiths and Howells’ suggestion is that the 
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combination of the two types of common bond could help to solve the 
sustainability problem, using an example of a credit union that is able to serve 
both poor local residents and factory workers. As the factory is located in a poor 
community, the savings from workers can boost the funds of that credit union, so 
poor local residents can benefit.601 
 
In short, multiple common bonds could strengthen the sustainability of credit 
unions and facilitate industry development, rather than its original purpose of 
proven creditworthiness. This is perhaps one of the explanations for the legislative 
amendments of common bonds in the UK in the past few years, and in the US 
several decades ago.602  
 
Originally, there were five types of common bond in the 1979 Act: (i) following a 
particular occupation; (ii) residing in a particular locality; (iii) being employed in 
a particular locality; (iv) being employed by a particular employer; (v) being a 
member of a bona fide organisation or being otherwise associated with other  
members of the society for a purpose other than that of forming a society to be 
registered as a credit union.603 Ryder (2009) categorises them into four types: (i) 
industrial, (ii) residential, (iii) association and (iv) live or work association.604 
Credit unions can only choose one of them as their membership eligib ility 
requirement. 
 
Dual common bonds, namely the ‘residing in or being employed in a particular 
locality’ common bond, namely the ‘live and work’ type as mentioned above were 
only added to the legislation in 1996. 605  Only after that could residents and 
workers in the same locality join the same credit union.  
 
The next amendment was in 2003. A credit union was permitted to combine the 
qualification of being a member of a bona fide organisation with any other 
qualifications in section 1(4)(a)–(d), so credit unions were, for the first time, able 
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to use multiple common bonds and combine two groups of people together. 606 The 
FSA also increased the flexibility on common bonds in its handbook.607  
 
However, one of most significant deregulations of common bonds was made in 
2011 by the Legislative Reform (Industrial and Provident Societies and Credit 
Unions) Order 2011 (hereinafter ‘LRO’), which amended the 1979 Act most 
profoundly in the following aspects:  
 
First, it allows credit unions to freely combine one or more common bonds in 
their admission to membership.608 Separate common bonds that are appropriate 
for credit unions in the 1979 Act remained in the LRO.609 After the amendment, 
credit unions were allowed to serve different groups of customers on the basis of 
one or more common bonds, which gives credit unions more flexibility to expand 
their market; for example, a credit union can serve employees’ employed by a 
hospital, and residents and other people employed in the same locality where the 
hospital is located.  
 
Second, it also regards ‘living in the same household or is a relative of a credit 
union member’ as the existence of a common bond,610 which further widens the 
potential membership.  
 
Third is the permission of corporate membership.611 The 1979 Act only permits 
individuals to be members of a credit union,612 which is criticized for being too 
restrictive when compared with the American example.613 The LRO changed such 
limitation by permitting three types of corporate members to join the membership 
of a credit union: (i) a body corporate; (ii) a person acting for a partnership and 
(iii) an officer or member of the governing body of an unincorporated 
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association. 614  Such body corporate, partnership and unincorporated association 
form the bond between members of a certain credit union, because they employ or 
engage persons in a particular occupation that are eligible to join a credit union,615 
or employ persons as the particular employer or provide services to that employer, 
whose employees are eligible for a membership of a credit union, 616  or their 
workplace is located in ‘a particular locality’ where other individual members 
reside or are employed in that locality,617 or they are a member of a bona fide 
organisation or are associated with individual members of that organisation. 618 By 
relaxing the membership, the LRO supports the credit union industry with further 
flexible common bonds, since local corporates, partnerships and social enterprises 
could also use the services of a credit union, and give their support to the local 
community by depositing money into a credit union.619  
 
Finally, the scope of ‘locality’ in a common bond is also virtually expanded.620 If 
the total number of potential customers linked by the same locality common bond 
does not exceed 2 million, and every one of those customers is still able to enjoy 
full rights as a member, then it is recognized that a meaningful common bond  
exists. 621  Ryder notes that, previously, the FSA confined the maximum 
membership of a credit union to 1 million, and if it exceeded this figure, the FSA 
would assume the common bond was ‘so diluted as to be meaningless’ unless a 
credit union could defend itself using sufficient evidence.622 Combined with other 
deregulated aspects, the 2 million maximum membership gives plenty of room for 
UK credit unions to grow in advance, especially since it is now permissible to 
combine multiple common bonds together. 
 
With all those legislative amendments, credit unions in the UK now, more than 
ever, have space to grow. The latest amendment is still too new to evaluate its de 
facto effect. However, it is reasonable to assume that they could benefit from such 
legislation, as the current legislation does not require small credit unions to 
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expand; on the contrary, it gives those small firms the possibility to grow, based 
on their own willingness. At least, the gradually relaxed process of common 
bonds removes regulatory barriers for credit unions.  
However, the deregulation process does not mean that the common bond would 
eventually be removed from legislation. The existence of the common bond 
distinguishes a credit union from commercial banks from a customer group, which 
gives legitimacy to those regulatory exemptions that apply to credit unions only. 
In this sense, a credit union could and shall not compete with banks. Hence, if 
common bond requirements are too flexible, it may cause commercial banks’ 
scepticism on its real effect of distinguishing between banking and credit union 
industries. Too flexible common bond criteria are criticised as de facto expanding 
a credit union’s customers to the general public while still enjoying regulatory 
exemptions, which is argued by commercial banks as being unfair.  
 
This dispute is represented by the US, where the credit union industry is able to 
compete with commercial banks due to, at least partly, legislative amendments 
and deregulation. 623  Although this would only happen when the credit union 
industry has reached a mature stage, it is still meaningful to look at this case, as it 
could demonstrate the possible influence of deregulation on this issue. 
 
A US dispute on common bond requirement 
 
Basically, credit unions in the US could be divided into two groups: (i) federal 
chartered and (ii) state chartered. This division further decides by what regulations 
they are regulated and who the regulator is. As the dispute mainly occurs between 
federal chartered unions and the commercial banking industry, the discussion here 
also focuses on federal chartered credit unions.  
 
For federally chartered credit unions, the basic legislation is the Federal Credit 
Unions Act (hereinafter ‘FCUA’), first enacted in 1934, which also sets out the 
power of the federal regulator, the National Credit Union Administration 
(hereinafter ‘NCUA’).  
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In the 1930s when the Act was first enacted, the role of the national credit union 
system in providing affordable credit to the working class had already been 
recognized by Congress.624 This led to the enactment of the Act, in which a credit 
union is regarded as ‘co-operative association organized . . . for the purpose of 
promoting thrift among its members and creating a source of credit for provident 
or productive purposes’.625 It is fair enough to regard this definition as a perfect 
one, as it defines a credit union with all its features, among which the limitation 
on eligible membership is essential to distinguish a credit union from a 
commercial bank.  
 
Besides, common bond is also regarded as useful to promote thrift, as NCUA 
argues:  
 
To promote thrift and credit extension, a meaningful affinity and bond 
among members, manifested by a commonality of routine interaction, 
shared and related work experiences, interests, or activities, or the 
maintenance of an otherwise well understood sense of cohesion or 
identity is essential to the fulfillment of the public mission of credit 
unions.626 
 
This argument still focuses on the traditional sense of common bonds, namely 
members need to share something to fulfil the original purpose of a mutual. 
However, in a more practical sense, the common bond requirement is more 
meaningful to distinguish two types of firms. Based on its common bonds, a credit 
union does not serve the general public and, hence, is not a competitor for 
commercial banks. This boundary gives credit unions legitimacy to enjoy 
additional regulatory exemptions.  
 
For example, Black and Dugger mention that, for a long period, federal credit 
unions were not subject to the branch restrictions of the McFadden Act, which 
restricted national banks from opening branches across state lines. 627  Credit 
unions are also not subject to Regulation Q, which limits the interest return on 
accounts with all other depository institutions, namely a credit union could pay 
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higher interests on demand deposit than the Regulation Q rate for commercial 
banks. 628  A credit union is also free from corporate income tax. 629  These 
exemptions found their legitimacy in the restrictions on membership: as a credit 
union is not able to grab banks’ customers, they shall not be equally regulated at 
the same level.  
 
Based on this recognition, in the early stages of their development (between 1932 
and 1982), federal chartered credit unions in the US could only have a single 
common bond.630 NCUA interpreted this restriction in the Federal Credit Union 
Act (§ 109) in a broader sense in 1982, and expanded single common bonds to 
combine different occupational groups.631 This flexibility gives US credit unions 
enough space to expand their services to different group of customers and reduces 
credit union failure.632 It was observed that due to this legislative amendment that 
reduced membership restrictions, multi-occupational credit unions in the US 
developed rapidly and dominated the federal credit union industry.633  
 
However, the US banking industry regards the redefined common bond 
requirement as too wide to be meaningful, and large credit unions operate like 
commercial banks, serve multi-groups of people according to their wishes but 
enjoy additional tax and regulation exemption. 634  Credit unions also do not 
comply with the Community Reinvestment Act (hereinafter ‘CRA’) as 
commercial banks do. The banking industry therefore argues that de facto it 
serves more vulnerable customers, which adds to the unfairness.635  
 
In the 1990s, conflict between the banking and credit union industries entered a 
white-hot stage, as both were engaged in lawsuit and lobbying activities. NCUA 
was sued several times by banks and bank associations for breaking the 1934 Act 
for allowing too many ‘unaffiliated groups’ into it. 636  Different federal courts 
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showed opposing attitudes on the precise meaning of ‘common bond’.637 Without 
a satisfying result for both sides, finally the dispute was handed over to the US 
Supreme Court. However, in the most significant lawsuit, NCUA v First Bank & 
Trust Co., NCUA lost judicial support. The Supreme Court regards NCUA’s 
interpretation of occupation common bond as too wide to be meaningful, believes 
that it would lead to de facto unlimited membership size and points out that 
NCUA’s expanding understanding is ‘impermissible’.638 After this judicial failure, 
NCUA turned to political support and finally promoted the Credit Union 
Membership Access Act (hereinafter ‘CUMAA’), enacted in 1998, 639  which 
amends the Federal Credit Unions Act and gives more flexible space for US credit 
unions to increase their potential members, not only re-confirms the multiple 
occupational but also allows membership within well-defined local community.640  
 
The banking industry is opposed to the legislation, as the Oklahoma Bankers 
Association argues: 
 
We believe that it is against the country’s best interest, and unfair, to 
pass a law allowing big credit unions to expand almost without limit 
while leaving the tax burden on everyone else. The credit unions that 
have strayed from their original mission and have chosen to become 
full service financial providers should play by the rules like those 
governing their tax paying competitors.641 
 
The loosely interpreted common bond of credit unions and the loss of the co-
operative feature of the organization during the deregulation process in the US 
have been criticized; for example, Hicks points out that it is the common bond 
requirements that maintain the mutuality of members together as a co-
operative. 642  Citing the example of the AT&T Family Federal Credit Union 
(hereinafter ‘ATTF’), which has 112,000 members working in 191 separate 
businesses all across the country at that time, Hicks argues that 
 
the common bond definition is diluted by legislation and agency 
interpretation, the concept of a credit union as a cooperative becomes 
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more tenuous . . . At some point, a collection of unrelated people 
should not be considered a cooperative because they fail to possess 
any sort of mutual connection or common relationship.643 
 
However, in contrast, this legal dispute between two industries, one of which has 
only been developed since the gradual deregulation, shows how regulations could 
facilitate the growth of a type of firm and help it compete with other players in the 
market. 
 
In the UK, the credit union industry has not developed into the mature stage as its 
US counterpart has. The deregulation of the common bond could be a problem in 
the competition sector after the industry has grown to the point where it would be 
able to compete with commercial banks, as is the case in the US. However, in the 
current stage it appears that the British government’s focus is on increasing the 
sustainability of credit unions by deregulation, and allows the industry to compete 
with subprime lenders; home credit, mail order catalogue and payday lender, not 
the commercial banks. 644  Considering the de facto membership size of British 
credit unions, 645  deregulation of the common bond gives the industry enough 
space to grow and removes many obstacles before it becomes a meaningful threat 
to banks. Nevertheless, from the several legislative amendments it is obvious that 
the UK chooses the sustainability value in the first place; the mutual feature of 
credit unions has to give way to organisational and industry growth.  
 
Last but not least, when the industry becomes more mature, a large part of credit 
unions based on occupation would unavoidably serve more middle-class 
customers. This is distinctive in the US, where the largest credit unions in the 
country are occupation-based, serving employees; while the CDCUs are 
community-based and still focus on low- and medium-income customers. A 
CDCU enjoys more regulatory advantages and government subsidies due to its 
community-serving feature. For example, a qualified CDCU is able to use the 
CDFI Fund. The credit union industry in the UK has not reached this stage yet, 
but the example in the US could partly answer the concern of encouraging credit 
unions to grow, would push them to become another commercial bank, namely a 
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small lender that has a financial inclusion purpose shall enjoy additional 
regulatory treatment to become sustainable. If regulations cannot give such 
additional recognition, it could become a barrier for those individual lenders to 
grow.  
 
3.2.3.2  Legislative amendments of customer borrowing 
 
Deregulation is also reflected in the removal of restrictions on customer 
borrowing. The original provision is set out in section 11 of the 1979 Act, which 
is restrictive in many respects. The gradually deregulation process gives more 
flexibility for customers. 
 
i Expansion of loan purposes 
 
According to the 1979 Act, a loan must have a provident or productive purpose.646 
Although the Act does not explain what a provident or productive loan is, this 
restriction may exclude consumption loans, irrespective of the borrower’s real 
repayment ability. In fact, whether loan purposes are acceptable, shall be decided 
only by the credit union itself, as its customers may have different requirements. 
To facilitate a credit union’s development, legislation shall give it enough 
flexibility in detailed business operations. 
 
This restriction on loan purposes was deleted in the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (Consequential Amendments and Transitional Provisions) 
(Credit Unions) Order 2002. Today in the UK credit unions provide diversified 
loan products, and there are usually no advance loan purposes for these products; 
the purpose of a certain loan application is decided by the borrower and the credit 
union decides whether to accept or reject it.  
 
ii Maximum total amount and length of loans 
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In the 1979 Act, the total amount of a loan to a member shall not exceed £2,000 
more than his or her paid-up shareholding.647 The length of a secured loan could 
not exceed five years, and an unsecured one could not exceed two years.648 Under 
the current FCA and PRA regulations, credit unions are divided into two 
categories based on their size and capital. 649  This is the distinction between a 
version one and a version two credit union, the requirements for each are 
differently based on the difference in their size. 650Again, taking its size into 
consideration gives a credit union more flexibility in its daily transactions. Both 
versions 1 and 2 credit unions are permitted to provide mortgages with the 
contract period not extending beyond 25 years,651 which enables credit unions to 
compete with subprime mortgage providers. The loan amount and length of the 
loan provide credit unions with more flexibility to serve customers’ different 
needs. 
 
iii Lending to corporate members 
 
As a credit union could have corporate members, it could also lend to corporate 
members if the rules permit it to do so, 652  with some limitations to protect 
individual members’ interest, for example, the total balance of a credit union’s 
loan to corporate members shall not exceed 10% of its loans to all the members.653 
This protects individual members’ interests. It could also prevent a credit union 
that enjoys tax and other regulatory benefits from not mainly serving individual 
members, but merely lending to corporate members. However, the permission of 
corporate members could give a credit union more sustainability. In the US, it is 
shown that corporate membership in credit unions could support the credit union’s 
growth through an employment relationship, as the joining of a firm as a member 
facilitates its employees to join the credit union.654 
 
iv Interest rate cap 
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To give credit unions more sustainability, the cap on the interest rate that a credit 
union can charge was lifted from 1% to 3% per month.  
 
In the 1979 Act, the ceiling is 1% per month, including all administrative and 
other expenses.655 Since the 1974 Consumer Credit Act has removed interest rate 
ceilings, credit unions are the only type of mainstream lender that has a legislative 
interest rate cap for a long period. Payday lenders are also regulated with interest 
rate caps.656 This is criticised for being too restrictive and would influence both 
borrowers and credit unions. For example, Ryder (2009) mentions that the 1% 
interest rate ceiling is ‘problematic’ since it forces a credit union to ask its 
members to save before they can borrow, because credit unions could not 
accumulate enough funds from interest income to re- lend them.657 Limited by size, 
credit unions are, hence, unable to serve more people who need instant loans for 
emergency purposes, and the gap in the market could be seized by subprime 
lenders. It could also limit the sustainability of some small credit unions, if 
interest income cannot cover defaulted loan losses.  
 
Considering this possibility, the Treasury published the ‘Promoting Financial 
Inclusion’ report in 2004 to consult widely on the cost and benefit of raising 
interest rate ceilings,658 and invited responses. The result of the responses shows a 
generally positive attitude towards raising the cap, although with opposing voices 
as this would be a ‘threat to the ethos of the credit union movement’.659 However, 
the government benefits from the costs. The ceiling was raised to 2% by Credit 
Unions (Maximum Interest Rate on Loans) Order 2006, yet the 2% ceiling also 
received some criticism after several years of applying, as not being enough to 
support small credit unions’ growth. For example, the DWP credit union 
expansion project has studied the feasibility of the industry, and notes the gap 
between the high operational cost of small loans and the interest rate that a credit 
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union could charge. 660  Small, short-term loans usually have more expensive 
administrative fees, which is partly the reason why commercial banks do not serve 
the market. A restrictive interest ceiling at 2% makes it unlikely for ‘even the 
most cost-effective (credit unions) to break even on smaller loans at present.’661  
 
To increase the sustainability of the industry, the government chose to raise the 
ceiling for the second time to 3% per month through Credit Unions (Maximum 
Interest Rate on Loans) Order 2013. The DWP’s credit union feasibility report 
explains the increase to 3% by listing an example of a £400 loan interest rate per 
month at the rate of 2%, 2.5% and 3%, and shows that the total interest on a £400 
loan is £82.19 at a 3% rate over a period of 52 weeks,662 and regards this example 
as ‘still compar[ing] very favourably to the interest charge of over £300 on a 
similar loan from a leading credit lender’. 663  Moreover, the interest ceiling is 
permissive rather than compulsory, and credit unions are free to charge lower 
rates than the legal maximum.664 The consultation document of HM Treasury on 
the credit union’s maximum interest rate cap argues that 
 
a more stable credit union sector will mean that low-income 
consumers will have greater access to reliable, affordable credit, 
without having to resort to more expensive means, such as home 
credit or payday lenders, or worse, illegal lenders.665 
 
Increasing the ceiling of the interest rate is regarded as a solution to such a status 
by giving credit unions more available income to cover the costs. 
 
3.2.3.3 The size matters: Differentiated regulatory standards for credit unions 
and banks, and for version 1 and 2 credit unions 
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In the regulatory regime in the UK, credit unions are treated in a similar, but 
simplified, manner when compared with banks and building societies. This means 
regulating methods are similar, yet the standards are different. Besides, regulatory 
standards for large and small credit unions are also distinct, considering their size 
difference. Distinction in regulatory standards is regarded here as another key 
point in facilitating industry growth, as it is the opposite of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach. 
 
i Regulatory framework for credit unions 
 
Before 1998, the regulatory body of the credit union industry was the Registry of 
Friendly Societies under the Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1965. 
Regulation of the Registry was criticized for being too limited to be effective; for 
example, Sibbald, Ferguson and McKillop mention that in 1980s there were only 
two people working in the Registry that managed credit union business. 666 
Limited regulatory resources does not mean the industry has more room to 
manoeuvre. On the contrary, it means that the regulator cannot understand new 
conditions in the industry quickly, which may delay the process of making new 
rules to adapt the market. Furthermore, if the regulator’s resources are limited, 
then the firm’s misconduct cannot be overseen effectively, which, according to 
the adverse selection theory, would only harm both consumers’ interests and the 
market order.  
 
In order to better regulate the credit union industry, the powers of regulation were 
transferred from the Registry to the FSA in 2002, as the former was incorporated 
into the latter. 667  FSA powers include authorisation of the credit unions, 
supervision and regulation, and investigatory and disciplinary powers. Although 
there were concerns that the regulator would adopt a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach 
in credit union regulation in the same way as banks and building society 
regulations, Ryder praises the new regime for being ‘proportionate’ which could 
facilitate industry growth.668  This is reflected in the FSA Handbook for Credit 
Unions. Many aspects of this handbook were superseded by the version of the 
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sourcebook that followed. After the FSA had been split into two regulatory 
authorities in 2013, namely (i) the PRA and (ii) the FCA, the power of regulating 
credit unions was also transferred to the PRA and FCA.  
 
The current regulatory framework is the CREDS, which contains both prudential 
and conduct regulations. However, many other regulatory standards also apply to 
the industry. CREDS 10.1.3 gives a detailed glossary on the application of other 
sourcebooks with which a credit union must comply. These include the Threshold 
Conditions (hereinafter ‘COND’), Supervision (hereinafter ‘SUP’), Conduct of 
Business Sourcebook (hereinafter ‘COBS’), and Banking: Conduct of Business 
Sourcebook (hereinafter ‘BCOBS’). Moreover, a credit union that seeks to operate 
credit-related regulated activities has to comply with the new CONC, which 
provides detailed conduct standards for consumer credit-related regulated 
activities.669  
 
Generally, these sourcebooks are applied to credit unions only if a credit union 
operates regulated activities. For example, a credit union that accepts deposits has 
to comply with several sections in BCOBS and COBS, not the whole 
sourcebook;670 if a credit union provides a Child Trust Fund, it shall also comply 
with COBS, as well as the Child Trust Funds Act 2004. Failure to comply with 
the rules will result in penalties based on the Decision Procedure and Penalties 
Manual (hereinafter ‘DEPP’). Generally, the regulatory regime in these 
sourcebooks is proportionate to the size of the credit unions, as their size is taken 
into consideration, as discussed in the next sections. 
 
ii Differentiated regulatory standards between credit unions and other 
financial firms 
 
Considering the relatively small size of credit unions, it is reasonable to reduce 
regulatory standards to fit in with their limited size and resources. As discussed in 
the previous section on common bonds, the separation of customer groups is the 
legitimacy of any regulatory exemptions, because a credit union cannot directly 
compete with a commercial bank who serves the general public. Therefore, legal 
exemptions would not lead to unfair competition.  Similarly, reduced regulatory 
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standards are not in conflict with fair competition; it comes from the size 
difference between financial firms.  
 
For example, in section 8.2 of CREDS, all credit unions are required to submit 
quarterly and annual returns to the PRA, in order to report the ‘key financial data’ 
in their operation.671 Although all the firms that are permitted to take regulated 
activities have to do this, 672  the format requirements are different. A bank is 
required by SUP to send its data to the PRA by ‘electronic means’ provided by the 
regulator,673 while a credit union can choose a convenient way to submit the data, 
including sending a paper report to the Bank of England via post, or to pay the 
Bank of England a visit and leaving the data report there or sending electronic 
mail to the regulating team.674 This gives credit unions more flexibility to abide by 
regulatory standards. As to the content of data, the requirements for credit unions 
have also been simplified as opposed to those for banks.675 Where a UK bank has 
to submit more than 20 types of data to PRA, a credit union only needs to send 
five core data: (i) balance sheet, (ii) income statement, (iii) capital adequacy, (iv) 
large exposures and (v) liquidity.676 A simplified reporting requirement for credit 
unions is more appropriate for the industry, as same regulatory standard with 
banks could be burdensome for small credit unions and add their operational 
costs. Based on these facts, Ryder (2003) regards the FSA’s regime as effectively 
supported the industry developments.677 
 
iii Differentiated regulatory standards between version 1 and 2credit union 
 
Regulators also treat credit unions according to their difference in size and 
capacity, namely version 1 credit unions and version 2 credit unions.678 This is 
further progress made in differentiated regulation to fit in with the industry’s 
status quo, as most credit unions in the UK are version 1 credit unions. 
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First, in section 2 of CREDS (Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and 
Controls), credit unions are required to set up robust governance arrangements 
that fit in with ‘the nature, scale, and complexity of the risks inherent in the 
business model and of the credit union’s activities’.679 These measures include 
‘establish[ing], maintain[ing] and implement[ing]’ a proper business plan, 680 
policies and procedures manual, 681  inner control system 682  and accounting 
system.683 For a small version 1 credit union, the regulators do not expect it to 
have the same systems and controls as a large version 2 credit union does, 684 as 
the former may be smaller in size and the management team, which may not be 
able to support them, will meet all the regulatory requirements. If all the 
management and inner control requirements are on the same level, small credit 
unions could face regulatory burdens that constrain their growth. 
 
Second is the capital requirement for credit unions. According to Principle 4 of 
the Principles for Businesses (hereinafter ‘PRIN’) (A Firm Must Maintain 
Adequate Financial Resources), 685  a credit union is required to have adequate 
capital in order to absorb unexpected losses coming from daily businesses. This is 
essential for credit unions’ stability, as capital could absorb repayment risks from 
defaulted loans. Therefore, the capital requirement is related to the level of risk a 
credit union bears; the higher the risk it has, the more capital it needs. CREDS 
gives detailed lists of types of capital and special requirements in section 5.686 A 
version 1 credit union has the least strict capital requirements (capital: total assets 
ratio of at least 3%);687 while a version 2 credit union is at the other end of the 
spectrum, using the 8% standard.688 What is more, based on the size of total assets 
and members, there is a sub-classification in a version 1 credit union, namely the 
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‘large version credit union’.689 The capital requirements for it are also based on its 
size and risks. This distinction in capital requirement is meaningful, as most UK 
credit unions are version 1 credit unions, 690  which means they have smaller 
business scope and asset size, and ‘one-size-fits-all’ capital regulation would 
become a barrier to their being able to use their funds. Besides, both version 1 and 
2 credit unions are required to have adequate initial capital, 691 in order to set a 
buffer for credit unions against repayment risks. 
 
Third is the liquidity requirement. If a credit union has fewer liquid assets it 
cannot give back all the members their savings and non-deferred shares, and it 
risks defaulting. Therefore, a buffer of liquid assets is essential to avoid liquidity 
problems. CREDS sets a minimum liquid requirement for all credit unions, 
namely 5% of its total liabilities that can be withdrawn in a short time. However, 
as 5% is the minimum standard, the amount of liquid assets shall be ‘prudent and 
appropriate to the scale and nature of its business, having regard to material risks, 
including the risk of a sudden adverse cash flow, with a view to enabling it to 
meet its objectives.’ 692  Although there is no admission procedure (the level of 
liquidity is decided by the credit union’s management committee) from the 
regulator,693 PRA still keeps an eye on version 2 credit unions, which have to 
satisfy PRA that they have enough and prudent liquid assets.694 
 
In general, the regulation set up in CREDS is focused on the safety and soundness 
of credit unions. It has taken the differentiated risk size of credit unions into 
consideration, and treats version 1 and 2 credit unions differently based on their 
risk level. Instead of adopting a ‘one-size-fits-all’ regime, the FCA’s and PRA’s 
regulatory regime is generally reasonable, which could facilitate the stability of 
credit unions without becoming a ‘regulatory burden’ for small, community credit 
unions. This is the recognition of the different sizes of credit unions, which is 
reflected in the risks taken during taking deposits and giving credit.  
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Therefore, the regulation of credit unions is not a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model; rather, 
it has taken the relatively small size of a credit union and its limited resources into 
consideration. This proportionate regulatory regime is appropriate, as it could 
avoid regulations backfiring on credit unions’ development and become a new 
‘regulatory burden’. 
 
3.2.3.4  Available financial resources 
 
As most credit unions in the UK are version 1 credit unions with smaller 
memberships and lower customer deposits, it is essential to give them available 
external fund resources, not only in the start-up stage, but also in the following 
businesses when a credit union may need to borrow from other financial 
institutions in its daily transactions. Relying only on members’ deposits is not 
enough, especially for the small credit unions located in deprived communities. 
 
There are two parts to available financial resources, namely (i) the grants from 
local authorities and society, and (ii) the investments and loans from other firms. 
At present, there is no legal duty on any firm or organisation to assist a credit 
union. 
 
i External grants 
 
In the UK, many credit unions still rely on external grants after setting up, due to 
their high operating costs in daily transactions, and their limited ability to 
accumulate assets and build capacity.695 Capped interest rates are also criticized 
for being a cause of unsustainability.696 In order to assist small credit unions in 
playing their role in providing credit, government, local authorities and other 
entities have to support the industry with financial grants.  
 
To help a credit union start up, local authorities and charities may give financial 
grants to pull them through their difficulties.697 Thomas and Balloch note that the 
grants of local authorities to credit unions are aimed at covering the start-up 
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expenses and the amount of the grants is limited to £500 to £2,000.698 This is 
because a well-operated credit union is assumed to be sustainable with its own 
funds and shall not rely on external grants after the start-up stage. However, some 
external funds in a credit union’s early stage are indeed essential to help it begin 
with the businesses.  
 
There are also other types of support, including staff training, providing an office 
in the city council and so forth.699 In considering the win–win relationship of a 
local credit union and the local authority, a credit union could usually receive such 
support at the setting-up stage. 
 
More recent approaches focus on the setting up of a fund that is available to credit 
unions. In 2004, the Labour government set up the Growth Fund to fund ‘third 
sector lenders’, including credit unions and social enterprises such as community 
development finance institutions (hereinafter ‘CDFIs’) to promote financial 
inclusion.700 The Growth Fund is then administered by the DWP and paid by the 
Financial Inclusion Fund (hereinafter ‘FIF’).701 Grants are gratuitously given to 
credit unions that are in contract with the DWP and become their capital on the 
balance sheet. After a credit union has received the full amount of granted funds, 
the grant turns to its assets and hence strengthens its ability to lend.702 A credit 
union could then use the fund to lend to its members who are unable to save 
before borrowing, which gives it more flexibility to serve the deprived 
community.703 Such loans are called ‘Growth Fund loans’, as the money comes 
from the Growth Fund grant to the credit union. Since 2010, more than 300,000 
Growth Fund loans and £137 million in total has been loaned by credit unions 
across UK.704  It is generally agreed that the Growth Fund has played its role 
during this process.  
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Local authorities also help credit unions by giving them financial support, which 
is based on goodwill rather than legal responsibility. The aim to do so is clearly 
stated by a credit union in England (SurreySave Credit Union), as an example: 
 
Local councils may wish to support the credit union as a means to 
recession proof local economies. Credit unions can stimulate growth 
by making available lending opportunities for consumers and 
entrepreneurs. Delivering a credit union service in your 
neighbourhood can offer a strategic fit with other work the authority 
may be doing to promote social inclusion and support local 
communities to access services.705  
 
Nevertheless, credit unions’ over-reliance on such external funding is criticized. 
The industry is criticized for not being able to sustain themselves with their own 
income without making use of external financial support, due to their limited 
ability to build capacity and improper regulation, for example, capping interest 
rates.706  
 
Ryder disagrees with the criticism, and regards external funding as an essential 
way to benefit credit unions. 707  External funding is not the cause of 
unsustainability. On the contrary, it is the by-product of an unsustainable 
development model of credit unions. Therefore, if a credit union could use 
external funds as one of the available funding resources rather than totally relying 
on government grants, the grants could benefit its sustainability, and not harm it. 
Ryder further quotes four examples from Wales, Scotland, England and the US 
and supports this view, namely that appropriate grants would benefit small credit 
unions to grow.708 Even in the US where the credit union industry has reached 
such a scale that the banking industry regards it as a competitor, those small-size 
CDCUs are still supported by external funds. After being certificated as a CDFI, 
the credit union is able to use the CDFI fund.709 As the US Treasury mentions, 
‘the CDFI Fund was created for the purpose of promoting economic revitalization 
and community development through investment in and assistance to community 
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development financial institutions (CDFIs). ’ 710  It is recognised as an essential 
financial resource for a community development credit union to play its role in 
community developments.711 
 
In short, for those small community-based credit unions that bear policy targets 
for financial inclusion, external funding to support their capacity to provide credit 
to low-income community appears reasonable. Using external funding does not 
contradict the target of achieving financial sustainability. In consideration of the 
policy duty that small credit unions bear, such external resources are both 
reasonable and important. The US example shows that to provide more steady 
sources of financial sources, a regime to certify small community credit unions 
and give them official supports is essential, which provides normal assistance 
once the criteria are met, rather than occasional donations. 
 
ii External investments 
 
A credit union shall also be allowed to attract external investments, similar to 
interbank loans but in the longer term.  
 
As a financial institution, although in mutual style, credit unions in the UK are 
allowed to use their surplus funds712 to invest or lend to other firms, institutions 
and credit unions.713 A credit union is also allowed to borrow money for a certain 
length of time to cover risks on the balance sheet;714 the borrower could then use 
the loan for liquidity purposes.715 CREDS does not forbid a credit union to use 
external loans from other credit unions in its daily business, as this is an important 
way of supplementing its fund, but specifically notes that credit unions shall be 
cautious about lending to other credit unions, by taking the risks of the borrower’s 
non-repayment risk into consideration.716  
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The sourcebook also differentiates between larger and smaller credit unions. The 
total amount of this type of debt is different between a version 1 credit union and 
a version 2 credit union, and shall not exceed a certain percentage of its non-
deferred shares. 717  Both could lend to, or invest in, other credit unions, but a 
version 1 credit union has special time limits.718 This is because long-term loans 
as assets would influence a credit union’s ability to lend to its individual 
members; it may also influence a credit union’s liquidity, for example, to make 
payments to its customers as the deposits become due, or to cope with 
shareholding withdrawals.  
 
In general, the regulator tries to give credit unions more available sources of funds 
to avoid temporary risks, but also focuses on the safety and soundness of credit 
unions by setting limits on such transactions. In the short term, external funding 
could help credit unions to build their capacity and, in the long term, a credit 
union shall be permitted to attract external investments to further strengthen their 
sustainability. 
 
However, there is concern about the real ability of these small credit unions to 
attract external investments, although regulatory sourcebooks have given 
permission for them to do so.719 
 
3.2.3.5 Disciplinary power of the financial regulator 
 
The last point in the regulatory regime is the mandatory power of regulators that 
could be used over credit unions that break the regulatory rules. Although 
mutually owned by members, the daily operation of credit unions is still 
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controlled by the board of directors, which inevitably leads to agency problems as 
discussed in section 3.2.1.3. To reduce this problem, there are both ex ante 
regulations for firms to follow and ex post disciplinary power to punish 
misconducts.  
 
Before 2013, the regulatory power for credit unions was held by the FSA. After it 
had split into the FCA and PRA, disciplinary and enforcement power also 
transferred to both of the regulators. PRA is responsible for authorisation and 
prudential regulation of credit unions, 720  while the FCA has investigative and 
enforcement powers to regulate the industry. Credit unions are regulated by both 
PRA and the FCA. FSMA 2000 empowers the regulators to publish a censure to 
name and shame the firm or authorised person, or to impose a penalty for more 
serious condition.721  
 
Maintaining the market order by disciplinary action and enforcement would 
definitely benefit the members of misconducting credit unions, and of well-
behaved credit unions. As mentioned in section 3.2.3.3, credit unions have to 
comply with a series of regulations. Failing to do so may incur public censure or a 
penalty, depending on which aspect of the rules the credit union breaches. For 
example, penalties may be imposed on a credit union who fails to submit key 
financial data to PRA on time.722 The FCA is responsible for regulating credit 
unions’ misconduct. Both regulators have disciplinary power to impose.  
 
In order to treat authorised persons fairly, FSMA 2000 sets out a series of 
procedures in its Part XXVI.723 The Act is further detailed in DEPP.724 Depending 
on the stage of the regulator’s decision-making, there are five types of notices: (i) 
warning notice, (ii) decision notice, (iii) notice of discontinuance, (iv) final notice, 
and (v) supervisory notice. This is generally a step-by-step procedure, as after a 
warning notice, the recipient has the chance to defend himself or herself within a 
reasonable period.725 This is also the case with a decision notice.726 A warning or 
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decision notice can also be changed by a notice of discontinuance.727However, a 
final notice is the final decision without an appeal procedure, since in the previous 
stage the recipient already had a chance to defend himself or herself. The 
authority would decide whether to give a public censure or a penalty, or other 
types of punishment in the final notice, such as cancelation of Permission to Carry 
on Regulated Activities.728  
 
In the period from 2002 (when the FSA assumed the power of regulating credit 
unions) to 2012, six FSA Final Notices in total have been imposed on credit 
unions. None of the six final notices includes a decision to give a penalty to a 
credit union. In three cases, the FSA decided to cancel or refused to vary the 
permission to carry on regulated activities, generally due to the unmet threshold 
conditions. In the other three cases, the FSA issued a public censure because the 
credit union had been involved in misconduct in its business, including lending to 
its own directors at more favourable interest rates than common members, 729 and 
loans to non-member exceeded the 25% limit of the credit union’s capital.730  
 
A most typical case of misconduct, the case of The Pentecostal Credit Union 
Limited (hereinafter ‘TPCU’), is worth quoting here. The case involved a credit 
union that broke a series of rules, which is a good mirror that reflects the 
regulatory environment of UK credit unions. It is also important to note that the 
FSA took a risk-based approach in its regulation until its later reform. This means 
it would not chase and punish every breach of rules, but selectively focused on the 
events that have the most serious impact.731 However, this approach was generally 
transformed into principle-based regulation.  
 
The case of the TPCU732 is a vivid example of what the FSA considers to be a 
serious breach of the restrictions. Many aspects of the rules were involved in the 
misconduct process, including the TPCU’s own responsible lending rules. First of 
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all, the conduct of TPCU is opposite to the statutory objectives in the Part I of 
FSMA 2000, that is, the protection of consumers, and the reduction of financial 
crime. By indirectly lending to the non-member church organisation under the 
name of its individual members, the TPCU deliberately exposed those members to 
the risk of financial loss. This is especially the case for the member who was in a 
loan contract without being aware of it, as FSMA 2000 requires ‘consumers 
should take responsibility for their decisions.’733 FSA’s Principles for Businesses 
were also breached, as the principles require a firm to conduct its business with 
integrity.734 Under the regulatory objectives and the Principles, both the 1979 Act 
and CREDS were breached in respect of customer borrowing. For example, the 
1979 Act requires that ‘[a] credit union may make to a member a loan, upon such 
security (or without security) and terms as the rules of the credit union may 
provide.’735 The TPCU has, on the contrary, lent to members in breach of its own 
terms of responsible lending. This risk was exposed to the FSA before Legislative 
Reform Order 2011 allowed a credit union to have corporate members or lend to 
them. While TPCU de facto lent to a corporate entity via indirect loan 
arrangements, which was forbidden by CRED 10.2.11 G (1). 
 
However, although this case was criticized by Tracey McDermott as ‘a 
disgraceful case of a credit union putting the interests of another organisation 
before those of its members’, the then FSA director of enforcement and financial 
crime736 issued public censure instead of a penalty to TPCU. The basic reason for 
the FSA choosing public censure rather than a penalty is the nature of credit 
unions, as the TPCU was owned by all its members, therefore a penalty would 
directly influence the innocent members’ interest. 737  The small size of credit 
unions was also taken into consideration. The co-operating attitude of TPCU 
during the decision-making process also won itself the regulator’s forgiveness, as 
it ‘voluntarily replaced its entire management’ after FSA required that it do so. 
Decisions by the FSA were therefore made on a case-by-case basis and it would 
not rigidly impose punishment without special consideration.  
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There is still no case of credit unions’ misconduct under the new regulator FCA’s 
regulation, due to its youth. However, as the regulator is committed to turn into 
principle-based regulation, this would influence the credit union industry through 
enforcement of the principles, rather than merely obeying the detailed rules. 
MacNeil (2007) suggests that there are two identifying characters for a principle-
based regulation regime: the first is whether principles are for the purpose of 
compliance and enforceable, and the second is whether merely following the 
detailed rules may still breach the principles. 738  This is explicit in the case of 
TPCU, as the FSA used the Principles as the basic statutory provision being 
breached. The outcome required by the FSA was also not achieved. The FSA also 
criticized TPCU’s deliberate circumvention of the rules in 2007, when the credit 
union put forward several suggestions that were aimed at bypassing the 1979 Act, 
section 11(1).739 However, the real effect of transformation to the new approach 
still remains to be seen.  
 
3.2.4.  Regulatory regime of rural mutual co-operatives in China 
 
As discussed in section 3.2.2, the RMC industry in China is still in its nascent 
stage. Considering the industry’s advantages and weakness, it is not surprising 
that the Chinese government supports the industry through administrative and 
regulatory measures; for example, in order to facilitate market entrance, threshold 
conditions for RMCs are significantly lower than with a commercial bank. An 
RMC could be set up merely by local residents and enterprises based on their 
credit demands; there is no requirement for state investment. Official support also 
includes additional tax exemptions for firms.740  
 
However, in many respects the current regulatory regime for RMCs is 
inappropriate and could backfire in regulatory terms when it comes to industry 
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development. Regulations for RMCs are mainly aimed at controlling risk and 
market stability, rather than facilitating development of the industry and RMC’s 
sustainability, although the possible risk originates in an inappropriate register 
regime. There is also a ‘one-size-fit all’ approach in the regulatory regime, which 
sets the same prudential regulatory standards for RMCs as for commercial banks. 
In addition, available financial resources are also limited; an RMC is de facto 
unable to borrow money from other financial institutions, there is also no official 
funds that support the growth of the industry. An RMC in this sense has to merely 
rely on its members’ deposits but is subject to the same regulatory standards as 
commercial banks, which would impair its sustainability and limit its capacity to 
serve more members. In practice, the CBRC’s role of authorisation and 
registration is also unclear, and leads to a special case that many RMCs in practice 
are unable to get financial licences from the CBRC local bureau and are forced to 
register with other authorities without financial licences, bringing their ability to 
take deposits to the edge of breaking the law. It is therefore assumed that although 
being officially regarded as one of the new solutions for rural financial exclusion, 
the industry would not fulfil this role if the regulatory regime is not appropriately 
amended.  
 
3.2.4.1 Restrictive regulatory rules 
 
As RMCs have only been officially recognized by the CBRC since 2007, there is 
currently no statute for this new type of firm. However, the Banking Supervision 
Law  of China (2003) will be applied to RMCs in the broader sense if there is no 
special rule for RMCs in regulations. 
 
At the regulation level, the current basic rule for RMCs is the Interim Provisions 
on the Administration of Rural Mutual Co-operatives (2007) of the CBRC. Its 
content includes six main parts, namely (i) setting-up procedure, (ii) membership 
eligible criteria, member’s rights and shareholding, ( iii) member’s decision-
making power and management team’s duty, (iv) rules about customer borrowing, 
(v) prudential supervision standards, and (vi) merger, division and liquidation 
rules. Although it covers the matters of RMCs from their establishment to their 
liquidation, rules are still quite sketchy in this regulation. It is also a restrictive 
rule in many respects. In general, the regulatory regime for RMCs is focused on 
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firms’ stability from the prudential aspect rather than the sustainability of the firm. 
This restriction is reflected in several aspects.  
 
First, it relates to the strict eligibility criteria of RMC membership. Although there 
is no such phrase as ‘common bond’ in China’s regulatory regime, as in the UK 
and US, an equal concept is accepted in the regulation to define the central mutual 
feature of the firm. This is the ‘eligible membership’ requirement in the Interim 
Provisions (2007), articles 17 to 19.  
 
The advantage of this requirement is suggested by He.741 Owing to the familiarity 
and trust between RMC members who live in the same community, information 
asymmetry between an RMC and its members could be reduced. In He’s view, 
peer pressure within RMCs is another factor that could reduce bad loan rates, as 
the mutual credit organization is owned by all the members and non-repayment 
would harm other peer members’ interests. Therefore, moral hazard could be 
reduced, for example, some member may deliberately be taking risks with his or 
her acquired loan, knowing that the risk would be borne by other RMC members. 
In practice, some RMCs also choose to raise interest rates for those who do not 
repay on time. He or she therefore deduces that a well-managed RMC could be 
sustainable on the basis of the relatively lower level of non-performing assets 
because of the eligibility membership rule. 
 
The Interim Provisions (2007) recognize only one type of eligibility criteria to 
join an RMC’s membership, namely the locality of the RMC. Individuals must 
reside in the same area as where the RMC is located, irrespective of whether their 
households are registered in that town or village, or they have resided in their 
permanent housing in that locality for more than three years. 742  Although 
enterprise members are allowed to join the membership, their place of registration 
or major business site must be located in the same geographical area as the RMC. 
This rule is really sketchy but still restrictive, as it closes the door to more 
available fund resources. In practice, as local authorities have the power to issue 
administrative rules that can further detail the CBRC’s rule, stricter restrictions 
are set in those local rules; for example, RMCs in Guangzhou are forbidden to 
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accept civil servants into membership, while only members of local rural 
associations are eligible to join in. 743  Although the original intention of this 
restriction is to avoid civil servants from acquiring higher amounts of loans than 
other common members, this restriction on eligible membership de facto sets up a 
regulatory barrier for an RMC to grow.  
 
In fact, the existing limitations about eligible members of RMCs reflect what the 
attitude of the CBRC on the role of RMCs could be. Instead of being an open and 
inclusive financial institution that could develop to a large scale and across 
regions, the regulator in China now expects RMCs to be a community mutual 
credit group with a fixed group of local people and to remain small in size. The 
only way for an RMC to increase its membership is to merge with other RMCs, as 
the potential eligible members in a certain locality would not increase quickly 
enough. It is possible that the regulator intends to control the size of deposit risk 
within a smaller group or people by using restrictive eligibility criteria, since 
China currently has no deposit insurance regime as in the UK.744 This restriction 
on eligible members – both on residential and working standards – could not 
support an RMC’s capacity in the long run to take enough deposits and increase 
its business size from broader membership. 
 
The next related problem is RMCs’ available fund resources. An RMC is allowed 
by the CBRC to take members’ deposits, accept external grants and use other 
financial institution’s investment. 745  However, for those RMCs located in 
deprived rural communities where members’ capacity to deposit is severely 
limited and they are not allowed to accept more members based on multiple 
eligible criteria, it is also not a simple task to attract enough grants or investments. 
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There are no national-scale official fund resources for RMCs, and the industry is 
ineligible to make use of the central bank’s policy loan that supports rural 
financial inclusion.746 Local authorities and research groups may give financial 
support to small RMCs in rural areas, which are usually one-off and focus on 
supporting their start-up phase, for example, purchasing equipment, rather than 
making funds available to be lent out. Moreover, although RMCs are allowed to 
accept investments from banks and other financial institutions, their repayment 
ability de facto limits their ability to attract any meaningful external investment or 
wholesale loans. For most small RMCs, their only fund resource is members’ 
deposits which are not only highly limited by members’ low-income level, but 
also because they are trapped by the restrictive membership eligibility criteria 
from accepting more members. 
 
Another regulatory failure of RMCs is that the regulator adopts a ‘one-size-fit-all’ 
regulatory standard, without any distinction in the difference in size between 
RMCs. According to the Interim Provisions, all RMCs must obey the same 
standard of capital adequacy ratio of commercial banks, namely the minimum 8% 
standard. In some added rules issued by local authorities, the capital adequacy 
ratio is lifted higher to 10%. The CBRC’s rule also sets up disciplinary measures 
for those RMCs who fail to keep an 8% capital adequacy ratio, in most severe 
cases (ie, where the capital adequacy ratio is less than 2%), an RMC is required to 
increase its share capital, recover its non-performing loan and reduce its asset size 
within a limited period. Those who are unable to satisfy the regulator will be 
forced to dissolve; the regulator could also cancel their financial licence and 
business licence. The aim of these prudential rules lies in the stability of the firm 
which is essential to members’ deposit safety. Therefore, a licensed RMC has to 
comply with the rule on the same level as commercial banks without additional 
regulatory exemptions when it is less possible for a licensed RMC to cause 
systemic risk due to its small size, which is, to some extent, unfair on RMCs. 
However, unless RMCs could be covered by the in-proposal deposit insurance 
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regime of China, it is less likely that the regulator would reduce prudential 
standards on the core issue.  
 
In general, although the Chinese government regards RMCs as one of the 
solutions to financial exclusion, the banking regulator does not afford them 
appropriate regulatory support. In fact, the development of RMCs in China is 
disproportionately slow as there were only 49 formally licensed RMCs in the 
country as at the end of 2011,747 while, according to the CBRC’s list of licensed 
financial firms, there are more than 300 VTBs operating across the country. The 
restrictive regulatory regime and limited financial resources are here regarded as 
the main barriers to development in the industry. 
 
3.2.4.2 Improper licence regime and regulation 
 
A special phenomenon in the RMC industry is the coexistence of both licensed 
and unlicensed RMCs, which derives from the improper regulatory regime and the 
CBRC’s limited regulatory resources. 
 
According to the Interim Provisions (2007) and a new rule that focuses on RMCs’ 
setting-up procedures,748 an RMC must first send an application to the CBRC’s 
local bureau and get permission to start its setting-up procedure. Only once this 
has been done can the promoters send an application to the CBRC’s local bureau 
for permission to set up and, if approved, receive a financial licence.749 To be 
eligible for the licence, several standards must be met, including the criteria of the 
appropriate promoter,750 lowest amount of the registered capital, 751  and several 
requirements for the management team, business site and appropriate facilities. 
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 CBRC, ‘Annual Report of 2012’ (2012). According to the annual report, there are 49 RMCs 
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The CBRC would then give a financial licence to the eligible RMC with the local 
bureau’s permission. 752  As in China’s banking regulating regime, a financial 
licence is essential for anyone who wishes to provide financial services to 
customers.753 The inability to get a licence would stop a new player from entering 
the field. Only once a financial licence has been obtained can an RMC register in 
the local bureau of industry and commerce, and get the business licence and 
formally start its business.754  
 
Ideally, this procedure could screen out an ineligible player by turning down its 
application. However, in practice, there is evidence that shows that it is de facto 
not a simple task to get a financial licence. Because the approval power is held by 
the CBRC’s local bureau and there are only several rough eligibility criteria in the 
CBRC’s rules, whether local bureaux of the CBRC would accept an application is 
not guaranteed. Unsuccessful attempts to apply usually occur in this phase; for 
example, an article notes that a local bureau of the CBRC in Zhejiang Province 
turned down all applications from locally proposed RMCs because its superior 
bureau did not list the province as an RMC licence pilot area,755 even after the 
local authority had requested the bureau to do so. There is also evidence that 
shows that local officials’ personal supportive attitude is essential for whether 
RMCs could get licences.756  
 
However, those unlicensed RMCs can still trade their business in the market. 
Because of regulatory loopholes, the CBRC does not explicitly prohibit those 
unlicensed mutual credit organizations from taking members’ deposits and 
lending to members. In He’s observation, there are some unlicensed mutual firms 
in the market who could not register with the CBRC.757 Some of them are set up 
with the support of local authorities; the others are merely set up by local 
residents. In order to remain in a ‘safer’ place under some sort of official 
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regulation, they could still register with local authorities’ other departments such 
as civil affairs bureaux. However, there are concerns that such local authorities are 
unable to efficiently supervise RMCs as a de facto credit intermediary. 758  In 
practice, many of the local authority departments, for example, the affairs office, 
industrial and commercial bureau, and the office of agriculture, are assuming the 
duty of giving mutual credit co-operatives business permission, but are unable to 
provide further professional supervision after the permission has been issued. 
Those unlicensed RMCs fall outside prudential regulation and are de facto 
exempted from regulatory requirements, and therefore enjoy more flexibility than 
licensed ones, irrespective of the fact that their licence applications have been 
declined or they choose not to be authorized or their registration department is 
unable to carry out professional supervision.  
 
More severe risks lie in those unlicensed lenders who deliberately use the name 
‘rural residents mutual credit co-operatives’ to confuse depositors, and are 
accused of being a ‘fake bank’ (山寨银行，Shan Zhai Yin Hang) because they 
actually do not have a licence or are not efficiently supervised by any authorities 
but still take deposits from members who mistakenly believe they are joining a 
formal, licensed financial institution and their deposit is protected. These firms 
also do not need to comply with membership eligibility criteria, because they are 
able to attract more deposits from the general public by promising higher deposit 
interest rates. These firms could then lend the money out at profitable rates. Such 
unlicensed firms de facto turn into profit-making lenders and take semi-public 
deposits, while still using the similar, yet confusing, name as licensed RMCs, 
under the guise of being official but, in fact, without offering any protection or 
insurance. Risks behind this phenomenon may expose members to deposit risks, 
which has already happened in the Yancheng County of Jiangsu Province in 
2012. 759  Without enough supervision, two mutual credit firms in Yancheng 
County deliberately lent members’ deposits out to a non-member corporate, and 
when the borrower failed to repay the loan, a liquidity problem resulted and the 
two firms went out of business.  
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It is possible that the CBRC chooses not to prohibit unlicensed RMCs because of 
the limited regulating resources in its local bureaux. Regulators are more 
concerned about commercial banks that are more significant in terms of system 
stability rather than tiny RMCs. However, as the regulator for the banking system, 
it is irresponsible of the CBRC and its local bureaux to regulate only the 
‘licensed’ RMCs, and leaving the riskier unlicensed ones outside their 
supervision. Although people who deliberately set up a fake bank and take public 
deposits would be punished under the criminal law, system stability within the 
region would still be influenced as ex ante prevention is lacking. This is in 
conflict with the CBRC’s implicit regulatory principle, namely the value of 
system stability and depositor protection. The current licence regime is not only 
risky, but also unfair in terms of competition, as those licensed RMCs are bearing 
regulatory burdens because they choose to be regulated, while the unregulated 
ones have more flexibility in taking deposits. If there are compliance costs for 
licensed RMCs, while non-compliance would not lead to penalties, then the 
regime could be regarded as improper and unfair for those who choose to comply 
with the regulation. The current licence regime, as well as regulation for licensed 
RMCs, however, cannot support their development but could become a regulatory 
burden. Instead, it lacks proper monitoring of the ‘regulatory perimeter’ so as to 
exclude unlicensed RMCs from the market. The licence regime de facto loses its 
original purpose of controlling the entry of market participants to regulated 
activities. Failure in unified market entrance thresholds and the licence regime is 
de facto the primary cause that leads to the stagnation of the licensed RMC 
industry. Improper regulatory standards aggravate this situation. 
 
3.3  Commercial bank in the community level: Regulation of village and 
township banks in China 
 
The preceding sections discussed the benefits and drawbacks of mutual credit 
firms, and the regulatory regime in the UK and China respectively. Another form 
of community financial institution facilitated by the Chinese government that will 
now be examined is the VTB.  
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A VTB is a banking financial institution760 set up in a rural area that provides 
local residents and enterprises with financial services.761 In the array of banking 
institutions with the word ‘bank’ in their name in China, a VTB is the smallest in 
respect of the minimum amount of registered capital. Based on a firm’s location, 
the minimum registered capital of a VTB shall exceed at least 1 million yuan (if 
set up in villages) or 3 million yuan (if set up in towns).762 The official starting 
point of setting up VTBs is to provide more accessible banking services to 
township and rural residents, and to micro- to small enterprises, and to control 
informal usury practice by offering access to affordable credit in rural areas. 
 
The advantage of VTBs is obvious. Compared with other kinds of ‘new’ financial 
institutions, VTBs are the only ones that have full access to basic RMB services 
for the local general public.763 In contrast, an RMC can only serve its member, 
while small loan companies are forbidden from taking public deposits.764 With 
access to inter-bank borrowing, VTBs also have more financial resources than 
RMCs who in reality can only use members’ deposits.765 VTBs therefore have 
special advantages in competition as they could provide the pubic with full access 
to banking and credit services. Theoretically, it could therefore fill the gap in 
deprived areas where large commercial banks lack incentives to re-enter the 
market or expand their service.  
 
Furthermore, Du suggests several benefits of VTBs compared to ‘traditional’ or 
‘old’ commercial banks.766 First, the local feature of VTBs helps to relieve the 
information asymmetry problem in loan assessments. 767  VTBs are set up at 
community level and are thus more familiar with local residents’ general 
information and potential repayment risks. Second, VTBs have more simplified 
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and effective loan approval processes than large commercial banks.768 Their own 
staff could decide to whom to lend rather than sending the loan applications to 
higher branches as is the case in the large and medium banks’ loan approval 
model.769 Third, VTBs have lower operational costs because of their relatively 
small firm size.770 Fourth, if a VTB becomes insolvent, considering the small size 
of its assets, capital and debt, it is less possible to incur systematic risks.771 
Moreover, Du also suggests that, once competition is well established, VTBs are 
able to attract local borrowers with lower interest rates than informal lenders, 
which could partly constrain usurious lenders’ expansion in rural areas.772 These 
benefits of VTBs may explain the positive attitude of the Chinese government and 
the CBRC of encouraging such institutions to be set up at county and rural level.  
 
Ever since 2006 when the CBRC facilitated the entry and development of small 
financial institutions in the rural market, the VTB industry has experienced 
considerable expansion. As of October 2010, there are 1,000 VTBs operating in 
China. 773  The coverage percentage is also even: all 31 provinces and directly 
controlled municipalities now have VTBs in operation within the region, among 
which the central and western parts of China has 62%; 660 in total. 774  These 
regions are in general less developed than China’s coastal region and  therefore 
first require permission from the CBRC to pilot VTBs. However, research shows 
that there are still statutory and regulatory barriers in the VTB industry. The 
nationwide market penetration level of the VTB industry is still very low and only 
takes up a tiny market share in total.775 There are several well-documented reasons 
for the constraints in the development of VTBs.  
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3.3.1  Strict regulatory standards for eligible setting-up promoters 
 
Under the Company Law (2005), a ‘promoter of a company’776 refers to either an 
individual or legal entity that prepares and arranges the setting-up procedures of a 
joint stock limited company, who turns into a shareholder of the company after 
the company has been established.777 Promoters must subscribe all or part of the 
shares that should be issued by the company, depending on whether there are 
remaining shares to be offered to the general public or specified persons. 778 This 
concept could also be applied to limited liability companies. For a common joint 
stock company, the law does not set special conditions for the promoter’s 
eligibility. The rules are set out in two of the CBRC regulations. 
 
In Interim Provision (2007), rules on the qualifications of promoters of VTBs are 
quite brief. The required promoter or capital investor of VTBs shall contain at 
least one banking institution, either domestic or foreign.779 No further restrictions 
are given in this rule, which means private capital could also join in in the 
promotion process, together with a commercial bank. However, the main 
promoter of the setting-up procedure and the then controlling shareholder after the 
company has been established is restricted to only banking institutions.780 What is 
implied in this requirement is that only banking institutions can lead the setting-up 
procedures of a VTB and be its controlling shareholder, while private investors 
without a financial licence can only ‘follow’ the steps of banks and will not have a 
controlling stake.781 If several private investors wish to set up a VTB, what they 
need to do first is to invite a bank as the ‘leader’.  
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This restrictive requirement was detailed further in a Notice of the CBRC in 
2011,782 in which the standard for main promoter was raised. Promoters of a VTB 
shall still contain at least one banking institution. However, the main promoter 
(and the controlling shareholder, after the firm has been established) must be a 
banking institution with a last annual supervisory ratings scores of 2, 2+ or 1, 
using the ‘CAMELS+’ rating system. 783  The main promoter shall also employ 
sufficiently qualified staff and meet other prudential regulatory standards required 
by the CBRC.784  These rule changes de facto raise the threshold for banks as 
eligible promoters of VTBs. The strict requirement remains in Measures 
(2014).785 
 
The real effect of this restrictive standard on the VTB industry lies in several 
aspects. It sets up an entrance threshold for banks who wish to set up and control a 
VTB. Only those banks scoring 2 or 1 are eligible to assume the role of main 
promoter under the current rule. The purpose of the CBRC is to keep the rural 
financial market stable by preventing unqualified banks from controlling a VTB. 
A bank that scores 2 or above in the CAMELS+ system is well operated in respect 
of supervision, so it can take the responsibility of setting up a VTB and, more 
importantly, of following up on management of its subsidiary. Although a VTB is 
an independent legal entity and is legally separate from its controlling 
shareholder, in the current bank management model, the holding bank usually 
takes the duty of managing its subsidiary VTBs by setting up a separate 
management department inside the bank. 786  Banks with a higher score in the 
rating system are therefore assumed to be more capable of managing a separate 
VTB in respect of, for example, the qualifications and ability of directors and 
senior managers sent from the holding company to the subsidiary.  
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This standard, however, is also too restrictive, as the majority of city commercial 
banks cannot score 2 in the rating system. For example, as at the end of 2010, the 
Bank of Luoyang was the only city commercial bank in Henan Province that 
reached a score of 2,787 yet the Henan Province has at least 13 city commercial 
banks in operation. Besides, none of the city commercial banks in China has ever 
reached the score of 1. A newspaper article mentions the fact that only large 
commercial banks (ie, the ‘big four’) and joint-stock commercial banks (who are, 
in fact, less interested in getting involved in setting up VTBs, as discussed in 
Chapter 2), could score 2 or above.788 
 
Therefore, the ‘2 or above’ threshold becomes a new restriction for the VTB 
industry. It is the city commercial banks who show the biggest interest in setting 
up VTBs.789 Large and medium banks have less incentive to re-enter the county 
and rural markets from which they once withdrew, since they could earn huge 
benefits in their mature urban market throughout the country. A reason for major 
banks setting up VTBs is suggested as merely ‘responding to the CBRC’.790 In 
contrast, city and rural commercial banks usually have fewer branches and wish to 
expand their market access and get more RMB licences by setting up VTBs. It is a 
new strategy for expanding the market for the small banks, while at the same time, 
local residents would benefit from available banking facilities and affordable 
credit. Ideally, here lies a ‘win–win’ situation. The current threshold on main 
promoters for setting up a VTB, however, is inviting those uninterested banks into 
the industry, while keeping those with more incentives outside the realm.  
 
3.3.2  Lack of regulatory incentive for eligible commercial banks 
 
Under the restrictive rule discussed above, VTBs’ main promoter and future 
holding company must be a commercial bank, and since in reality the eligible 
commercial banks are largely the state-controlled and joint-stock commercial 
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banks, it is essential for the regulator to offer enough incentive for them to set up 
VTBs. 
 
In order to facilitate more VTBs to be set up in deprived areas, the CBRC indeed 
provides some rewards to commercial banks. According to a 2006 Notice of the 
CBRC,791 the regulator 792  can examine and approve applications for setting up 
VTBs prior to other kinds of branch-opening applications, if all other conditions 
of the two applications are on the same level. This priority reduces the time of 
waiting for approval, so the main promoter who wishes to grab a rural market 
share could enter into the market easier. However, this is only a suggestion rather 
than a rule for the local CBRC bureaux and provides no incentive for banks that 
do not have such plans. 
 
Another way of stimulating the setting-up of VTBs taken by the CBRC is the 
‘link-up’ policy. 793  This policy links the setting-up of VTBs in rural areas to 
licences of other RMB market services. Commercial banks who wish to open a 
new branch or a VTB in a mature market in rich regions, they have to set up a 
VTB or a branch in a deprived area at the same time; if the ‘link-up’ objective is 
unsatisfied, the CBRC shall not approve its application of setting up a VTB in an 
urban area.794 The CBRC also proposes to report the real effort of commercial 
banks in the process of setting up VTBs in deprived areas.795 The CBRC describes 
this effort as a ‘social responsibility’ of large and medium banks.796  
 
However, the real effect of this policy is not as satisfying as the CBRC proposed. 
Deloitte’s data show that as at the end of 2011, large and medium commercial 
banks had promoted 78 VTBs in total, while the number of VTBs promoted by 
city commercial banks is 273; almost 3.5 times higher than the former. Zhang 
concludes several aspects from the reluctance of large and medium banks to set up 
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VTBs, and notes that the profitability of controlling a VTB is lower than their 
own branches. 797  Moreover, large and medium banks had already set up 
sophisticated networks of branches in rich eastern region during the years of 
expansion. The ‘link-up’ policy is, hence, less stimulating, since large and 
medium banks, on the one hand, have less incentive to open new branches in rich 
regions, and, on the other hand, in those regions commercial banks are also 
reluctant to set up new VTBs, as this would increase competition for the existing 
bank branch.798 What is more, there are also reports that some commercial banks 
set up VTBs in deprived areas only as an exchange for opening new branches in 
rich areas.799 The ‘link-up’ policy is therefore de facto less effective than what it 
proposes to improve, although with a good starting-point. However, for eligible 
city commercial banks who have an incentive to operate across the region by 
opening more branches, this regulatory reward is more meaningful. Nevertheless, 
since only a city commercial bank scoring 2 or plus in the ‘CAMELS+’ rating 
system are eligible to open cross-region branches,800 the main force of setting up 
VTBs is therefore still the state-controlled and joint-stock commercial banks. 
Without more effective incentive in regulations, the current condition could 
hardly improve. 
 
3.3.3  Restrictive rules of cross-regional business 
 
At present, VTBs are restricted from taking deposits outside the region of their 
registered location. An Opinion of the CBRC clearly clarifies its attitude of 
forbidding VTBs’ cross-regional business from the aspect of controlling risk and 
maintaining local system stability, as well as keeping VTBs’ inclusive feature of 
serving the rural household and small enterprise.801 Under this Opinion, a VTB 
registered in County A is not allowed to take deposits or give loans to a resident 
living in nearby County B. It can only provide services to local residents living in 
County A. One consideration of this prohibition is to avoid VTBs giving up their 
local feature: if the cross-regional business is allowed, then there will be risks that 
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a VTB would use local residents’ deposits to serve individuals and enterprises 
outside its registered place to earn better profits. Local depositors’ access to loans, 
on the contrary, would be harmed. This condition that the regulator proposed to 
avoid, in fact, actually happened in the 1990s, when local RCCs were described as 
‘pumping’ out local deposits to urban areas. Therefore, VTBs are prohibited from 
providing cross-regional loans and from taking deposits to avoid similar cases. 
 
However, this prohibition would also constrain VTBs’ ability to take deposits and, 
more importantly, lead to the loss of its inclusive feature. Since a VTB is 
prohibited from providing loan and deposit services outside its registered region, 
the only way it could expand its market is to open a new branch. However, 
according to the CBRC, a VTB is not allowed to open a branch outside its 
registered region. It can only set up a branch in towns within its registered region, 
if the VTB is well operated and prudential supervision standards are met; for 
example, if a VTB is registered in County A, then it could open branches in towns 
B, C, D. In contrast, if a VTB is set up in town E, then it cannot expand its market 
since a township is the lowest level of the administrative regions in China. Other 
towns are parallel with its registered region, so it will not be able to expand the 
market. Therefore, VTBs would tend to register at county level in order to avoid 
such restrictions.  
 
Ideally, local residents who live in towns and villages could still have access to 
the bank if there are branches in their town. However, at present, the majority of 
VTBs do not qualify to open branches, nor would they have enough capital to do 
so. The limitation on providing services to residents outside their registered 
location would cause VTBs to lose their feature of ‘village  and township’, and 
serve local enterprises rather than low-income rural residents.  
 
For example, the Commissioner of Ministry of Finance Guangdong Office 
worried about the deviation from VTBs’ original purpose in an official news 
article, 802  which mentions that among the total of 16 VTBs operating in that 
province, only two had issued more than 40% of rural households with loans of 
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the total loan amount.803 The article shows that the main customers of VTBs are 
actually small enterprises at county level rather than township and village 
residents.804 Moreover, those VTBs would usually require guarantees for personal 
loan products rather than base the loan on personal creditability. 805  The 
commissioner therefore suggested that VTBs set up at township level and, 
furthermore, richer regions with mature market competition should not be allowed 
to set up new VTBs.806  
 
However, it should be noted that the restrictive rule of cross-regional businesses 
could not solve the problem; restricting VTBs from setting up at county level will 
also lead to an unwanted result, namely of reducing the firm’s sustainability, since 
a VTB set up in a town is not allowed to serve residents in nearby towns and can 
only serve the limited small market in subsidiary villages. If a VTB cannot grow 
to be self-sustainable and has to rely on its controlling bank, the percentage of 
loans to individual low-income customers would be further reduced. This is 
contrary to the CBRC’s purposes. 
 
A recent change in this regulatory barrier is the pilot ‘municipal’ VTBs set up in 
selected provinces.807 According to the CBRC, VTBs are able to register in cities 
in the western provinces (except for the provincial capital city) and in under-
developed cities in the middle part of the country, which has areas that are 
traditionally regarded as under-served when it comes to financial services. The 
headquarters of a VTB is allowed to be registered in municipal cities, with its 
branches located in the counties of the municipal city, so the whole municipal 
region is blanket-covered. Deposits taken by the headquarters shall be mainly 
used for the local branches’ loans, while deposits taken by branches shall be 
entirely used for local loans. The headquarters could provide RMB services, 
except issuing loans. This rule in general provides another way of solving the 
restrictive rule of prohibiting cross-regional business. However, if not properly 
regulated, the danger would be that VTBs would become another city commercial 
bank and not mainly serve local rural residents.  
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3.4.  Summary 
 
This chapter discussed the legal and regulatory arrangements of alternative access 
to credit for low-income customers in both the UK and China. Two kinds of firms 
are discussed: (i) mutuals, including credit unions in the UK and RMCs in China, 
and (ii) VTBs in China. Both are regarded as an alternative solution to the credit 
gap left by commercial banks. Therefore, how the law and regulations facilitate 
their growth is analysed in this chapter. 
 
For the issue of financial exclusion in the respect of consumer credit, the 
establishment of mutuals or co-operatives is a useful way of enhancing people’s 
access to affordable credit. The member ownership structure of the firm gives 
mutuals more special benefits than corporates do, making it possible for low-
income members who are usually ineligible to prove their creditability through the 
traditional manner of assessment in commercial banks. Mutuals are also suitable 
for maintaining long-term relationships between firms and members, and promote 
the development of the firms. In both the UK and China, the significance of a 
mutual-style credit firm is recognised by governments as one way to solve 
financial exclusion, since commercial banks are usually reluctant to provide 
services to low-income customers or in deprived remote areas. In fact, it appears 
that the main solution taken by both countries for financial exclusion is to set up 
new institutions that focus on the lower end of the market. Credit unions in the 
UK and RMCs in China are examples of the attempts made in this regard. 
 
As those mutual firms are usually small in asset size, their capacity to serve more 
members’ credit needs is usually limited by firms’ available fund resources. For 
mutuals, available funds mainly include members’ deposits and external 
investments or grants. Therefore, ways to strengthen mutuals’ sustainability 
include two aspects: first, permitting the mutual serves multiple groups of people 
to enlarge its membership size, thus taking more deposits. This requires 
regulations to reduce the strict common bond or eligible membership rule. Second, 
mutuals may also need external investments or grants, especially in the setting-up 
stage. Whether statute and regulations could support mutuals in these two aspects 
is therefore essential. Furthermore, in respect of prudential regulation, the small 
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size of a firm decides that they shall be treated differently from large commercial 
banks; otherwise regulations may become another burden for mutuals. 
 
Generally, the legal and regulatory environment for credit unions in the UK is 
appropriate for firms’ development. Through several legislative amendments, the 
rules of common bonds have now been relaxed for multiple groups, leaving 
enough space for UK credit unions’ future development. In respect of prudential 
regulations, small and large credit unions are also distinct in avoiding a rigid 
application of the rule regardless of the differences in size of the credit unions. In 
contrast, eligibility for membership rules of RMCs in China still have the most 
stringent status, which partly reflects the nascent stage of mutuals in the country. 
The prudential regulation for RMCs adopts the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach and 
treats RMCs on the same level as commercial banks. However, before the licence 
issue of fake RMCs can be settled appropriately and RMCs be covered by the 
deposit insurance regime, it is unlikely that the CBRC would reduce current 
regulation standards to support industry growth. The prudential attitude of the 
CBRC is, however, a hindrance for any further developments in the industry. 
 
Issues related to VTBs in China were also noted. As China’s banking regulator, 
the CBRC maintains the prudential attitude of setting up depository institutions: 
only commercial banks are allowed to ‘lead’ the process of setting up a VTB. 
However, owing to the regulatory requirement, only larger and medium banks and 
part of the smaller banks that score 2 or higher are eligible, while the former 
usually do not have enough incentive to do so, nor do regulations provide 
appropriate rewards for participating banks. After the VTB has been set up, its 
operation is further limited by regional restrictions. The effect of the restriction is, 
however, contrasted with the CBRC’s original purpose of maintaining VTBs’ 
inclusive feature. In fact, although being endowed with an inclusive orientation by 
the CBRC, the essence of a VTB is still that of a commercial bank or, in other 
words, a profit-maximizing corporate. This is essentially the distinction between 
VTBs and RMCs, as the latter are non-for-profit-maximizing firms. 
 
In fact, it is inevitable for those alternative lenders who are set up within the 
mainstream to make a profit. Irrespective of whether it is a mutual or VTB, they 
all need to grow and expand to increase sustainability. Before the access problem 
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to credit for low-income residents is solved, the law and regulations shall give the 
sustainability of the firm priority. There are legal and regulatory barriers that 
could be removed to fulfil this aim. At the same time, it should be recognized that 
as these alternative community small lenders develop, they are inevitably going to 
include more affluent customers in their customer base, who are, in fact, the 
backbone of the firms’ sustainability. In order to facilitate firms to serve more 
low-income customers who are both risky and less profitable, the regulatory 
system shall not be ‘one size fits all’ to provide additional space and rewards for 
small firms operating in deprived communities, and if the regulation standard is 
distinguished by firm size, mature prudential regulation experiences are also 
essential to avoid potential liquidity problems. Regulations shall therefore 
maintain a balance between supporting firms’ growth and keeping firms stable.  
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Chapter 4: Responsible lending: Customer protection  
through conduct regulation and private law  
in the subprime credit sector 
  
On 1 April 2014, regulatory power over all consumer credit firms in the UK was 
taken over by the brand-new regulator, the FCA, from the OFT. 808  This is a 
remarkable turning point as all firms doing businesses in this sector are now under 
the supervision of the new authority, and must renew their licences and obey new 
conduct rules. Firms are proportionately regulated based on different levels of 
risks posed to customers. Among them, high-risk consumer credit lenders are 
under enhanced supervision as they may lead to higher risks to consumers in 
financial difficulty. The FCA has the enforcement power to punish those firms 
who behave unfairly or dishonestly in dealing with customers. In contrast, local 
courts provide a redress regime to customers who are unfairly treated, who could 
also complain to the FOS services under the Consumer Credit Act 2006. Both the 
ex ante conduct of business regulation and ex post dispute resolution provides 
consumers with safety protection in consumer credit markets. 
 
The conditions in China, however, are still similar to that in the UK before the 
1970s. Different consumer credit firms are regulated separately, echoing the 
industry’s juvenescence at this stage. Rules of conduct regulation are sketchy, and 
the law and regulations do not clarify which regulator is responsible. Customers in 
China rely heavily on judicial solutions when disputes arise, which is neither 
economical nor practical. Two suggestions for China are made in this chapter: (i) 
set up more detailed but appropriate conduct rules with regard to responsible 
lending and information disclosure, and (ii) when possible, provide better and 
simple dispute solution method for customers. 
 
4.1 Empirical evidence of the subprime lending market’s weaknesses  
 
The consumer credit market is usually complex. At the top of it are the 
mainstream lenders, which mainly include commercial banks, mutual credit 
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institutions (eg building societies and credit unions in the UK, rural credit co-
operatives in China) and other credit facilities. There are also licensed 
moneylenders in the subprime market. In the literature on the consumer credit 
sector, the description of subprime lending is basically equivalent to ‘fringe 
banking’, and both ‘subprime’, ‘fringe’ and sometimes ‘alternative’  are used in 
similar context, which describes its non-mainstream and secondary status.809  
 
Some lenders in the subprime credit market have a longer history (eg, 
pawnbrokers810 and mail order retailers811) but their numbers have declined with 
time, while several new lenders have developed in recent decades and then 
expanded rapidly; 812  for example, the typical subprime lender in the UK, the 
payday lender, has continued to grow during recent years under the name ‘high-
cost, short-term’ lender. Another kind of subprime lender is the pawnbroker. 
Monthly interest rates charged for pawnbroking in the UK range from 5 to 12%, 
according to an NPA survey813 The amount of the loan is based on the value of the 
pledged item evaluated by the pawnshop; generally, it will extend half of the 
resale value.814  In traditional points of view, pawnbroking is closely related to 
usury and thus less appealing to consumers,815 as it requires borrowers to depart 
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with their property to use as collateral.816 Similar to pawnbroking, is auto-title 
lending, as borrowers pawn the title of their vehicle for a short-term loan at high 
interest rates. However in this case, the consumers can keep their vehicle until the 
loan is repaid or, where they default, the lender gains possession of the vehicle.817 
Proceeds from interest and fees are found to be more profitable than the resale 
value of the car obtained through repossession, and the repossession cost and legal 
fees are quite high compared to the value of the car. Lenders would rarely seek 
defaulting from their customers.818 
 
China has also increasingly become accustomed to subprime moneylenders in 
recent years. The most common one is the small loan company which provides 
both secured and unsecured loans to individuals and small enterprises. According 
to the CBRC, there were 8,394 small loan companies in the whole country as of 
June, 2014. Loan products are diversified, the amount of a personal loan usually 
varies from a small amount of 3,000 yuan to 100,000 yuan (approx. £300 to 
£10,000) based on borrower’s income level, occupation, or value of their secured 
property. The minimum loan period is usually three months. Customers can 
choose to repay their debt automatically directly from their bank account, usually 
on a monthly instalment basis. Since the 1990s, pawnbrokers have also been 
revived in China after being prohibited by government for several decades. They 
provide instant cash for secured property.819  
 
Although complex in company types and products, in essence, subprime lenders 
are similar. No matter what kind of products they provide, they make profit from 
high interests, fees and penalties from lending. This similarity makes it possible to 
abstract a definition of subprime lending.  
 
Ramsay defines subprime lending as ‘a variety of financial services and credit 
selling which target the bottom third of the economic ladder and/or individuals 
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with spotty or blemished credit histories’.820 Similarly, Caplan describes fringe 
banking as ‘the arena of financial services that enables people with bad or no 
credit and without access to mainstream financial institutions to obtain money’.821 
The intrinsic similarity between different types of credit services provides the 
ground for consumer credit regulation and customer protection, no matter how the 
lender deals with its customers. 
 
4.1.1 The three tiers of the subprime credit market 
 
In the ‘subprime’ context, many would agree that there are two broad tiers of 
lenders targeting different groups of people, namely those who have blotted credit 
records, and those who are more vulnerable in economic status. 822  Both are, 
however, vulnerable to lenders’ misconduct. 
 
Specifically, customers in the upper tier in the market tend to be better off and can 
secure their loans with their property.823 They are not necessarily living on very 
low income; for example, Zywicki confirms the relatively better economic status 
of some title loan customers, some of whom are small business owners. 824 The 
reason why they are rejected by banks is mainly due to their poor credit records or 
history of bed debts, or they have already reached the credit limit with mainstream 
banks.825 Similarly, the main customer group of small loan companies in China is 
small business owners, rather than low-income individuals. 
 
The next tier in the subprime credit market, based on the classification of 
Kempson et al, serves people who are in a more vulnerable economic status than 
the first group, namely those who have a lower or unstable income. However, 
these people still have some sort of creditworthiness: this could include a fixed 
home address, a job and a bank account, if the loan is unsecured; or a valuable 
property that can be pawned, if the loan is secured. This market in the UK is 
represented by payday lenders and pawnbrokers, and many other licensed 
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moneylenders who offer small loans to customers. The customers of payday 
lenders, for example, usually have a job and repay their loan with their next 
month’s salary directly from their bank account.826 Furthermore, the consumers of 
pawnshops often do not own collateral to secure a minimum bank loan, and are 
judged too risky for unsecured credit. 827  Typically, pawnshop borrowers have 
been turned down for a payday loan and use pawnshops as their last resort.828  
 
In addition to licensed lenders, there is usually an underground credit market 
filled with unlicensed moneylenders. This market serves the most vulnerable 
people who cannot even reach the second tier of the credit market. Collard and 
Kempson suggest that unlicensed lenders are widespread in the UK’s low- income 
neighbourhoods. 829  O’Connell regards this market as a ‘sub-sub-prime sector’ 
filled with illegal lenders and more inferior than the subprime sector.830 Lenders 
are usually criticized for being usurious or predatory, or being ‘loan sharks’. 
Features of loans sharks defined by the Citizens Advice Bureau are cited here: 
 
loan sharks often work from home, charge very high rates of interest 
and don't give you much paperwork to confirm the arrangements they 
have made with you; loan sharks often take other illegal action to 
collect the money they have lent you, such as threatening violence or 
taking away your credit cards or valuables.831 
 
On this issue, there is a special concept, ‘informal lending and borrowing’ (民间
借贷, MinJianJieDai) in China’s legal context. When it is mentioned in Chinese 
legal literature, several different meanings are used in different contexts. In the 
narrow sense, it refers to the lending activity between individuals, or between 
individuals and non-financial entities. In contrast to it is the so-called formal 
lending between customers and any licensed lenders, either mainstream or 
subprime. People are free to set up loan contracts with other individuals or 
                                                 
826
 Timothy Edmonds, ‘Payday Loans: Regulatory Reform’(2014).  
827
 John P Caskey, ‘Pawnbroking in America: The Economics of a Forgotten Credit Market’ 
(1991) 23 Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 85. 
828
 Zywicki (n 816). 
829
 Collard S and Kempson E, Affordable Credit: The Way Forward (1st edn, The Policy Press 
2005) 10-13. 
830
 Sean O’Connell, Credit and Community: Working-Class Debt in the UK since 1880  (1st edn, 
Oxford University Press 2009) 169. 
831
 Citizens Advice Bureau, ‘Loan Sharks’ 
<http://www.adviceguide.org.uk/england/debt_e/debt_borrowing_money_e/debt_types_of_borrow
ing_e/debt_loans_e/loan_sharks.htm> accessed 10 March 2015. 
203 
 
enterprises. The activity is per se legitimate and is legally protected by China’s 
Contract Law.832  
 
However, in recent years, the description ‘informal lending and borrowing’ has 
also been understood in a broader sense, namely borrowing money from 
unlicensed moneylenders or ‘underground money shops’ ( 地 下 钱 庄 , 
DiXiaQianZhuang). Customers are largely small enterprises that need the 
wherewithal to maintain production, but also include vulnerable individuals who 
need credit to deal with emergency situations but have no access to licensed 
lenders. For example, research on usury in China gives nine main reasons why 
people borrow from underground lenders, among which are (i) dealing with an 
unexpected emergency, (ii) trying to make ends meet, (iii) paying for medical 
care, (iv) borrowing to repay old debt, (v) paying for a wedding or funeral.833 
Underground lenders serve this market without a valid banking licence, however 
conducting similar business to commercial banks and dealing with the public. 
Some therefore call them ‘China’s shadow banks’. 834 This is China’s underground 
credit market where usury practices (高利贷, GaoLiDai) are rampant, especially 
in the rural areas where residents have a lower income, and where banking outlets 
are rare.835  
 
Irrespective of whether it is in the UK or China, underground lenders are viewed 
as illegal, not only due to their usurious charges and other possible illegal actions, 
but also because the financial authority requires all moneylenders to have a 
licence to operate a lending business. Therefore, it is more common to use 
financial regulations to regulate licensed lenders who conduct their business 
improperly, while using criminal law in the case of illegal underground 
moneylenders who abuse customers. 
 
                                                 
832
 Contract Law of the People's Republic of China (1999) Chapter 12, ss 196-211. 
833
 Ruiming Liu, ‘高利贷借贷的逻辑’ [Logic of high-cost loans] Working Paper of China 
Northwest University (2004). 
834
 See, eg ‘Shadow Banking in China: The Wenzhou experiment, China Unveils a Pilot 
Programme to Legitimise Informal Lending’ (The Economists) 
<http://www.economist.com/node/21552228> accessed 10  March 2015. 
835
 See, for example, Ethan Wilkes, ‘For China’s Rural Poor, Life Without Banks’ (The Atlantic) 
<http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/for-chinas-rural-poor-life-without-
banks/274435/> accessed 10 March 2015. 
204 
 
In contrast to underground moneylenders, subprime lenders are at least under 
moderate regulation control, which reduces the risk they could pose to consumers. 
Moreover, they de facto fill the gap left by banks in the consumer credit market, 
making subprime lenders essential to the market before alternative lenders such as 
credit unions could take over. Vulnerable people who have to make ends meet or 
deal with emergencies and need additional money should ideally have their 
demands met either by the state welfare system or by access to widespread, 
affordable credit to help them live a decent life and remain free from usurers’ 
exploitation. 836  However, in reality, as discussed in previous chapters, their 
demands cannot be met by commercial banks, nor would it be realistic for 
regulators to require banks to do so. The subprime lending sector, in contrast, 
provides an available choice that could, at least partly, fill the gap left by banks 
and the welfare system. This gap-filling function is perhaps why subprime lenders 
are legally licensed to lend at higher interest rates.  
 
The necessity for the subprime lending sector is perhaps more evident in China, 
where the consumer credit sector is highly monopolized by banks. Privately held 
lending companies without bank-shareholding were allowed to set up only a few 
years before. For low-income Chinese citizens, even licensed subprime credit is 
also scarce. The problem in China is the lack of trustworthy credit resources, 
rather than too many of them. Too-tight regulations (eg, interest rate cap) will 
possibly lead to the market exit of licensed moneylenders, leaving customers 
vulnerable to underground usurers. Similar concerns also exist in the UK, as some 
argue that regulations could become a burden for subprime lenders. 837 However, 
this concern cannot exempt subprime lenders from being regulated. Before the 
available alternative choice developed into a large scale and can be easily 
accessed, vulnerable customers should be protected from being severely harmed 
by the moneylenders’ misconduct. An appropriate level of regulation should be 
set to deal with this issue. 
 
4.1.2 Harmful issues related to the subprime lending market 
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Although being licensed lenders, subprime lenders’ practices could damage 
customers’ welfare in many respects. 
 
The first issue is the high costs of borrowing money from lenders. The idea that 
‘subprime credit is expensive’ sounds like a cliché, but it is indeed more costly 
than loans from banks. It is reasonable for a subprime lenders to set higher APRs 
due to customers’ higher risk level. However, excessively high interest and fees 
can be usurious and unfair.  
 
For example, on the homepage of one famous payday company in the UK, the 
lender discloses the costs and fees of its loans, for instance, the APR goes up to 
1,509%.838 Although this is not the actual interest rates borrowers would pay, as 
the typical length of a loan would not be as long as one fiscal year but only last a 
short period such as 14 days, it is undeniable that the interest rates charged on 
payday loans are higher than other consumer credit products supplied by cred it 
unions or commercial banks, or even other alternative lending services. 839 Hence, 
the payday lending industry is viewed by its opponents as predatory, or usurious; 
its critics argue that such high interest will be too burdensome for vulnerable 
borrowers and may trap them in debt cycles.840 In China, because there is a legal 
cap on loan interest rates, moneylenders usually choose to charge additional fees 
to avoid breaking the law on the legal usury cap. A local court in Chongqing, 
China confirmed the high costs of loans provided by moneylenders, which include 
‘handling charge, loan management fee, consultancy fee [and] default 
management fee’.841  
 
The next issue is information disclosure. Whereas rich or better-educated 
customers could use own knowledge or hire experts to make proper 
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judgements,842 customers in the subprime market are usually not very experienced 
in understanding loan contracts. Mistakenly entering into an improper loan 
commitment without comparing different products holds the danger of further 
financial difficulties. For example, customers may not be aware of the real cost of 
loans and be charged unexpected fees. The CBRC issued a warning for potential 
customers of moneylenders, reminding them to stay alert when it comes to online 
loan advertisements that promise ‘an unsecured, fast loan at low interest rates’, as 
some of them advise people irresponsibly and others are fraudulent. 843 What is 
more, subprime lenders are usually criticized for using advertisements targeted at 
certain consumers, for example, under-18-year-olds or other vulnerable people, or 
suggest that payday loans could be used to pay for shopping.844  
 
The third feature of the subprime lending sector comprises irresponsible lending 
practices. Generally, lenders’ responsible lending means properly assessing 
customers’ creditworthiness and loan affordability; the former means lenders 
could anticipate that loans would be repaid, while the latter means borrowers can 
afford the debt. In contrast, irresponsible lending usually means offering 
unaffordable credit products to customers without checking their repayment 
ability. Customers may still be able to repay on time, but with financial difficulty. 
Since people who borrow from subprime lenders usually only have a limited 
income, any life emergency could lead to the danger of them defaulting. For 
example, a report on the financial difficulties the customers in the UK experience  
suggests that people who are in arrears in their household commitments are also 
largely in debt and have to use their limited income to repay their borrowing.845 
Customers’ vulnerable status could be exacerbated by lenders’ irresponsibility, 
dishonest advertisements and hidden high costs, making it more difficult to save 
up money for future use. For example, a major concern of the opposition to title 
loans is that default will cause the customers to lose perhaps their most valuable 
property and the only way of transportation to work. 846 In addition, high costs 
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could lead to higher default rates, especially in the case of payday lending, as it 
has very short repayment period.847 
 
Reasons why lenders ignore creditworthiness checks, as Fairweather explains, is 
either because the cost of the checks may exceed the benefits of doing so, or 
because they need to accelerate the speed of the loan approval to win more market 
share. 848  Lenders could also profit from defaulted loans, for example, payday 
lenders are criticized for encouraging customers to roll over their loans multiple 
times.849 Such debt is only good for the lender, not the borrower. Lenders should 
know their customer before making any lending decision to make sure the product 
is appropriate for the customer, and to avoid the possibility of trapping customers 
in debt. 850  However, affordability is usually not really considered by subprime 
lenders. Research shows that although 83% of the surveyed UK payday lenders 
have told the borrower how the loan works and the total cost of the loan, 851 they 
are less concerned about the customers’ ability to afford the loan product. Only 
39% of the payday lenders would check whether a customer is suited to a loan, 
and only 39% of them would carry out a sound, proper and appropriate 
affordability assessment and credit vetting for each loan application and before the 
loan is extended.852  
 
If borrowers choose to finance the debt with a new loan, the danger of being 
‘trapped’ in debt exists. Because customers are already in a stressed condition, 
indebtedness over a longer period could make a bad situation worse. Although 
several researchers do not support the direct correlation between fringe banking 
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and the debt trap (and even personal bankruptcy), 853 irresponsible lending could 
indeed exacerbate the problem and push customers into a more dangerous status, 
that is, ‘over- indebtedness’ or ‘debt imprisonment’. 854  There is no generally 
agreed definition of the term over-indebtedness either in the UK855 or at the EU 
level,856 but generally, it can be described as the excess use of credit above an 
affordable level that causes repayment difficulties and further welfare loss. In 
Cartwright’s view, over- indebtedness is ‘the result of credit being too easily 
accessed, rather than too difficult to access.’ 857  Combined with the high-cost 
feature, easily accessed credit could make customers’ vulnerable situation worse.  
 
There are, of course, concerns about debtors’ irresponsible borrowing. 858 Not all 
customers are rational borrowers who will carefully consider their repayment 
ability before making any decision. Taking out a new loan to repay an old one is a 
typical example. 859  Entering into a debt agreement knowing the difficulty of 
repayment is another case.860 However, customers’ weakness does not exonerate 
lenders, as they are presumed to protect customers’ interests, using own business 
practices and procedures to prevent such cases from happening.861 The liability is 
usually attributed to the lender rather than the borrower who may not have enough 
financial knowledge to make a judgement.  
 
Last but not least, it is important to note that due to the nascent stage of consumer 
credit development in China, the infancy of the fringe banking sector, and 
residents’ traditional custom of saving money, 862  the problem of irresponsible 
lending in the country appears not to be as severe as in the UK or US, where the 
subprime consumer credit sector has existed for decades. In addition, not all 
subprime lenders in China have access to the central bank’s personal credit record 
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system, therefore, without this security blanket licensed subprime lenders tend 
perhaps to be more cautious about creditworthiness assessments of unsecured 
loans that may result in non-performance. However, this condition is not an 
advantage and is already in the process of change. Irresponsible lending and 
borrowing are already reflected in the credit card sector, as relatively better-off 
people who try to finance one debt using another credit card debt have already 
burdened themselves with debt problems.863 As the role of credit records in China 
have become increasingly more important in recent years as in developed 
countries, and subprime lenders are gradually joining the national credit record 
system, this situation is due to change.  
 
4.2 Economic rationale for conduct regulation 
 
Having recognized the fact that customers in the subprime consumer credit market 
are vulnerable to firm’s improper conduct, the necessity of protecting customers’ 
interests can hardly be overlooked. Generally, protecting customers’ interests is 
regarded as the role of conduct regulation, the rationale for conduct regulation is, 
however, deeper and more complex than the empirical evidence discussed above. 
 
Conduct regulation, as one of two pillars of the modern financial regulation 
system, focuses on how firms deal with customers while conducting their 
business. Its aim is to protect customers from being harmed by firms’ misconduct, 
rather than to ensure system safety. By setting up specific and detailed rules for 
firms to observe, regulators propose to regulate firms’ behaviour and to protect 
customers; and after customers have suffered any detriment, to recover their 
interests through compensation, penalty and other remedies. In short, business 
conduct regulation adjusts the relationship between firms and customers.864  
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At first glance, business conduct regulation appears to contradict the ‘free-market’ 
assumption represented by Friedman’s famous theory, which assumes that the free 
market can operate well in the long run and needs no more state intervention.865 
This free-market theory has several main assumptions: first, it assumes that 
individuals are rational and are able to make free choices based on own 
interests.866 Second, through rational customers’ free choice, only good firms can 
beat the competition. 867  Since the market can self-adjust through freedom of 
exchange, that is, rational customers choose good firms and vice versa, 868 
excessive government intervention could hence be ‘paternalistic’ and will increase 
unnecessary compliance costs for market participants.869  
 
Critics objecting to the prefect market assumption usually point out the market 
imperfection that exists in the real economy.870 It is recognized that customers and 
the market are usually neither rational nor perfect and the financial ma rket is not 
exempt from this imperfection. Owing to information asymmetry, a customer may 
not be able to make rational choices; firms usually also lack incentives to behave 
well without minimum standards of regulation. To prevent contracts failing 871 
(rather than failure of the whole system) and to protect customers’ interests, some 
sort of government intervention is essential under current circumstances; and, so 
long as regulation is proportional to the risk posed to firms, the benefits of 
regulation would exceed its costs and could be undertaken by rational customers. 
 
4.2.1 Market imperfection 
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The first basic understanding of conduct regulation is recognition of the 
imperfection of the financial market, that is, both firms and customers are less 
likely to behave like assumed rational market participants. Although market 
imperfection problem also exists in mainstream financial markets, the subprime 
consumer credit market is usually less regulated than the mainstream counterparts, 
while serves the less-privileged customer group who are denied of access to 
commercial bank credits.  This thesis therefore mainly discusses the market 
imperfection of the subprime credit market and chooses not to expand the 
discussion to misconduct in mainstream commercial banking activities. 
 
The problem of information asymmetry is a good example in this regard. In the 
theory of the perfect market, an individual is presumed to be able to make fully 
informed choices based on suppliers’ information. Presumed to be profit-
maximizers, customers will only make the choice that best fits in with their needs 
and choose the firm that provides sufficient information on its products. Suppose 
all rational customers choose to deal with an information-transparent firm, a firm 
that cannot collectively satisfy demands for information would face the danger of 
failing in the competition and exit the market, which provides enough incentives 
for information disclosure.  
 
However, in reality, customers are not necessarily rational, nor would firms have 
enough incentive to provide information. From the customers’ side, they are not 
always able to make rational choices as assumed. Their status is vulnerable in 
dealing with firms due to the asymmetry of information. From the firms’ side, 
Cartwright notes that firms are sometimes reluctant to provide information to low-
value individual customers, because this will not increase their profits.872 If not all 
firms choose to disclose relevant information on their products – which is 
foreseeable in an unregulated market – it would be difficult for customers to 
compare products from different firms and to distinguish which ones are good or 
not, which further highlights the problem of increased transaction costs and 
adverse selection.  
 
More specifically, difficulties brought about by market imperfection (in this case, 
the information asymmetry) in an unregulated market are first met by individual 
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customers. In Llewellyn’s view, what distinguishes a financial product from other 
products is the time and costs involved in figuring out the real quality of the 
goods. 873  Compared with a physical product whose quality could be evaluated 
prior to purchase, the real quality of a financial product will only emerge after a 
period of purchase. Hence, financial products are regarded as ‘credence goods’ 
which ‘are those where quality can be ascertained only at some cost after 
purchase, and in its extreme form might never be fully open to objective 
evaluation’.874 Furthermore, owing to this feature, many types of transaction costs 
would emerge prior to, during and after the setting up of financial contracts, as 
Llewellyn puts it, 
 
[T]ransaction costs can be divided into search costs (information 
needed in order to search alternative products and their suitability), 
bargaining and decision costs (involved in agreeing precise contract 
terms), monitoring costs (the costs involved in monitoring post-
contract behaviour to the extent that it is relevant in determining the 
ultimate value of a contract), enforcement costs (ensuring that 
contracting parties deliver on the contract), verification costs 
(ascertaining the characteristics of the product and whether, for 
instance, disclosed information is accurate and complete) and finally, 
where relevant, redress costs (costs involved in securing redress in the 
event of a contract failure of one sort or another).875 
 
Transaction costs of credence goods are apparently higher than common physical 
goods whose quality could be easily ascertained at lower or no costs. 876  For 
example, one may not spend several days researching the quality of a ne w brand 
of vacuum cleaner as this can easily be figured out by reading commodity 
comments, while much more time will be spent doing research before entering 
into a loan contract due to its complexity and potential risks.  
 
In addition, even if consumers are aware of the possible risks of a financial 
product, they are sometimes unable to make the right decision, which further puts 
forward the problem of bounded rationality, namely the limitation of individuals’ 
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ability to receive, to process and deal with the information.877 Not all consumers 
are irrational, impulsive buyers ignore product quality before purchasing; instead, 
individuals are sometimes simply unable to receive and judge excessive 
information due to their ability to understand contact terms. Although most 
customers may wish to maximize their profits, they may not know how to achieve 
this. The complexity of financial contracts is an apparent obstacle for ordinary 
consumers to process all relevant information, which not only exceeds their 
knowledge level but also costs too much. To put it simply, it is the mismatch 
between customers’ intention and their real choice that leads to the improper 
choice of financial product, where rationality on profit-maximization fails to take 
priority. 878  In order to reduce the consequence of bounded rationality in an 
imperfect market, government regulations on information disclosure may reduce 
transaction costs.879 
 
The problem of market imperfection is also reflected on the suppliers’ side which, 
in turn, influences consumers’ welfare. When information disclosure is not 
compulsory, it could be assumed that only minority firms would voluntarily 
disclose information to consumers. The firm that discloses sufficient information 
to customers then bears higher costs than its competitors, which may result in 
product price increase. What is more, since customers may be unable to 
distinguish products but choose a cheaper product, this would lead to a dangerous 
status, namely firms cannot obtain profits from information disclose. This is ‘the 
problem of lemons’ when good products or suppliers are adversely selected, 
because customers know there are both good and bad products on the market but 
cannot exercise sound judgement and choose the cheaper products. 880  Without 
proper intervention, it could be assumed that in the long run, information about 
financial products will become scarcer and individual customers need to pay 
higher transaction costs during and after purchase. Regulation on information 
disclosure in this sense is to set up conduct standards and drive those firms who 
cannot meet the standard out of the market. 
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The discussion above shows the difficulties met by both customers and firms in 
the unregulated market which is far from ‘perfect’. Without government 
regulation, simply relying on self-regulation and CSR may not make it possible to 
fulfil the customer protection objective. Conduct regulation, in this sense could 
provide minimum protection for common customers who are limited in ability, 
time and effort, and have no enforcement power to protect self-interests.  
 
4.2.2  Cost of regulation 
 
Some may argue that regulation of business conduct will increase direct and 
indirect costs.881 These costs are first incurred by firms in the form of compliance 
costs, but then shift to the customers, who ultimately bear the increased costs, in 
the form of an increased price. Payday lenders, for example, are concerned about 
their market exit if regulation becomes more stringent, after which vulnerable 
customers may be faced with the increased danger of being exploited by loan 
sharks.  
 
Indeed, conduct regulation on business standards would increase firms’ 
compliance costs. However, as discussed above, without proper regulation, firms 
in the financial market usually lack the incentive to conduct their business on a 
higher level, which would finally hurt their customers’ interests. Suppose there is 
no guarantee of product quality in an unregulated market, customers now need to 
bear the burden of exercising proper judgement of the product quality. Yet, owing 
to the bounded rationality, customers are not always able to bear this self-
responsible duty. The cost of monitoring financial firms’ product quality and their 
level of conduct would be disproportionately high and unbearable for each 
individual customer during every purchase of financial products. 
 
Moreover, the costs of figuring out product quality would be unnecessarily 
multiplied for society, since every individual customer needs to do the same 
research each time. It is difficult for individual customers to share their 
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knowledge of a financial product with other customers. The self-monitoring 
regime of the imperfect market means a waste of time and effort at the social 
level.  
 
A better and more efficient solution in this case, according to Llewellyn, is to 
delegate regulator monitoring firms on behalf of individual customers: 
 
Because most (especially retail) customers are not in practice able to 
undertake such monitoring, an important role of regulatory agencies is 
to monitor the behaviour of financial firms on behalf of customers. In 
effect, consumers delegate the task of monitoring to a regulatory 
agency, and hence that agency can be viewed as supplying monitoring 
services to customers of financial firms. This in turn raises the issue of 
the nature of any perceived implicit contract between the regulator and 
consumers of financial services. There are strong efficiency reasons 
for consumers to delegate monitoring and supervision to a specialist 
agency to act on their behalf as the transaction costs for the consumer 
are lowered by such delegation. There are potentially substantial 
economies of scale to be secured through a collective authorisation 
(via ‘fit and proper’ criteria), and supervising and monitoring of 
financial firms.882 
 
The cost-saving advantage through conduct regulation is also reflected in its ex 
ante feature in regulating firms’ behaviour. By setting up appropriate conduct 
standards and penalties for misconduct in advance, a rational firm would choose 
to comply with the law to avoid breaking the rules and being punished. This is 
more efficient than simply relying on judicial efforts after a dispute has arisen. 
Although being indispensable, courts could only provide an ex post remedy in the 
case of dispute, which adds additional costs to both the customer and the firm. 
After all, a fair legal system shall not only punish those who are regarded as 
behaving ‘unfairly’, but provides the firm with clear conduct rules.  
 
Furthermore, since the cost brought about by government regulation will reflect 
on the prices of financial products, it is also assumed that rational customers 
would prefer to bear these additional regulation costs, as this would be lower than 
the transaction costs they pay in the case of no regulation. Customers are willing 
to pay for regulation, which could provide them with more confidence in firms’ 
behaviour and product quality.883  
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In addition, regulation is, of course, not a free good. However, as long as 
regulation is proportionate, its benefits will exceed the costs that provide the 
economic ground for regulation. The remaining problem is to set up appropriate 
regulation standards that would fit in with different firms’ risk level and do not 
overburden low-risk firms. According to the Financial Stability Board, reasonable 
regulation shall be proportionate to, ‘characteristics, type, and variety of the 
financial products and consumers, their rights and responsibilities, and be 
responsive to new products, designs, technologies and delivery mechanisms.’884 
This is perhaps more evident in the subprime lending sector where the size of 
firms is usually small, and they may face more difficulties in satisfying stringent 
regulatory rules than commercial banks. 
 
Last but not least, it is important to note that the regulator cannot pursue the 
objective of customer protection without limits. As Llewellyn suggests, regulation 
would always be more effective if customers could pay higher costs. 885 However, 
the strength of regulation is bounded by the resources a regulator could use. An 
imaginary supremely powerful regulator has the ability to oversee all possible 
misconduct of firms in the domestic market which, however, could be to the 
detriment of consumers, as they have to bear the regulation costs.886 Regulation is 
therefore not an ultimate weapon in customer protection, but is de facto limited in 
its effectiveness in respect of costs. Here, there are inevitable trade-offs between 
pursuing a regulatory objective and bearing its costs. On the one hand, for the 
majority of customers’ sake, regulation is the firewall that provides them with 
minimum protection. On the other, customers shall be informed of the limits of 
regulation and be alerted when dealing with financial firms. Their self-cautious 
attitude cannot be totally replaced with regulation. This also explains why 
financial customers shall be educated with basic knowledge of protecting 
themselves to avoid any unwanted transaction costs.  
 
The economic rationale of conduct regulation of the financial market lies in the 
market imperfection which the market itself has little chance to correct at minor 
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costs. Information asymmetry is the most distinctive example of this imperfection 
which represents the weaknesses of both consumers and firms. Without proper 
regulation, customers with limited rationality may be faced with higher 
transaction costs than the cost of simply delegating a regulator to collectively 
monitor firms. To recap, regulation is not in conflict with the ‘free market’ 
assumption; instead, appropriate regulation provides preconditions for customers’ 
free choice, which cannot be satisfied by a chaotic, non-transparent and 
unregulated market. Free market in this sense is not simply opposite to but, in 
fact, relies on financial regulation. 
 
4.3.  Setting up an appropriate regulatory regime for subprime lenders 
 
As discussed in section 4.1, there are various kinds of subprime lenders in the 
market. In order to properly regulate those money lenders, the regulatory regime 
needs to be appropriately set. The UK has experienced a process of ‘unifying’ 
separate regulations in the consumer credit sector, while the regulatory regime in 
China is still piecemeal at this stage. 
 
4.3.1  The UK’s consumer credit regulatory regime development path 
 
4.3.1.1  Consumer Credit Act, 1974 and the original OFT Regime: Pre-1974 to 
2006 
 
It is fair enough to regard the issue of the Consumer Credit Act, 1974 (hereinafter 
‘CCA 1974’) as the de facto setting-up point of the UK’s unified consumer credit 
regulatory regime. Prior to CCA 1974, firms offering consumer credit were 
separately regulated by different legislation devised for every credit provider, for 
example, the Pawnbrokers Acts, Moneylenders Acts and Hire Purchase Acts. The 
shortcomings of the CCA1974 are criticized by many, but generally, it ‘dealt 
piecemeal with particular legal forms rather than comprehensively with the reality 
of credit provision common to them all’. 887  Firms are regulated based on 
transaction form, regardless of the similarities in essence, 888  which leads to 
                                                 
887
 KE Kindgren, ‘The Consumer Credit Act 1974: Its Scope’ (1977) 40 The Modern Law Review 
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regulatory loopholes and were out of date when various new types of consumer 
credit were invented in the new era. 
  
The CCA 1974 repeals those old laws and offers a brand-new, unified regulation 
regime, 889  with the purpose of setting up a single set of rules that covers the 
whole industry. The regulatory regime, usually known as the ‘OFT-style regime’, 
has three main pillars: (i) the licence regime, (ii) unified business standard and the 
(iii) enforcement power. All firms are under the regulatory power of the Director-
General of OFT, and must obey the same conduct standards in many respects. At 
the centre of the Act is the licence regime, which empowers the Director-General 
of OFT to grant, withdraw or limit the licence of a lender. This gives conduct 
standards real strength, as firms who misbehaved would face the risk of losing 
their licence and being expelled from the arena. The court also has enforcement 
power as a judicial control method. 
 
As a product of its era, the CCA 1974 has performed well in more than three 
decades. It was highly praised at the time it was enacted and is regarded as ‘the 
most comprehensive and sophisticated consumer credit statute ever to have been 
enacted in any country’ 890 , since the unified legislation provides an equal 
environment for all regulated credit activities, promotes competition by applying 
the same regulatory controls, and prevents legislation overlap or loophole 
underlying in previous statutes. Furthermore, detailed conduct rules could provide 
strengthened protection for customers, underpinned by the enforcement power.891  
 
4.3.1.2  Consumer Credit 2006, the joint regulation of OFT and FSA: 
Transitional period 2006-2014 
 
Ever since the CCA 1974 was enacted in the 1970s, the credit market in the UK 
has become more complex. Unsecured consumer credit expanded rapidly, 
especially after the 1990s.892 In consideration of the different conditions, the CCA 
1974 was reviewed for its suitability in 2001. The resulting White Paper, Fair, 
Clear and Competitive: The Consumer Credit Market in the 21st Century, 
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released on 2003, decided that the 1974 Act was slightly out of date and must be 
reformed to accommodate new conditions:  
 
The laws governing this market were set out a generation ago . . . The 
regulatory structure that was put in place then is not the same as the 
regulatory structure required today. As the credit market has 
developed, reforms have become necessary to modernise the current 
regime and update it for the 21st century.893 
 
For example, many detailed problems such as indebtedness, vulnerable customers 
being entrapped by loan sharks and information problems are not covered by the 
original legislation, which was fatal for customer protection.894 These concerns 
led to a series of legislative amendments in 2004 that added new standards to the 
1974 Act in respect of, for example, advertisements, disclosure and many other 
details.895  
 
However, owing to more fundamental problems, it was decided that ‘primary 
legislation’ was essential to amend the original legislation and this finally led to 
the Consumer Credit Act 2006 (hereinafter ‘CCA 2006’),896 which mainly focuses 
on the ex post consumer protection methods when there misconduct has already 
occurred:  
 
First, the CCA 2006 empowers OFT with further enforcement power to punish 
firms who fail to satisfy conduct regulation requirements imposed on them. 897 
According to the original CCA 1974, the regulator could only remove, limit or 
withdraw a licence of a misconducting firm. Now, under CCA 2006, OFT can 
impose a civil penalty of up to £50,000 for every breach of rules.898 Second, as 
regards the power of the court to decide whether an ‘unfair relationship’ exists 
between the debtor and creditor, and requiring the creditor to recover the debtor’s 
                                                 
893
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loss, the CCA 2006 provides additional protection for customers in a judicial 
process.899  
 
Next is the extension of the Financial Ombudsman Scheme to the consumer credit 
industry by amending the FSMA 2000.900 This is meaningful because until later 
reform, consumer credit regulation under the CCA regime was parallel with the 
FSMA framework. A consumer credit agreement was not included in the FSMA’s 
‘regulated activities’ and therefore the debtor cannot use the original Ombudsman 
scheme. The new amendment provides individuals with fast and easy dispute 
resolution with minimum formality, and encourages them to use this alternative 
way of resolving their complaints. 
 
It is also important to note that during the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
the consumer credit market in the UK was under dual regulation of both OFT and 
the FSA as a response to the FSMA 2000. Since the two authorities have 
‘different but complementary’ powers and principles, they have to work together 
to avoid possible regulation confliction and regulatory burden. 901  Several joint 
working documents are published by both. 902  However, joint regulation is a 
product of the transitional period when the CCA regime and FSMA regime were 
coexisting. The concern about the efficiency of this dual-regulatory regime and 
unnecessary cost, to some extent, led to the later fundamental reform.903 
 
4.3.1.3 FCA regime under FSMA 2000: A risk-based approach from 2014 
 
From April 2014, the regulatory regime of the consumer credit sector shifted to 
the FSMA regime. This was in response to the new circumstance. On the one 
hand, the consumer credit market has evolved quickly in recent years, leading to 
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higher risks to consumers. With the ‘credit crunch’ brought about by the recent 
financial crisis and the rapid increase of the small amount, short-term credit 
market, enhanced consumer protection standards are essential. On the other hand, 
the weakness lies in the previous joint-regulation under OFT and the FSA, which 
required regulatory efficiency improvement. The resulting reform is more 
profound than any of the previous legislative amendments as it replaced the 40-
year-old CCA regime with a unified, single FSMA framework.  
 
The reform, however, does not totally overthrow the previous CCA regime. To 
reduce firms’ burden of acclimatizing themselves to the new regulatory 
requirements, much of the contents of the CCA remained in the new framework. 
The new regime is a combination of FSMA (and its secondary legislation), 
retained provisions of the CCA 1974 (and its retained secondary legislations), and 
FCA’s (and FSA’s) rules. A new FCA sourcebook, the Consumer Credit 
Sourcebook (CONC), was also created to provide conduct regulations. It is very 
flexible to any future new circumstance. The general pillars of the CCA’s 
regulatory regime, namely conduct regulations, enforcement power and dispute 
solutions by the financial ombudsman and court, still underpin the new regulatory 
regime. In addition, the new regime would also adopt rules from industry codes if 
it provides higher levels of customer protection. 904  The regulatory sourcebook, 
Principles for Businesses, also applies to consumer credit firms and provides the 
basic behaviour standards in case of any new type of misconduct without specific 
rules to cater for them.905  
 
After the reform, the CCA, 1974, was no longer the basic legal framework, since 
it had been absorbed into the FSMA regime.906 The FCA obtains full regulatory 
power and is responsible for regulating more than 50,000 firms in this market.907 
The FSMA framework is also believed to be more flexible to adapt to the dynamic 
credit market than the CCA 1974. 
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In the new regime, consumer credit firms are regulated based on different levels 
of risk posed to customers, known as the ‘risk-based approach’.908 It proposes to 
provide better consumer protection and set a proportionate regulation burden on 
firms by distinguishing high-  and low-risk firms, and setting up regulatory 
standards tiers based on the risk level.909 Low-risk firms are less regulated, while 
high-risk firms must obey more stringent standards as they pose more risks to 
customers. This is one of the most significant differences between the old and new 
regulatory regime, as the CCA 1974 generally provided all firms with the same 
regulatory standards without considering the risk level of different firms. The 
most recognized high-risk credit type, namely short-term, high-cost credit, is 
specifically noted by the new regime. 910  What is more, the sourcebook is 
applicable to all firms that provide consumer credit; this means it could regulate 
mainstream firms and banks, 911  building societies, credit unions and subprime 
lenders. It is based on the essence of regulated activities in different industries. 
Firms are under the same conduct rule of regulated activities (except for high-
cost, short-term credit, which has higher conduct of business rules to obey), since 
consumers of the same type of regulated activity shall be equally protected 
regardless of with what kind of lenders they are dealing.  
 
4.3.2  China’s unifying-in-process consumer credit regulatory regime 
 
Owing to the nascent development stage of China’s consumer credit sector, the 
regulatory regime for the industry is, overall, less developed. However, the 
attitude of the regulators is increasingly more positive. Prior to 2010, the 
regulatory framework for subprime lenders could be regarded as ‘piecemeal’, 
different firms were under separate regulations and the regulatory power was 
exercised by different regulators; China’s regulator paid more attention to 
prudential and administrative aspects rather than customer protection, and focused 
on commercial banks rather than subprime lenders. Commercial banks have 
relatively comprehensive business conduct rules, while for the different types of 
subprime lenders there are only rough separate conduct standards. For example, a 
consumer finance company is simply required to ‘protect its customer, obey open 
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and transparent procedures when dealing with customers, disclose information to 
customers, including the loan amount, repayment period, price and repayment 
methods in the loan contract’.912 It also protects the confidentiality of customers’ 
personal information913 and shall not collect the debt using threat or harassment 
without further details.914 For small lending companies, there is no such conduct 
requirement; the regulator focuses all its attention on the licence regime and 
prudential regulation. Although anecdotal evidence since 2008 has repeatedly 
revealed that China’s central bank is drafting a Money-lenders Ordinance, this 
proposed regulation is still in its drafting process and there is no sign of 
promulgation.915 
 
However after new regulation, the Interim Measures for the Administration of 
Personal Loans (2010),916 issued by the CBRC, the fragmented and rough conduct 
of business regulation for consumer credit activities has largely changed, as the 
rule is applied not only to commercial banks, but also part of the subprime lenders 
as long as they offer personal loan products. Table 4.1 gives a primary 
introduction to, and comparison of, the current regime. 
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Table 4.1 Regulatory regime of firms that provide consumer credit loan in 
China 
 
Commercial 
banks 
Small 
lending 
company 
Consumer finance 
company
917
 Pawnbroker 
Current basic 
law/ 
regulation(s) 
for the 
industry 
(1) Law of the 
People’s 
Republic of 
China on 
Commercial 
Banks (2003 
Amendment) 
 (2) Interim 
Measures for 
the 
Administration 
of Personal 
Loans (2010) 
(3) Several 
conduct 
regulations
918
 
(1) Guiding 
Opinions of 
China 
Banking 
Regulatory 
Commissio
n and the 
People's 
Bank of 
China on 
the Pilot 
Operation 
of Small-
Sum Loan 
Companies 
(2008)
919
  
(1) Pilot Measures 
for the 
Administration 
of Consumer 
Finance 
Companies 
(2013)
920
 
(2) Interim Measures 
for the 
Administration 
of Personal 
Loans (2010)  
(1) Measures for 
the 
Administration 
of Pawning 
(2005)
921
  
(2) Provisions on 
the Regulation 
of the Pawn 
Industry 
(2012)
922
 
Year of issue (1) 2003; (2) 2010 (1) 2008 (1) 2013; (2) 2010 (1) 2005; (2) 2012 
Issuing 
authority(ies) 
(1) Standing 
Committee of 
the National 
People’s 
Congress;  
(2) CBRC 
(1) CBRC, 
PBoC;  
(1) CBRC 
(2) CBRC 
(1) Ministry of 
Commerce, 
Ministry of 
Public Security;  
(2) Ministry of 
Commerce 
Regulator(s) 
of the firm 
CBRC  CBRC CBRC Ministry of 
Commerce 
Is it a 
financial 
institution? 
Yes Yes Yes No
923
 
Does it need a 
licence? 
Yes Yes, from 
local Bureau 
of Industrial 
and 
Commerce 
Yes, from local 
bureau of 
CBRC 
Yes, from local 
Bureau of 
Industrial and 
Commerce  
Is it allowed 
to take public 
deposits? 
 
Yes No No
924
 No 
                                                 
917
 Consumer finance company (消费金融公司) offers unsecured consumer credit to medium- 
and-low-income people living in urban area. It is actually another kind of alternative lenders as 
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Commercial 
banks 
Small 
lending 
company 
Consumer finance 
company
917
 Pawnbroker 
Is it allowed 
to provide 
unsecured 
credit? 
Yes Yes Yes No
925
 
Main contents 
of the basic 
regulation 
Both prudential 
and conduct 
standards 
Licence; 
setting-up 
administrative 
procedures; 
funding 
resources; 
prudential 
supervisory 
requirements. 
 
Licence; setting-up 
criteria; approved 
business scope; 
funding resources; 
prudential 
supervisory 
requirements; 
information 
disclosure 
requirements; 
enforcement power 
of CBRC. Conduct 
rule in Interim 
Measures 2010 
applies. 
Licence; setting-
up criteria; 
changing licences; 
close-up 
procedure; 
approved business 
scope and 
prohibitions; pawn 
contracts; 
administrative 
power of Ministry 
of Commerce; 
penalty. 
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Although the regulatory regime of China’s consumer credit sector still appears 
fragmented, the Interim Measures 2010 provide business conduct regulations to 
part of the sector, as in its appendix it expanded the application scope from 
commercial banks (‘financial institutions’) to other non-banking financial firms 
that offer personal loan products, including consumer finance comp and auto-
finance companies.926 However, whether small lending companies shall comply 
with the Interim Measures 2000 is doubtful, since they do not belong to ‘financial 
institutions’ in China’s legal context. The licence needed to set up a small lending 
is issued by local industrial and commercial administrative departments (after 
being approved by the provincial authority’s financial office), just like other 
common companies; while financial institutions should additionally obtain their 
special licences from the CBRC before applying for the opening-up licence from 
industrial and commercial bureaux. Since small lending companies are the most 
popular type of subprime lenders in China, this is an apparent weakness in the 
Interim Measures 2000. 
 
Nevertheless, the content of the Interim Measures 2000 is still worth discussing. 
Interim Measures 2010 cover from the pre-contractual to post-contractual stages, 
and mainly focus on responsible lending and information disclosure, including 
creditworthiness assessment requirements to lenders (Chapter 2 and 3); contract 
form and mandatory disclosure in loan contract (Chapter 4); post-contractual loan 
management rules (Chapter 5); and penalties for misconduct (Chapter 7). In 
addition, both the PBoC and the CBRC have set up a bureau of consumer 
protection927 and issue corresponding administrative rules. Although the rules are 
mainly focused on mainstream firms and do not clarify whether subprime lenders 
are also covered, there is no evidence on this issue to suggest otherwise.  
 
For example, the PBoC’s rule defines financial consumer as a domestic individual 
customer who buys products or receives services from financial institutions, 
which also covers subprime lenders.928 However, the CBRC’s conduct rule was 
                                                 
926
 Interim Measures for the Administration of Personal Loans , Appendix, art 43.  
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 CBRC Bureau of Consumer Protection 
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set up for ‘banking financial institutions’, which literally excludes subprime 
lenders, who are in essence non-banking financial institution or non-financial 
institutions in China’s banking regulation regime.929 With general conduct rules 
and complaint procedures, such rules add more effectiveness to the conduct 
regulatory regime of the consumer credit sector. Although they are still rough in 
comparison with the UK’s regulatory rules, it is de facto China’s first step in 
protecting consumers in the consumer credit sector.  However, the regulator has 
not addressed the question of whether subprime lenders shall also comply with the 
CBRC’s conduct rules. Unless small lending companies and pawnshops are 
covered by the same conduct standards, consumers in the sector are still under 
imbalanced protection. The weakness in China’s regime is therefore obvious. 
 
4.4  Statutory/Regulatory techniques: Information disclosure 
 
After clarifying the strengths and weaknesses of the consumer credit regulatory 
regime in both the UK and China, the next step is to look at detailed regulatory 
techniques and their application.  
 
Among all the regulatory techniques in customer protection, the first and foremost 
aspect in the consumer credit sector should be information provision. Although 
the real market is usually not as ‘perfect’ as presumed, more transparent 
information could indeed increase customers’ welfare. The underlying message is  
that only with enough effective information can a customer enter into rational, 
profit-maximizing responsible borrowing from a reputational firm, irrespective of 
whether the information is offered under the mandatory requirement of the 
regulator or voluntarily provided by the firm. Given that disclosure of relevant 
information could be cost-saving for both individual customers and society, the 
problem is to decide what the proper way of disclosure is, which information is 
essential and how far regulation should go.  
 
4.4.1 Mandatory versus voluntary disclosure 
 
                                                 
929
 CBRC, 中国银监会关于完善银行业金融机构客户投诉处理机制切实做好金融消费者保护
工作的通知 [Notice of the China Banking Regulatory Commission on Improving the Client 
Complaint Handling Mechanisms of Banking Financial Institutions to Effectively Protect 
Financial Consumers] (2012 No.13)  
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The first question that needs to be answered is whether mandatory disclosure 
regulation is better than firms’ voluntary disclosure and the industry’s self-
regulation. To some extent, it is similar to the argument about whether regulation 
is necessary in the financial market, since mandatory disclosure belongs to the 
scope of government intervention. 
 
There is, however, a conflicting view on this issue; for example, Benston 
disagrees with the role of mandatory information disclosure in protecting 
customers’ interests.930 In his book Regulating Financial Markets: A Critique and 
Some Proposals, he argues that due to the complexity of financial products and 
diversification of customers’ real needs, government agencies are less likely than 
suppliers to be able to set up a disclosure regime that fits in with customers’ 
demands.931 Benston further argues that mandatory information disclosure tends 
to be very detailed and since costs of regulation compliance will inevitably reflect 
in product prices, this could turn out to be a burden rather than a benefit for 
customers. 932  Benston therefore regards mandatory information disclosure as 
‘more costly than beneficial’ in achieving the customer-protection goal. 933  A 
better solution suggested is voluntarily information disclosure by financial firms, 
as firms have stronger incentives to behave well in order to win competition, 
given that customers could always freely turn to better firms with better 
reputations and are more transparent on their product information.934  
 
As to voluntary disclosure, Ford and Kay suggest that reputation is a powerful 
incentive for respectable firms, who will ‘be careful to ensure that information 
they do provide is accurate; those that do not will find themselves criticised in the 
press and facing large numbers of consumer complaints’, 935 while a mandatory 
disclosure regime poses the danger of ‘giv[ing] consumers more information than 
they either want or can understand’936 and salesmen may use complex rules to 
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distract customers’ attention from the real meaning of the contract.937  Benston 
also regards reputation as an important incentive for firms to provide information 
and is aware of the adverse effect of excessive regulation. In addition, he notes 
that detailed mandatory information disclosure regulation could become a burden 
for new entrants to the financial market and be a detriment for consumers.938 
 
Those in favour of mandatory disclosure usually quote the economic rationale of 
regulation as evidence, that is, to provide minimum protection for customers who 
usually have limited knowledge of financial markets and products, and whose 
rationality is sometimes bounded by their limited time and efforts. For example, in 
Sunstein’s view, the benefits of mandatory disclosure have two aspects (i) 
efficiency and (ii) democracy. Efficiency lies in the economic rationale behind  
financial regulation (as discussed in section 4.2 of this thesis), while democracy is 
related to customers’ right to know, namely they should be informed about any 
possible risks in order to make knowledgeable purchases, which is ‘a precondition 
for liberty’.939 Furthermore, in answer to Benston’s criticism, Llewellyn defends 
his support for mandatory disclosure by arguing that regulatory rules only set up 
the minimum standards for firms and do not conflict with firms’ incentive to 
provide more information to consumers. Therefore, a firm could still value its 
reputation and treat its consumers honestly.940 
 
In addition, voluntary information disclosure by firms is regarded as less effective 
than mandatory regulation. Spencer lists three main market-based solutions of 
information asymmetry: (i) reputation, (ii) signalling equilibrium 941  and (iii) 
intermediation;942 the weaknesses of such market-based solutions are, however, 
evident. For example, reputation that comes from a long-standing relationship is 
not a very reliable metric of the quality of the product as buyers may not have a 
past track record in dealing with the firm.943 Besides, voluntary disclosure needs 
customers’ deeper involvement. However, consumers in the retail market may 
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find it hard to filter out bad firms.944 While the ‘industrial solutions’ in Spencer’s 
analysis is also not enough. Industry associations and professional bodies could 
set minimum standards for industry membership, provide mutual monitoring or 
auditing, and establish a mutual industrial insurance or compensation scheme.945 
However, Spencer criticizes this kind of self-regulation for being ‘anti-
competitive’, as the industrial regulator would favour the industry’s interests more 
than the customers’.946 This is called regulator capture as the self- regulatory body 
could evolve too close to firms.947 
 
What is therefore a better way of disclosing information? The possible answer to 
this disagreement, however, is not simply a ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Whether mandatory 
disclosure could be depends on many specific conditions, including the 
development stage of the regulatory regime and the enforcement power of the 
regulator. However, given the fact that the financial market is far from perfect, as 
well as empirical evidence existing in the market, it is supposed here that 
mandatory disclosure in the consumer credit sector is still essential in both the UK 
and China at this stage. Mandatory information disclosure could also strengthen 
customers’ confidence in the market, since they could assume that they are 
protected from being unfairly or dishonestly treated by firms. 
 
Moreover, this recognition of mandatory disclosure is not going to abandon firms’ 
role in voluntary disclosure. Since regulation only provides the minimum standard 
of customer protection, firms that value their reputation could freely disclose more 
information to customers. It is hard to regard mandatory regulation as being 
harmful to customers. However, minimum regulatory standards are only the first 
step towards customer protection; without effective clear enforcement power and 
penalties, it could hardly fulfil the customer protection goal. The enforcement 
power of the regulator in business conduct regulation will be discussed in later 
sections. 
 
In addition, even under the presumed perfect regulation regime, many less-
controllable factors, including customers’ educational background, knowledge 
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level and their awareness of information would influence the real effect of 
regulatory rules. Cartwright suggests that customers are sometimes unaware of the 
potential risks of loan products; 948  for example, they may sign the contract 
without reading its terms and conditions. This is an aspect of the ‘financial 
illiteracy’ which comes from the complexity of financial products and customers’ 
lack of knowledge. One of the possible solutions is to increase customers’ 
awareness of financial risk in every purchase through financial education; while 
the role of disclosure regulation is to assume customers have no specific 
knowledge on the financial products and provides them with minimum protection. 
 
4.4.2  Principles and techniques of disclosure, and inclined protection of 
financial consumers 
 
Having recognized the necessity for mandatory disclosure, it is essential to decide 
the content of disclosure regulation. This is related to the compliance costs of 
regulation, since any additional cost of regulation would ultimately be reflected in 
prices and be borne by customers. To put it simply, excessively stringent rules 
would become a regulatory burden for firms, while too-relaxed rules would lose 
their effectiveness. However, if information is essential for customers to make  
informed choices, it could be assumed that the benefit of regulation exceeds its 
costs.  
 
4.4.2.1 The UK 
 
The UK has made good progress with this issue. Previously, disclosure 
requirements in the CCA 1974 covered both financial advertisements and pre-
contractual stages; for example, it requires that a financial advertisement shall be 
‘a fair and reasonably comprehensive indication of the nature of the credit or hire 
facilities offered by the advertiser and of their true cost to persons using them’.949 
During the purchase, firms are required to provide adequate explanation to the 
debtor and must give the debtor the chance to understand it. 950 Apparently, the 
CCA is not confined to disclosing the price of products but proposes to provide 
more comprehensive information to help consumers make informed choices.  
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This understanding of disclosure was adopted by the later regulation sourcebooks. 
The Principles (hereinafter ‘PRIN’) clearly require firms to ‘pay due regard to the 
interests of its customers and treat them fairly’ in Principle 6, and to ‘pay due 
regard to the information needs of its clients, and communicate information to 
them in a way which is clear, fair and not misleading’ in Principle 7.  
 
CONC generally requires that ‘a firm must explain the key features of a regulated 
credit agreement to enable the customer to make an informed choice’. 951 Chapter 
3, 4 and 6 of the CONC set up comprehensive rules for any regulated credit 
activities regardless of the type of firm, cover advertisements to post-contractual 
stages. The underlying philosophy of CONC on disclosure is explicitly reflected 
in its Chapter 3 (Advertisements and promotion) as ‘clear, fair and not 
misleading’.952 These rules are, however, not only confined to advertisements and 
the promotion stage, but could be extended to the whole process of consumer 
lending. 
 
The clear rule means a firm must provide transparent, easily understood 
information in its advertisements and not deliberately obscure the information; for 
example, the language used in advertisements must be ‘plain and intelligible’,953 
with the assumption that consumers may not have specific knowledge  of financial 
terms. Advertisements shall not confuse consumers with dazzling professional 
vocabulary that distracts customers from the product’s real feature. Another 
related issue of the clear rule in CONC is the requirement of comparison between 
financial products in advertisements, which shall be ‘meaningful and presented in 
a fair and balanced way’ 954 to prevent meaningless comparisons, since a common 
trick used by credit firms is to simply compare the prices of products, which may 
give customers an inaccurate impression of their risks.955 956 This helps consumers 
to shop around and make fully informed choices. 
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The fair rule is closely related to the misleading rule, although the former has a 
wider context and is not confined to information disclosure issues, but also covers, 
for example, responsible lending and charge of credit. Only added to the UK’s 
consumer credit regulatory regime in the last decade and heavily influenced by 
EU law, the fair rule provides fundamental grounds for further judicial 
intervention in firms’ unfair treatment of customers.  
 
For the meaning of unfair commercial practices, the Consumer Protection from 
Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (hereinafter ‘CPRs’) divides unfair commercial 
activity into two kinds. It is the implementation of the EU’s Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive 2005/29/EC into UK law. Under CPRs, there are 31 
commercial practices that are unfair in their inherent nature, and would be 
assessed as unfair without the effect (or likely effect) on average consumers;957 for 
example, firms are prohibited from falsely ‘[c]laiming to be a signatory to a code 
of conduct when the trader is not.’ This is to prevent customers from being 
deceived by false information, as they mistakenly believe in firms’ reputation in 
the industry and make decisions based on this misunderstanding. Consumer’s 
behaviour is in this sense being distorted. Since such behaviour is by nature 
deceiving or aggressive, and deliberately conducted by the firm, unfairness 
assessment does not need to be made on actual effects and whether consumers are 
‘average’. While other commercial activities would be regarded as unfair only 
when (i) they contravene the requirements of professional diligence; and (ii) they 
materially distort or are likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of the 
average consumer with regard to the product. 958 A firm is not only expected to 
reasonably exercise its special skill when dealing with consumers,959 but is also 
required to treat consumers with special care, as they are regarded as common 
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people without any professional financial knowledge. Commercial activity shall 
not cause average consumers to make distorted decisions. Again, this reconfirms 
the basic assumption that consumers are likely to be financially illiterate, which, 
however, shall not exempt firms or provide them with the opportunity to treat 
consumers unfairly. 
 
COCN recognizes that customers are average people. As regards information 
disclosure, one of the typical unfair activities is misleading consumers in the pre-
contract stage. 960  This means average customers are often deceived by firms’ 
activity into making a transactional decision they would not otherwise have 
made. 961  Although CONC only gives one example on this issue (‘stating or 
implying that the firm will introduce the customer to a provider of a standard 
personal loan . . . but instead introducing the customer to a provider of high-cost 
short-term credit’),962 there are other forms of misleading activities in CONC and 
other regulations such as CPRs. For example, firms are prohibited from unfairly 
‘encourag[ing], incentivis[ing] or induc[ing]’ consumer to sign the contract 
without sufficient consideration, which deprives consumers of their free will in 
making choices.963 CONC also prohibits firms from advertising their products by 
suggesting or implying that no creditworthiness assessment is needed, or 
promoting unsuitable products to vulnerable consumers regardless of their 
financial circumstances. 964  Moreover, attracting customers by using tempting 
expressions is also forbidden. 965  In addition, in order to behave fairly, lenders 
shall clearly list a representative example in advertisements to provide consumers 
with direct knowledge of the products, which must include, but not be limited to,  
for example, the rate of interest, charge of credit and representative APR.966 
Consumers could therefore shop around for the best deal and would be able to 
foresee costs of the loan and avoid possible indebtedness. In the post-contractual 
stage, consumers shall be informed of their right to cancel in the cooling-off 
period.967 All these rules presume that customers in the consumer credit sector are 
common people without professional financial knowledge.  
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Specifically, CONC highlights the risk of borrowing money from short-term, 
high- interest firms by additional risk disclosure requirements to avoid misleading 
consumers. Except for compliance with all the disclosure rules discussed above, 
firms in this sector are also under more stringent conduct standards; for example, 
all their promotions must include a risk warning, given that they are ‘e specially 
dangerous’ for vulnerable consumers, while other credit firms do not need to obey 
this additional rule.968 The new regulatory regime is viewed as following a risk-
based approach. Cartwright regards risk-warning as a simple way of raising 
consumer’s awareness of credit products, as this could give them a first 
impression of the risks involved before entering into a credit contract. 969 Since the 
final decision-making power to enter into a loan contract is held in consumer’s 
own hand, what the regulator could do at this stage is to allow consumers to be 
warned about risks, for example, CONC requires lenders in this sector to explain 
to consumers before they enter into contracts that it is unwise for them to borrow 
money from them for long periods.970  
 
The regulatory regime is therefore not piecemeal but interrelated, as information 
about products’ risks is closely linked to consumers’ responsible borrowing 
behaviour. To help consumers realize the underlying risks of indebtedness, CONC 
requires firms to disclose ‘the principal consequences for the customer arising 
from a failure to make payments’ and other information about repayment, 971 
which will enable customers to make a reasonable assessment of whether they 
could afford the debt and the underlying indebtedness risks.972  
 
Next is about the fairness of contract terms, as the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations 1999 (hereinafter ‘UTCCR’) defines a contractual term as 
follows: 
 
A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be 
regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it 
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causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations 
arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.973 
 
According to the UTCCR, if the annual percentage terms o f contracts are ‘drafted 
in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to influence the 
substance’, then it is not ‘individually negotiated’, unless the term belongs to 
mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions.974 If the contract terms are to the 
detriment of customers then they are regarded as unfair. 975 Contract terms should 
be interpreted in the most favourable manner for consumers if there are doubts 
about their meaning.976 Customers could lay complaints about the detriment they 
have suffered to the qualified regulator,977 and it is the firms’ duty to prove that 
the terms have been negotiated individually. 978  If the terms are assessed by 
regulators and found to be ‘unfair’, then they do not bind consumers. 979 Although 
the UTCCR mainly focuses on the recovery of interest, it could also encourage 
firms to negotiate with customers who are in the process of setting up a contract to 
avoid dispute, and therefore reduce customers’ unawareness of contract terms. 
 
However, a limitation of UTCCR 1999 is that the assessment of the unfairness of 
contract term does not cover ‘definition of the main subject matter of the contract’, 
and the ‘adequacy of the price’ of goods or services, as long as the term is in plain 
and intelligible language.980 Since the interest rate of loans belongs to the price of 
services, the fairness of loan interests cannot be challenged as long as the contract 
has listed it in it, and the language of the contract is plain and intelligible.981  
 
Up-to-date legislation on this issue is the Consumer Rights Act 2015 that 
consolidates the UK’s consumer protection regulations. It also applies to the 
financial service sector. In respect of information disclosure, the Act expands the 
scope of content of contracts and the application of the fairness test to enhance 
consumer protection. First, anything said or written to the consumer by the firm is 
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included in the formal contract terms, if the information is taken into account by 
the consumer to make a decision during or after entering into the contract.982 
Second, the application of the unfairness assessment of contract terms is also 
reconfirmed by applying a higher standard, although the UTCCR already covers 
the exclusion clause. Under the UTCCR, the assessment of fa irness does not cover 
the main contents or price terms if the terms are ‘plain and intelligible’. However, 
as discussed in section 2.3.1.1.ii, consumers would not usually read the contract 
term even if it is in plain and intelligible language. While the Act still maintains 
the exclusion clause of the UTCCR, it aims at increasing the level of consumer 
protection by adding a ‘prominent’ requirement into the previous exemption 
application scope, which means contract terms shall not only be plain and 
intelligible, but also for average consumers to be aware of the term.  983  If this 
standard is not met, then the main subject or price term would not be exempted 
from being tested for fairness after a detriment has occurred. 
 
To avoid disputes under the new rule contained in the Act, firms will need to not 
only talk or write to consumers in transparent language, but also, and more 
importantly, to inform consumers of the substance and price of the product, rather 
than simply listing the terms in the contract and leaving it to consumers to read 
through. It is the firms’ duty to ensure that consumers are informed. As the Act 
covers financial services, lenders in the consumer credit sector shall also comply 
with it and increase customers’ awareness of, for example, loan charges. Failing 
to do so may lead to negative assessment in judicial processes and statutory 
remedies.984  
 
Together with the transparent standard of contract language, the rule of consumer 
awareness of the main subject or price terms gives consumers another layer of 
protection, namely of being informed of the contract contents and product prices, 
although it still does not cover the substantial fairness of the term, for example, 
whether or not the high charge of a loan is fair, but focuses on proper disclosure.  
What is implied in the rule is that as long as the firm has disclosed the charge of 
the loan to consumers properly and consumers are already fully aware of the 
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charge, then it is consumers’ own responsibility to decide whether or not to enter 
into the contract.  
 
4.4.2.2  China 
 
As a comparison, China does not have a single and unified conduct regulation in 
the area of consumer credit that focuses on protecting financial consumers’ right 
to know; the Interim Measures 2010 also do not have detailed rules of 
disclosure.985 Rules of information disclosure are roughly set up in the Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests 
(amended in 2013) (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPL 2013’), protecting all 
individual consumers in all consumption sectors.  
 
Prior to the amendment, China’s law did not explicitly provide special protection 
for individuals dealing with financial institutions, although the CBRC has set up 
some rules and require banks and securities traders to provide adequate 
information for their consumers, but not in the consumer credit sector. 986 
Professional clients and common consumers were not differentiated under the 
consumer protection law; customers of banks and moneylenders were hence 
unable to quote the older version of the CPL as the primary legal basis when they 
were unfairly deprived of their right to know.987 This part of the basic consumer 
protection law was criticized by many, who argued that banking customers shall 
be equally protected as in other consumption areas.988  
 
                                                 
985
 However, in the life insurance sector, the regulator has issued a specific ru le, see China 
Insurance Regulatory Commission, 人身保险新型产品信息披露管理办法 [the Administrative 
Measures for the Information Disclosure of New-type Personal Insurance Products] (2009 No.3). 
It provides sophisticated protection for insurance consumers with mandatory disclosure. This is 
also the case in the security trading sector. Consumer credit area is left behind due to its nascent 
stage. 
986
 See, for example, CBRC, 商业银行个人理财业务管理暂行办法 [Interim Measures for the 
Administration of Commercial Banks' Personal Financial Management Services ] (2005 No. 2) 
987
 Another issue in the Consumer Protection Law (2013) is  the long-standing argument on the 
definit ion of ‘consumer’, as in its art. 4, the law states that ‘the rights and interests of consumers 
purchasing and using commodities or receiving services for daily consumption shall be protected 
by this Law,’ some therefore argue that financial services do not belong to ‘daily consumptions’. 
However, after the 2013 amendment recognized financial consumer’s rights to be equally 
protected, there is now little argument on this issue. See, for example, Zhenming Peng and Xin 
Yin, ‘论金融消费者知情权的法律保护’[Legal Protection of Financial Consumer's Right-to-
Know] (2011) 145 Fa Shang Yan Jiu 13. 
988
 Ibid; Dan Guo, 金融消费者权利法律保护研究 [Legal Protection of Financial Consumer's 
Rights]  (1st edn, Jilin University Press 2009). 
239 
 
Only in the recent amendment has the basic law recognised the consumer status of 
individuals who purchase products or services from financial institutions, rather 
than regarding them as investors with professional knowledge. This is one of the 
most highlighted changes of the law and reflects the attitude towards change by 
the lawmaker, which gives financial consumers the same level of protection in 
respect of disclosure. The discriminatory rule was changed by the recent 
amendment as follows: 
 
Firms that offer security, insurance, banking, credit and other types of 
financial services shall disclose information to consumers, include but 
not limited to firms’ address, firms’ contact number, amount and 
nature of the product/service, price and costs of the product/service, 
start and end date of the contract, how to fulfil contract obligations, 
risk warnings, post-contract services, civil liabilities etc.989 
 
It is the first time that the status of the ‘financial consumer’ is officially confirmed 
by legislation, which underpins the inclination to protect all consumers’ right to 
know in the financial sector. The legislation moves a step away from the caveat 
emptor principle, which requires buyers to beware of their purchase. Consumers 
in the financial sector are no longer regarded as professional investors who shall 
take responsibility for their dealings with financial institutions after the 
amendment, but are equally protected as common customers in other retail areas. 
This is real progress that China’s legislation has made in recent years. 
 
Although article 28 is the only clause in the CPL 2013 that explicitly sets up a 
mandatory disclosure requirement in the financial sector, other clauses in the law 
could also apply to financial firms. At the top would be article 4 in the General 
Provisions which requires firms to ‘adhere to the principles of free will, equality, 
fairness, and good faith’, 990  providing the basic legal ground for information 
disclosure and fair treatment of customers; while the following several articles in 
the law set up rough protection with respect to information disclosure: article 8 
sets up customers’ rights to obtain information from the firm; article 9 protects 
customers’ rights of free-choice; article 18 requires firms to provide risk warning 
for customers; while article 20 requires firms to ‘provide consumers with true and 
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complete information on the quality, performance, use, and useful life, among 
others, of commodities or services; and shall not conduct any false or misleading 
promotion’.991 These clauses set up the conduct standards in disclosure that all 
firms, including financial firms, must comply with when dealing with consumers. 
In the later part of the legislation, consumers also have the right to claim for 
compensation if their interests were unfairly undermined by firms’ misleading 
promotion.992 Together with article 18, it is fair to regard CPL 2013 as providing 
the primary ground for the protection of domestic financial customers. 
 
However, the weakness of China’s consumer protection regime is also obvious. It 
is still extremely rough, and lacks any detailed rules and supportive regulations; 
for example, there is no explanation of what the ‘misleading’ promotion activity 
of firms is and what the complaint procedure is. Furthermore, the perspective of 
current legislation is still firm-oriented and does not cover average consumers’ 
awareness of the price and risks. There is also no requirement on the clarity of 
language used. Such sketchy disclosure rules in the CPL is a disadvantage for 
consumers in judicial processes because courts may tend to interpret the law in a 
narrow sense; for example, if consumers argue that they were unaware of the 
prices or risks in a contract term, their only chance to be justified by the court is to 
prove the misleading or missing terms in the contract, which is procedural rather 
than substantial justice for consumers, since consumers’ real awareness of 
information is not covered by the CPL. In addition, as CPL 2013 is only the 
second amended version in more than two decades, the flexibility of the statute is 
limited in the evolving market. Without detailed regulatory rules as support, 
effectiveness of the statute in reality remains to be seen.  
 
4.5  Statutory/Regulatory techniques: Responsible lending 
 
In order to protect customers’ interests, lenders should remain responsible during 
the whole process of credit relationship, especially in the pre-contractual stage 
when the lender is going to approve a loan application. 993 In the definition of the 
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EU Commission, ‘responsible lending means that credit products are appropriate 
for consumers’ needs and are tailored to their ability to repay’,994 it is another way 
to ensure that the loan product is suitable for customers’ needs. Information 
disclosure also helps customers to decide about the suitability of loan products, 
since without enough information and comparison, average customers cannot 
distinguish the better firm or product from the bad one. However, making a 
judgement is still customers’ own duty, while the firms’ duty is to provide 
adequate information to help with a rational judgement. Responsible lending, in 
turn, is the ender’s duty to ensure that only an appropriate loan be approved to 
suitable borrowers who can repay the debt without financial difficulty, 
irrespective of whether or not the customers are rational. Responsible lending as 
the regulatory methods in this sense is the second layer of protection, or a 
‘firewall’ of customers’ interests not to be harmed by any negative consequences 
of their limited rationality when borrowing money from lenders.  
 
4.5.1  Assessment of creditworthiness 
 
In order to ensure that borrowers can repay their debt, lenders should collect 
relevant information to assess customers’ financial situation and repayment ability 
before approving or significantly increasing the amount of a loan. This is the 
creditworthiness check procedure, which is the most commonly used method of 
lending responsibly.  
 
Both the UK and China have a creditworthiness check requirement for consumer 
credit in their statutes or regulations. In the UK, the role of irresponsible lending 
was inserted in the UK’s regulatory regime by section 25(2B) of CCA 2006, 
which empowers OFT to consider if business practices in the consumer credit 
sector may involve ‘irresponsible lending’ and are ‘deceitful or oppressive or 
otherwise unfair or improper’.995 It is part of the licence control regime of OFT. If 
the rule is not satisfied, OFT could use enforcement actions, include requirements, 
penalties, and vary, refuse or revoke the licence. 996 The extent of enforcement by 
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OFT is ‘guided by the level of actual or potential harm to borrowers and by the 
scale or frequency of identified misconduct.’997  
 
Specifically, the creditworthiness assessment requirement (s 55B) was inserted 
into CCA 1974 by the Consumer Credit (EU Directive) Regulations 2010, which 
set the requirement for firms as having ‘to undertake an assessment of the 
creditworthiness’ before loan approval or significantly increasing the loan 
amount, 998  based on the information from the debtor and the credit reference 
agency. However, there is no further explanation on the details. Fairweather 
therefore views section 55B as merely a statutory provision of ‘what is necessary’ 
for lenders to do when conducting their business. 999  There is also no further 
explanations in OFT’s Guidance. CONC further developed the rules about 
creditworthiness assessment by requiring lenders to consider ‘the potential for the 
commitments under the regulated credit agreement to adversely impact the 
customers’ financial situation’,1000 which, however, still focuses on the borrower’s 
repayment ability.  
 
A similar rule can also be found in China’s Interim Measures for the 
Administration of Personal Loans, which regulates both banks and other subprime 
credit firms. 1001  For example, lenders are required to assess borrowers’ basic 
condition, income level, loan purpose, repayment source and capacity; lenders 
shall base their assessment on interviews, and risks of granting loans should be 
under control. In fact, there is no essential difference between the rules in the two 
countries’ regulations, partly because of lenders’ common incentive to check the 
borrower’s financial condition to ensure repayment. Since debtors’ repayment 
ability concerns lenders’ own interests to avoid ‘damaging and expensive defaults, 
write-offs and home foreclosure procedures’,1002 it is assumed that lenders have 
enough incentive to carefully check the potential borrower’s financial 
situation.1003 In OFT’s irresponsible lending guidance, the creditworthiness check 
is described as a ‘credit-focussed test’1004 or lender-oriented.  
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However, even though it is in firms’ own interests to check creditworthiness, there 
are still concerns about regulation non-compliance. It is observed that 
moneylenders may choose to ignore borrowers’ past credit record or financial 
situation to reduce the costs of the creditworthiness check, the risk of which is, 
however, covered by higher charges, which are finally transferred to 
customers. 1005  For example, in the UK, some payday lenders who promise to 
provide ‘instant loans’ would reduce the creditworthiness assessment standards 
and, instead, charge higher interest and fees as the price. 1006 Nevertheless, this 
does not mean payday lenders do not care about borrower’s creditworthiness; they 
still tend to use available information (eg, the previous borrowing record with the 
same lender) to avoid possible loss. Lenders are de facto responsible for 
themselves upon assessments of every single loan application. The prime purpose 
of the check, however, is to protect lenders’ own interests with regard to 
repayment, rather than customers’ interests. 
 
In this sense, mandatory creditworthiness checks in regulation appears to be a 
minimum requirement for firms. Firms would usually choose to comply in their 
own interests. This could perhaps explain why non-compliance usually only has 
‘disciplinary consequences’. 1007  In the prior regulatory regime, non-compliance 
under CCA 1974 only has a licence issue under OFT’s power; section 170 of 
CCA 1974 clearly states that breach would not lead to civil or criminal 
sanction. 1008  At present, under the FSMA regime, the FCA could also use its 
enforcement power in disciplinary cases if firms breach FSMA and its rules,  1009 
for example, CONC and CCA; this covers the creditworthiness assessment rule in 
CONC. FCA can also prosecute firms for serious breaches (eg, insider dealing) 
through criminal courts and/or bring proceedings (ie, injunctions and restitution 
proceedings) in civil courts.1010 However, breach of responsible lending does not 
reach that extent. Similarly, in the Interim Measures for the Administration of 
Personal Loans (2010) of China, lenders who fail to make the assessment are in 
                                                 
1005
 FSA, ‘Consultation Paper 13/7, High-Level Proposals for an FCA Regime for Consumer 
Credit’ (2013) Annex 2, paras 36-37. 
1006
 ibid. 
1007
 Fairweather (n 848) 94. 
1008
 CCA 1974, s 170 (1).  
1009
 FCA, ‘Enforcement Information Guide’ (2013) <http://www.fca.org.uk/your-
fca/documents/enforcement-information-guide?utm_source=CCguide&utm_medium=firm-
guide&utm_campaign=CCFG> accessed 22 March 2015.  
1010
 Ibid. 
244 
 
breach of article 37 of the Banking Supervising Law of China, local bureau CBRC 
could order the lender to change its improper conducts.1011  
 
4.5.2  Assessment of affordability 
 
In contrast, the updated concept of ‘affordability check’ in the context of 
responsible lending has a more customer-oriented factor. In OFT’s view, 
assessment of affordability is the ‘borrower- focused test’ which requires lenders 
not only to assess borrower’s ability to repay, but also to consider whether they 
would be faced with any financial difficulty due to loan repayments. 1012 What is 
implied in it is that a borrower may be able to repay a loan on time but this would 
entail an additional burden for the borrower, such as in order to pay off the loan a 
borrower has to pawn her jewellery.1013  
 
In the OFT Guidance, the criterion of affordability check is set as ‘sustainable’: 
customers could repay the loan in a sustainable manner ‘without undue difficulty 
– in particular without incurring or increasing problem indebtedness’, ‘over the 
life of the credit agreement or, in the case of open-end agreements, within a 
reasonable period of time’, and ‘out of income and/or available savings, without 
having to realise security or assets.’ 1014  The credit limit and repayment period 
shall be decided depending on, for example, the type of credit product, loan 
amount, borrowers’ financial situation, credit history (which may indicate any 
possible financial difficulty), existing and future financial commitments, the 
impact of a future change in the borrower's personal circumstances, and the 
vulnerability of the borrower (e.g., limited mental capacity).1015  
 
Since failing to make an affordability assessment under the OFT Guidance does  
not breach section 55B of CCA 2006, which regards creditworthiness assessment 
as lenders’ legal duty, the Guidance manages to classify several cases of failure to 
assess borrowers’ affordability as irresponsible lending, 1016  which further 
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breaches section 25 (2B) of the CCA, so that the lender’s fitness to hold a 
consumer credit licence could be questioned by OFT.1017 
 
CONC also draws a clear line between assessment of creditworthiness and 
affordability, and requires firms to consider ‘more than customers’ ability to repay 
the credit’. 1018  This means all firms should take reasonable steps to assess 
customers’ repayment ability to make sure the loan is ‘sustainable’ and would not 
incur future financial difficulties or significant adverse consequences. 1019 
Specifically, lenders are required to ‘reasonably expected future income or 
expenditure (to the extent to which it is proportionate to do so) where it is 
reasonably foreseeable that it will differ from actual current income or 
expenditure over the anticipated repayment period of the agreement’. 1020  Only 
considering current income and expenditure is viewed as not enough, as CONC 
admits the possible future change of borrowers’ personal condition may have an 
influence on loan repayment. However, to avoid the rule from becoming a 
regulatory burden, CONC also limits the assessment duty within ‘reasonable 
foreseeable’ changes,1021 Therefore, lenders do not need to undertake excessive 
duties. 1022  The meaning of ‘sustainable’ in CONC carries on OFT Guidance’s 
methods as cited in the last paragraph without change.1023 As CONC is mandatory 
for all consumer credit firms, affordability assessment is now mandatory for all 
lenders – including subprime lenders – to comply with under the sourcebook. 
There is no exception for small-amount, short-term credit under this rule. 
However, since CONC does not set up a checklist of all possible factors that may 
influence customers’ future income and expenditure, lenders are still left with 
flexibility during their businesses.  
 
Although China has requirements about creditworthiness assessment in its 
regulations, rules about affordability are almost all blank. The leading rules for 
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consumer credit, namely Interim Measures for the Administration of Personal 
Loans, only sets up creditworthiness assessment requirements. Although in the 
previous version of the Pilot Measures for the Administration of Consumer 
Finance Companies (2010), the cap of loan amount was once set as ‘five times the 
borrower’s monthly income’ to make the loan affordable, this rule was changed 
by its 2013 amended version, raising the loan amount cap to 200,000 yuan, 1024 yet 
there are no further rules about loan affordability. One explanation for this 
regulatory vacuum is the nascent stage of the industry as well as regulations. In 
addition, since the credit reference system is not as widely used as in the UK, it is 
assumed that lenders in China would take customers’ future possible income loss 
into account to avoid defaults. This consideration is, however, still ‘creditor-
focused’ rather than out of concern for customers’ interests.  
 
Last, but not least, an important issue relating to the strength of responsible 
lending rule and customer protection needs to be clarified here. In the subprime 
lending sector, irresponsible lending practices are usually accompanied by 
unwanted effects after consumers have started repaying the loan, since they have 
chosen unsuitable loan products, and are usually charged with unfairly high rates 
and fees. Rules about responsible lending (either creditworthiness or affordability 
check), however, only provide minimum conduct standard for firms to comply 
with and disciplinary power for regulators, but do not directly offer remedies or 
recoveries to the detriment of customers.  
 
The effectiveness of regulations on responsible lending is to regulate lenders’ 
activity from an ex ante perspective, although the disciplinary power could only 
be exercised in the aftermath of irresponsible lending. Similarly, in the case of 
mandatory disclosure, as customers would only find out the insufficient or 
deceptive information given to them after entering into the contract and suffering 
from lenders’ unfair charges. Conduct regulations in this sense are proposed to set 
up standards of behaviour and empowering regulators to take disciplinary 
measures if the misconduct is at a serious level. However, since there is always 
misconduct in firms’ business, regulators would usually not intervene in every 
individual case due to limited regulatory resources. What consumers could do is 
to lodge complaints with the lender and, if unsatisfied, to courts or the appropriate 
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ombudsman. Whether their appeals would be justified is, however, depended on 
many factors. Another ex ante way to protect consumers that regulators could 
follow is to set a cap on loan charges in advance.  
 
4.6  Statutory/Regulatory techniques: Usury control and remedies  
 
As discussed in the section above, an efficient and direct way to protect customers 
in the subprime lending sector is to set a certain cap to regulate loan charges. This 
is similar to ‘usury control’ in the traditional sense, which has been exercised by 
states since ancient times; for example, the prohibition of loan charges higher than 
the allowed interest rates.  
 
However, in the modern legal system, usury has more complex meanings because 
of the financial licence regime. For example, in Aldohni’s view, usury can be 
defined as licensed lender taking charges that exceed the legal cap of interest, if 
such a cap exists in the regulatory regime, or unlicensed lenders who do so. In 
contrast, in other jurisdictions, if there is no rate cap in the law, usury only refers 
to unlicensed lenders’ illegal taking of interests from lending activity, while 
licensed lenders are free to charge in the regulated lending activity on the rates 
they regard as profitable or proper.1025 Since in a modern financial system one 
must obtain a licence before lending money to the public, to do so without licence 
usually means a criminal offence that is more serious than simply violating 
financial regulations. In contrast, licensed lenders’ lending activities are regulated 
to prevent unfairly high rates. Traditionally, consumers could protect their 
interests through the courts. However, whether their appeals could be justified is 
largely dependent on whether or not there is a rate or cost cap, as well as the 
courts’ judgements on the fairness of the charge. However, this judicial solution 
criticized for being is less effective for individual consumers. Another remedy 
taken by the UK is to cover consumer credit in FOS’s scheme to provide simple 
solutions. There is also a usury cap in China and a new ADR for banking 
consumers has been set up. 
 
4.6.1 The UK 
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In the UK, lenders can only carry on regulated activities after obtaining a licence 
from the authority – OFT previously, and FCA since 2014 – otherwise they would 
be ‘loan sharks’.1026 For licensed lenders, there is no legal cap on interests for a 
long period of time since the usury law was abolished in 1854. 1027 This status has, 
however, changed since January 2015, when the interest rate of short-term, high-
cost credit was capped. Prior to that, consumers could only seek a remedy from 
courts after being affected detrimentally. From 2006 consumer credit is covered 
by the FOS regime. A cap placed on a loan charge, in contrary, is an ex ante way 
of extending protection.  
 
4.6.1.1  Test of fairness in the court 
 
Although there had been no usury cap since the mid-nineteenth century in the UK, 
the need to protect consumers against being unfairly treated by moneylenders is 
not overlooked by statutes. In the original CCA 1974, courts were entitled to 
‘reopen extortionate’ credit agreements. 1028  An ‘extortionate’ cred it agreement 
either requires the borrower to make ‘grossly [inflated] repayments’, or ‘grossly 
contravenes ordinary principles of fair dealing.’ In order to arrive at a judgement, 
the court needs to consider both creditors’ and debtors’ conditions and decide 
whether the cost is extortionate. 
 
However, judicial remedy set up in CCA 1974 has long been criticized for being 
‘ineffective’;1029 a White Paper made by the Department of Trade and Industry 
(hereinafter DTI) mentions that during some three decades only 30 cases 
involving extortionate loan costs reached the courts, and only 10 of them were 
proven to be extortionate and reopened.1030 The wording of the statute on what is 
extortionate  is regarded as imprecise,1031 which leads to the cautious attitude of 
courts on how to interpret the term. Litigation is regarded as complex, 
unpredictable and expensive for customer. 1032  Furthermore, the White Paper 
criticizes the courts’ focus on interest rates and overlooks other misconduct, 
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including level of security required, default charges and lack of transparent 
information.1033  Courts usually also chose not to take post-contract issues into 
account, which are not guaranteed to be fair.1034  
 
The UTCCR provides how terms of contract would be regarded as unfair, that is, 
it causes ‘significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations’ and leads to 
consumer detriment. 1035 However, terms about payable price does not belong in 
the scope of unfair assessment.1036 Therefore, as long as the lender has disclosed 
the clear charges of a loan in contract terms, fairness of the term cannot be 
challenged. Consumers who are charged with high costs by moneylenders are 
therefore unable to complain to qualifying bodies and have the courts as their only 
remedy, which were less effective and hard to reach. 
 
All these disadvantages led to the change in legislation. The Consumer Credit Act 
2006 replaces the extortionate credit test in the original CCA 1974 with the new 
‘unfairness test’ to provide more profound consumers protection. Instead of 
merely focusing on the charges of loans, courts are entitled to test the relationship 
between creditor and borrower, and decide whether it is unfair. 1037 If unfairness is 
confirmed, then the court has the power to require creditors to recover debtors’ 
interests.1038 In order to test the fairness of a credit agreement, courts should not 
only consider all terms of the contract, but also pay attention to how creditors 
have exercised or enforced their rights, as well as ‘anything done’ by or on behalf 
of creditors.1039 
 
However, the effectiveness of the new unfairness test is also questioned. 
Fairweather, for example, points out that English courts are traditionally 
accustomed to ‘unease with the notion of judicial intervention in bargains between 
private parties’ on substantial unfairness, but focus on more procedure issues.1040 
Courts’ attitude are also mixed. In several cases the courts found the relationship 
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as unfair because the interest rate charged by lender was too high;1041 while in 
other cases the court justified the high rate because the lender has taken 
‘considerable’ or ‘substantial’ risks, which entitles lenders to levy high 
charges. 1042  The result of the court remedy is therefore less predictable for 
consumers.  
 
Moreover, in Aldohni’s analysis of several cases in English courts, instead of 
being given special care, the vulnerability of consumers is actually a detrimental 
factor for them during litigation, as courts would regard their risks of repayment 
as the justification for higher charge levied by lenders. 1043  In Aldohni’s 
observation, courts sometimes choose to justify the high cost of loans taken by 
lenders, regarding the high costs as reasonable because these are ‘common 
practices of lenders’ in the subprime lending market, regardless of consumers’ 
vulnerability, and view the high charges as fair and acceptable. 1044 For example, 
in a typical case, Nine Regions. (t/a Log Book Loans) v Sadder, the defendant who 
was in serious financial difficulty and had bad credit records borrowed £880 from 
the claimant and was charged £2,378 in total. The APR at 384.4 % was regarded 
as reasonable by the court because the loan repayment period was ‘over a 
relatively short period’ and was therefore acceptable. 1045 Aldohni regards the 
unfairness test in judicial use as less effective in substance, as in the existing cases 
consumers’ repayment risk was taken into consideration by the courts as an 
‘overriding’ consideration and therefore justified the high charges of the loan, as 
long as the rate was in line with common practices of other moneylenders. The 
vulnerable status of consumers, however, was largely ignored.1046  
 
However, simply vulnerability can hardly influence the court’s decision because it 
means, to some extent, ‘reverse discrimination’ for the better-off borrowers who 
are also charged with high rates by subprime lenders. Whether consumer’s 
vulnerability shall be part of the unfairness test is not clear. It is simpler to decide 
if the charge is proportionate to the risk; the courts, however, usually remain 
cautious by referring to common business practices in relation to high rates. 
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In addition, the new Consumer Credit Bill, which consolidates previous consumer 
protection regulations, has actually changed only slightly from the UTCCR, as it 
still exempts price term from fairness assessment of authorities, unless the term is 
not plain or intelligible, or consumers were unaware of it. Theoretically, to avoid 
disputes, firms have to use plain and intelligible language and ensure customers 
‘awareness of the contract substance and prices of services, which also add the 
strength of disclosure regulation. However, for vulnerable consumers who have 
no access to commercial banks and use subprime moneylender as the ‘last resort’, 
one possible condition is that they would still choose the expensive credit after 
information disclosure, because they have no other choices and are less sensitive 
to the price. The effectiveness of the Bill in this respect is impaired, although it 
has made good progress with regard to information disclosure. 
 
4.6.1.2  Cap on payday lenders’ charges 
 
A more direct way to protect customers in the consumer credit market, as 
discussed above, is setting up interest rate caps in certain sectors of the market. In 
the UK, the FCA has taken measures to limit the high charges of high-cost, short-
term credit, represented by payday lenders, by setting up an inclusive price cap in 
its rules.1047 
  
The cap has three main parts. First, the initial cost cap is set at 0.8% of the 
outstanding principal per day, and for all the interest and fees charged during the 
loan and when refinancing, so firms are prohibited from adding interest to the 
original principle, regardless of the repaid parts. Second, the cap for default is set 
at £15 to avoid lenders from charging high fees for failed repayments. Charging 
interest after default is allowed but must not be higher than the initial cost cap. 
Third, there is a total cost cap for all interest, fees and charges that shall not 
exceed 100% of the total amount borrowed to avoid any possible loopholes.1048 
Repeat borrowing is also covered by the rules. All firms that provide high cost, 
short-term credit are covered by this rule, which came into force by January 2015, 
as the Consumer Credit (Cost Cap) Instrument 2014 (hereinafter ‘CCCCI’) 
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The advantages of this multiple cap are obvious. It is not a simple ‘interest rate 
cap’ which only sets up a usury line, but takes all other charges and fees into 
consideration. The total charges lenders can levy are therefore strictly controlled 
by the all-covering rule. As a comparable case, the roughly set fourfold interest 
rate cap could not avoid charges for, for example, ‘consultation’. In addition, the 
CCCCI clarifies the consequence of non-compliance: (i) the agreement is 
unenforceable or against the borrower, and (ii) if the borrower chooses to not to 
perform in terms of the agreement, the lender is obliged to repay the excessive 
charges to the borrower.1049 The effectiveness of the regulation is enhanced. 
 
However, disputes about the charge cap always exist. A major concern, as the 
FCA Policy Statement notes, is that the cap will reduce the number of licensed 
moneylenders in the market, and leave vulnerable consumers to illegal loan 
sharks. 1050  This concern is, in fact, widespread. Zywicki summarizes the 
unintended consequences of usury regulations in the US, which include ‘term re-
pricing’ (ie, the lender increases the price of the unregulated terms of a loan or 
other loan products to cover the loss on regulated terms), ‘production substitution’ 
(ie, if the rate cap makes re-pricing impossible, then the lender will change the 
products; for example, the growth of title lending in the US resulted from 
regulations that eliminated payday lending) and ‘rationing’ (ie, market exit of 
licensed lenders would force vulnerable consumers to turn to the informal sector 
or go without credit).1051 A study of France, Germany and the UK indicates that 
stricter regulation of consumer credit and reduced access to legal credit is 
correlated with higher rates of illegal lending activity.1052 Since Japan severely 
tightened its rate ceiling on consumer loans, there was a two-third decrease in the 
acceptance of loan applications, accompanied by a dramatic growth in illegal loan 
sharking.1053  
 
The FCA admits this possibility of reduction in credit access but, at the same time, 
regards those who may be influenced as ‘the least creditworthy’. 1054 Customers 
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who will continue to get loans will benefit from the cap. 1055 In the FCA’s view, 
the majority of consumers in the high cost, short-term credit market will remain in 
this market.1056 The FCA therefore regards the cap as proper, since the benefits 
exceed the disadvantages. 1057  However, it still believes the rule change will 
‘overall’ benefit consumers who access high cost, short-term credit, as those 
consumers could face a reduced risk of difficulty in paying back high cost, short-
term credit loans and would alleviate stress, mental-health and welfare 
consequences.  
 
The real effects of the cost cap in the high cost, short-term credit sector still 
remain to be seen due to the very short time for the application. However, this 
thesis, in general, supports the use of cost caps as one effective way to protect 
customers more directly than the unfairness test which largely depends on the 
courts’ interpretation of the fairness and is less predictable. For example, if the 
majority of consumers could benefit from the rule change, then the benefit of the 
regulation has exceeded the cost of it, which provides legitimacy for the new 
regulation. Those ‘excluded’ consumers have the most vulnerable status: their 
rights and supplements to their income would be better served by state welfare 
and mature alternative lending facilities, such as credit unions. It is the state’s role 
to establish affordable, alternative credit sources. 
 
4.6.1.3  Dispute resolution through the Financial Ombudsman Service 
 
In addition, since the FCA will not intervene in individual disputes with lenders, 
and judicial remedy is regarded as expensive and less effective, a simpler and 
easier way to solve disputes is essential. In the UK, the FOS is entitled by the 
CCA 2006 to accept complaints in the consumer credit sector. 1058  The FOS 
scheme is set up in Part XVI and Schedule 17 of FSMA 2000, 1059  while the 
detailed rules are contained in the FCA’s handbook, Dispute Resolution: 
Complaints (hereinafter ‘DISP’). In general, FOS provides UK consumers with a 
simple, informal way of dispute resolution. It has a simple complaint procedure 
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for average consumers that does not require the help of solicitors; FOS is not only 
limited to investigating consumers’ complaints, but can look at other relevant 
conditions of the dispute, including consumer’s financial difficulties; its services 
are available free of charge to consumers; its decision is final and binding for the 
firm to comply with if consumers choose to accept the decision, but not vice versa. 
For consumers in the subprime credit sector whose disputed loan principle is 
usually small and demands less time or knowledge in court procedures, FOS is an 
effective alternative way of solving disputes. Data provided by FOS shows the 
increasing trend of cases reported to it about payday lending, with 794 cases by 31 
March 2014 and 542 by 31 March 2103; and increase of 46%.1060  
 
One of the most obvious advantages of the FOS scheme in the subprime lending 
sector is that it would consider individual’s conditions in every case, including the 
affordability of credit, lenders’ assessment of borrowers’ financial circumstances 
and consumers’ vulnerability.1061 In a recent case, for example, when a consumer 
in financial difficulty could not repay the debt on time and with the agreement of 
lender, entered into a debt management plan, the lender still tried to withdraw 
from the borrower’s bank account, knowing that the customer was in difficulty. 
FOS regarded this activity as unfair because it ignored the consumer’s financial 
difficulties and made them worse, and required the firm to refund what it had 
taken from the consumer’s account with interests, plus compensation for the 
inconvenience it made the consumer suffer. The firm was also required to help the 
consumer with a repayment plan she could afford.1062  
 
4.6.2  China 
 
China has a legal cap on the interest rate for lending activities. In a 1991 judicial 
explanation of China’s Supreme Court, interest rates for ‘informal lending’ were 
allowed to be higher than, but shall not exceed fourfold, commercial banks’ rates 
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on the same loan product.1063 Since there was no subprime lender at all at the time 
this cap was set up by the Supreme Court, ‘informal lending’ in its original sense 
only referred to a money-borrowing activity between individuals or between 
individuals and legal entities. According to this rule, any claim of a creditor on 
loan interest that exceeds the fourfold limit will not receive judicial support, if the 
debtor refuses to pay the additional interests.1064 Apparently, the fourfold line is 
what the reasonable interest rate is in the Supreme Court’s mind. However, 
contractual parties could still freely agree on higher rates in contract. The courts 
will not intervene in contractual freedom unless a dispute is referred to the court.  
 
Originally set up to regulate informal lending activities, this rule now, in fact, 
applies to all moneylenders. Subprime lenders are allowed to lend money to the 
public and belong to the ‘formal’ market; there are also two kinds of ‘informal’ 
lending activities: (i) those in the original sense which are by nature legitimate, 
while (ii) at the other end of the spectrum are the underground illegal 
moneylenders without licence and who are illegal. In fact, the legal cap is an 
important aspect for identification of the ‘loan sharks; although China’s criminal 
law does not have a ‘usury crime’, a criminal offence still applies in this case, that 
is, ‘illegally engaging in operate certain business that severely disturbed 
marketing order’, 1065 because they have lent vast amounts of money to the public 
at usurious interest rates, and use violence to collect loan repayments. 1066 Usury, 
as defined by Chinese criminal law, therefore has four elements: (i) lenders have 
no licence, (ii) money is repeatedly lent to the public, (iii) interest rates are 
charged that exceed the legal cap, and (iv) force is used in debt collection. 
Apparently, the criminal law aims not to punish whoever crosses the line, instead, 
only those who repeatedly lend money to multiple debtors and conducting a 
business without a licence and who charge interest that exceeds the usury cap are 
regarded as being criminal. Other casual, small-scale and informal lending and 
borrowing activities with a certain person (ie on a one-to-one basis) are 
legitimate. 1067  In this sense, although not being explicitly expressed by the 
                                                 
1063
 Ch ina Supreme Court, 最高人民法院关于人民法院审理借贷案件的若干意见[Several 
Opinions of the Supreme People's Court for the trial of lending and borrowing cases] (1991), para 
6. 
1064
 Ibid. 
1065
 Criminal Law of China (1997), s 225. 
1066
 Zhongqiang Li and Yan Chen, ‘ 放高利贷行为的刑法评析 ’ [Criminal Analysis of 
Usury](2013) 1 Ren Min Jian Cha.  
1067
 Ibid. 
256 
 
authority, the fourfold rate cap is de facto the courts’ standard of judging the 
fairness of a lending activity. An interest rate cap in China de facto protects all 
money borrowers, whether they are dealing with subprime lenders or friends and 
relatives or underground or unlicensed moneylenders. It is a ‘blanket’ protection 
in the sector. 
 
However, the effectiveness of the rule is limited. First of all, the fourfold cap is 
merely an ‘interest rate cap’ and does not cover any other additional charges, 
which means lenders could stay under the rate cap and safely charge for other 
services, such as ‘handling charges’ or ‘consulting fees’, without any legal cap or 
limit.1068 This is de facto a loophole in the regulation and licensed lenders could 
benefit from customers. However, since the courts would usually also consider 
whether the total amount of loan interest (including the interest for late repayment 
and penalties) exceeds the fourfold line, it is a remedy applied by the courts.  
 
A judgment handed down by the Xuzhou Municipal Court reflects this judicial 
attitude. When the defendant defaulted on the loan, the claimant required 
repayment of the loan principle, loan interests and compounded interests and 
attorney fees, as agreed in the loan contract. The court justified the claimant’s 
appeal on the loan principle. However, as regards the agreed default, the rate had 
exceeded the fourfold rate cap and went against the Supreme Court’s judicial 
interpretation.1069 Although this dispute arose between a small money lender and 
several small enterprises, and the loan amount was also high (i.e., 5,000,000 yuan; 
approximately £540,000), it indeed shows how Chinese local courts would 
interpret the legal usury cap. Because of the existing rate cap, results of disputes 
referred to court are largely predictable for both parties. 
 
However, although courts indeed provide a remedy for loan cost disputes, for 
vulnerable consumers, it is less convenient and economical to seek redress 
through judicial methods. Available judgements disclosed by Chinese local courts 
are, in fact, largely between small enterprises and subprime lenders; the former is 
far from being ‘vulnerable’. What is more, judicial control is only meaningful if 
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borrowers choose to seek judicial remedy, which is difficult not only because of 
individual consumer’s economic or social status, but also due to the nascent stage 
of conduct regulation. For example, rules about information disclosure are largely 
sketchy and simply require firms to disclose essential information in contract. 
There is also no requirement of assessment of affordability or suitability in 
China’s regulatory regime. Therefore, it is difficult for consumers to defend 
themselves by arguing about being unfairly treated; local courts in China would 
also usually tend to justify lenders’ appeal of the additional charges for delayed 
repayment of a loan, as long as the two contractual parties had agreed on the 
charges or compounded interest in the contract.1070 Lenders’ business conduct is 
outside the judicial view because current regulations of consumer protection in the 
sector are sketchy, and are more procedural than substantial. Therefore, the only 
non-compliance risk for subprime lenders is the loss of judicial support for 
interest that exceeds the fourfold limit; for lenders there is actually nothing of 
substance to lose. Individual customers are not under special judicial protection 
but are regarded as an equal contractual party by courts; without the development 
of conduct of business regulations (eg, affordability assessment), judicial attitudes 
can hardly change. 
 
A most recent development in China is the setting up of a new dispute resolution 
mechanism under the authority power of the PBoC, and consumers could seek 
protection by complaining to PBoC branches. An administrative instrument, 
Administrative Measures for the Protection of Financial Consumers' Rights and 
Interests (hereinafter ‘AMPFC’) was enacted in 2013, which set up rules for 
PBoC dispute resolution in the banking sector.1071 Consumers shall first complain 
to firms, if they are dissatisfied with the result, then they can complain to the 
PBoC’s local branches.1072 However, if financial institutions’ conduct is illegal, 
then the firm-level complaint procedure can be skipped. 1073  The method of 
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complaining is also flexible and includes a visit to or a telephone call to the PBoC 
branch, or sending letters or electronic mail.1074  
 
However, what the PBoC could do is limited to investigation and mediation 
between the disputed parties to the agreement between them. The PBoC is not 
entitled to make judgements. While agreement on individual case is not legally 
binding on both parties to the dispute, if the firm does not comply with the 
agreement, the only route consumers could follow is to send the case to court or 
other arbitration authorities. In this sense, the dispute resolution regime proposed 
by the PBoC is an ‘incomplete’ version of the commonly used ombudsman 
services. Without the binding force, which is central to any dispute solution 
regime, the effectiveness of the newly established PBoC regime needs to be 
reviewed after a period, since it is still in its very early stage of application.  
 
4.7  Summary 
 
This chapter discusses another form of access to credit that vulnerable consumers 
could use, namely credit from subprime lenders. Such lenders are ‘subprime’ 
because they are less regulated and tend to misconduct themselves when dealing 
with consumers. However, since to many consumers, access to mainstream credit 
is unavailable, the gap-filling role of subprime credit is essential. Regulations of 
the subprime lending market could be justified in two aspects. First, consumers 
are not presumed ‘rational’ participants in the market but may be abused by firms 
and, second, benefits of regulation exceed the costs. Generally, regulators would 
set up business conduct rules to provide a minimum level of consumer protection. 
The main content of this chapter is the discussion on whether the current 
regulatory regimes in the UK and China are effective.  
 
Both the UK and China have experienced tremendous changes in their regulatory 
regime. However, it is apparent that UK consumers enjoy more enhanced 
protection than their Chinese counterparts. The unified regulatory regime in the 
consumer credit sector in the UK provides equal protection to all consumers, 
regardless of what kind of firm they are dealing with, while providing an 
additional safety net for those who access high cost, short-term credit. Detailed 
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rules are set up in the FCA’s sourcebook on firms’ conduct standards. However, 
in China the regulations are still sketchy and ‘piecemeal’. Although the Interim 
Measures for the Administration of Personal Loans (2013) se t up rules for all 
lenders, the conduct rules in it are still too sketchy, although the consumer credit 
market is expanding rapidly. 
 
As to the detailed rules about consumer protection in the subprime lending sector, 
this chapter mainly discussed three major parts: (i) information disclosure, (ii) 
responsible lending and (iii) cost control.  
 
In general, consumers shall be regarded as ‘average’ in their knowledge level 
about financial markets and products. Mandatory disclosure about loans is 
essential for consumers to make informed choices. However, the effectiveness of 
disclosure lies in whether consumers are aware of the information; simply listing 
terms and conditions in contracts does not equal consumer awareness. On this 
issue, the UK takes the ‘clear, fair and not misleading’ approach which protects 
both procedural and substantial interests of consumers. Lenders’ business 
activities and contract terms are all included in the rule; contract terms should be 
written clearly, in plain and intelligible language, while lenders are prohibited 
from engaging in misleading activities that would distort consumers’ decisions, as 
this may lead to their detriment. What is more, consumers’ awareness of the main 
content or payable price terms is also enhanced, as the Consumer Rights Act 2015 
adds the ‘prominent’ rule into the exemptions. In China, in contrast, rules about 
disclosure and consumer protection have only been added to the statute very 
recently and only require firms to disclose essential information. Neither the plain 
language standards nor the remedy of possible detriments caused by insufficient 
disclosure are available in the CPL 2013. 
 
Responsible lending is another way of protecting consumers from detriment by 
choosing unsuitable credit products. It includes both creditworthiness and 
affordability assessments. The latter is more essential as it takes consumers’ 
possible financial difficulty into consideration. The UK has already set up rules 
about affordability checks in CONC, while this issue in China’s consumer credit 
sector has still not been addressed. This is another aspect of substantial consumer 
protection in the UK’s regulatory regime. 
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However, both information disclosure and responsible lending are ex ante rules 
set up by financial authorities as the minimum standard of business conduct. 
Firms can always violate rules and once disputes arise, consumers need other 
remedies to recover their losses. In fact, the common result of lenders’ misconduct 
is default on loans and consumers are charged unfairly high fees and interest. 
Therefore, central to consumer protection is the cost control, either by setting up a 
cap on charges, or by referring the dispute to court or FOS for unfairness 
assessment. The former is a direct way of protection. However, unless the cap is 
all-charges inclusive, its effectiveness would be limited. As to the latter, since 
court procedures are both expensive and time-consuming, it is unrealistic for 
individual consumers to seek judicial assistance. Although the UK has an 
unfairness test, courts largely ignore consumers’ vulnerability. The remaining 
remedy is through alternative dispute resolution, which is simpler and consumer-
friendlier. However to be effective, decisions made by the ADR must be binding 
on firms. 
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Chapter 5:  Conclusion  
 
This thesis discusses the role of law and financial regulations in financial 
exclusion in respect of payment services and consumer credit. The term ‘financial 
exclusion’ describes the difficulty and negative consequences faced by certain 
groups of people who have no or limited access to mainstream basic financial 
services. People are ‘excluded’ from commercial banks as clients because they 
yield low profits for banks and are less creditworthy. In the context of this thesis, 
basic financial services that are essential to vulnerable consumers include (i) 
payment services and (ii) consumer credit. The former is essential because using 
cash is both inconvenient and more expensive in many cases; for the latter, 
making use of consumer credit acts as an income supplement and emergency 
cushion. Lack of available access means customers have to choose inferior 
alternatives (eg, subprime credit) or go without access, which would add to their 
vulnerability. This thesis argues that customers’ vulnerability should not 
rationalize this exclusion; instead, law and regulation should recognize this 
vulnerability and facilitate possible access for those customers to affordable, 
easily accessed, basic financial services, and reduce the negative impact brought 
about by subprime markets. 
 
Several basic understandings are presented in this thesis to justify this viewpoint. 
First, regulation is not in conflict with the free-market theory. In fact, the market 
is never totally free from government intervention. Reliance on firms’ rationality 
or the industry’s self-regulation does not mean the minimizing of social costs, 
since consumers are less likely to be able to make rational choices. If they are 
unable to choose a good firm over a bad one, their remaining option is to rely on 
business conduct regulation which would, at least, provide minimum protection of 
their interests. Second, regulation in this area also does not intend to provide 
everyone in society with account payments or credit; instead, it aims to expand 
equal opportunities since people should not be discriminated against when it 
comes to access to basic financial services. Third, as long as regulations are set up 
properly, their benefits to consumers and to society would exceed the costs.  
 
Based on this understanding of financial regulation, this thesis is divided into 
three parts. Chapter 2 discusses the role of consumer banks in facilitating financial 
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inclusion. In general, although banks are not in the position of public institutions, 
they are still anticipated to fulfil the duty of offering easily accessible accounts 
and payment services to society, including vulnerable consumers. Since 
commercial banks are at the centre of the regulatory regime and enjoy government 
protection when it comes to firm stability, they should also show some corporate 
social responsibility in return. Furthermore, in the modern era, a bank account has 
become an essential of life and is gradually replacing the use of cash in many 
social aspects. The position of people who have no access to a bank account is de 
facto exacerbated as a result of the expansion of basic banking services. Although 
there is usually no explicit statutory objective stating the necessity for promoting 
financial inclusion, banks are usually encouraged by government to be involved in 
the process.  
 
In general, commercial banks could be regulated which would require them to 
conduct their lending business properly. Even if there is no explicitly stated 
inclusion purpose in the law, access to a basic bank account for the vulnerable 
could be strengthened by specific rules. In the UK, banks are obliged to disclose 
information about basic accounts to consumers at an appropriate time, using an 
appropriate medium, and in plain and intelligible language. While in contrast, in 
China, as long as the contract terms have listed core information then this could 
be regarded as proper disclosure. However, this does not touch on the more 
substantial issue of consumer awareness of the term. Compared with the UK’s 
approach, made by the BCOBS, rules relating to disclosure of bank accounts or 
cards are still bank-orientated rather than account-holder-oriented; these rules are 
more disciplinary in nature than standards of business conduct.  
 
In addition, there are issues surrounding banks’ reluctant incentives, since offering 
account and basic payment services is hardly profitable for banks. One way to 
facilitate banks’ participation in the process lies in governments’ relationship with 
the industry. In China, for example, government is the controlling shareholder of 
the major commercial banks and could take advantage of this status. Another way 
is to recognize access to banking services as necessary in regulation and to set up 
a new duty for banks in statutory instruments. This is represented by the EU 
Directive on payment accounts, which sets out detailed rules on how to facilitate 
access to payment accounts in Europe. It regards the use of payment accounts as 
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consumers’ right, reduces discrimination based on consumers’ economic status 
and intends to increase consumers’ awareness through conduct regulation. Since 
the substantial contents of the directive were de facto accepted by an agreement 
signed between the UK government and the major participants of the industry, it 
provides a new incentive, namely a relationship with the government, for those 
banks to be involved in the process. When compared with China, where banks are 
merely instructed by the PBoC, this thesis regards the UK’s approach as more 
appropriate since there are detailed rules that could support the government–
industry relationship on the issue of bank account inclusion.  
 
Comparing payment account services, legal and regulatory issues related to 
consumer credit are more complex. Again, banks are reluctant to expand access to 
vulnerable consumers, as lending to them is not profitable; the possible default 
risks could indeed be covered by increasing interest rates or charges, which is in 
conflict with banks’ strategy of maintaining their moral reputation. However, it is 
hardly practical to expand the social duty from banking services to consumer 
credit. Unlike the account issue, which is less relevant to individual’s economic 
status and has fewer risks, consumer credit has the inherent risk of loan default. 
Regulation could reward banks who offer basic bank accounts to vulnerable 
people, but is hardly going to compensate the bank if it suffers from default loss. 
When the responsibility of assessing borrowers’ creditworthiness is solely borne 
by banks themselves, there is no place for regulation to require banks to serve 
certain groups of the vulnerable. What regulation could do is to provide incentives 
or rewards for the participation; for example, the Community Reinvestment Act in 
the US sets up a series of assessment standards, rewards and punishments in the 
statute to provide incentives for banks. It is a typical example of how law and 
regulation could play their role in expanding affordable credit to the low-income 
communities.  
 
However, before any of the roles similar to that in the CRA can be set up, the 
incentive issue of banks can only be complemented by regulatory rewards. An 
alternative route followed by China’s banking regulator, the CBRC, is to 
encourage commercial banks to set up VTBs in rural communities, with the 
reward of promising the participating banks priority in new-branch opening 
applications. Such rewards, however, were found to be ineffective. Unless the 
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regulator is willing to offer more attractive awards, this thesis adopts the view that 
it would hardly be possible for Chinese commercial banks to be substantially 
involved in the credit inclusion efforts. 
 
Therefore, the answer to how vulnerable consumers can access credit is now clear. 
Apart from mainstream credit from commercial banks, there are also other kinds 
of firms in the consumer credit market, namely the alternative credit facilities that 
provide affordable credit to consumers, and the subprime lenders that cover the 
repayment risk with high charges. Regulations relating to these lenders are 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
Chapter 3 deals with the regulatory regime of alternative community credit 
facilities in the UK and China, and tests the effectiveness of the regime in 
facilitating such lenders to grow. Two kinds of lenders are discussed in the 
chapter, namely mutuals and the small community- level commercial banks. The 
latter is exclusive to China.  
 
Mutuals show as special ownership structure. They are owned by customers, who 
are able to save or borrow money from them. However, before being able to do so, 
one must first join the membership by depositing a small amount of money in the 
firm. The long- lasting relationship between members and mutuals provides the 
essential stability for the firm.  
 
Chapter 3 also reviews the regulatory regime for credit unions in the UK and rural 
mutual co-operatives in China respectively. The conclusion is reached that credit 
unions in the UK could benefit from a gradual deregulation process, while the 
regulatory regime for RMCs in China is ‘one size fit all’, sketchy and lacks 
sustainability. In fact, the sustainability of such alternative lenders is at the centre 
of the effectiveness of the regulatory regime, as it serves some consumers who are 
unlikely to be approved for accessed to credit by commercial banks, but does not 
require high rates such as subprime lenders do.  
 
In order to support mutuals to be sustainable, there are several aspects of 
regulation that are essential. First, the customer base of the mutual shall not be 
limited to a single community or single group of people, but should cover more 
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diversified customers to increase the members’ capacity to deposit money into the 
mutual. This should particularly be the case if external investment or fund sources 
are not readily available. Here the diversified membership would be the basis for 
the mutual’s sustainability. Furthermore, to fulfil members’ need for credit, there 
should also be multiple loan products, ranging from small-amount, short-term 
loans to mortgages, if possible. Since mutuals are allowed to take members’ 
deposits, they are also under prudential regulation. However, small mutuals shall 
not be equal to huge commercial banks, since their potential level of causing 
systemic risk is by no means on the same level. In all, this thesis regards the UK’s 
regulatory regime as appropriate, since the basic statute, namely the Credit Union 
Act, 1979, has been revised several times and gradually deregulated, while 
prudential regulation distinguishes banks from credit unions, and makes a 
distinction between large and small credit unions. In contrast, RMCs are still 
under restrictive rules, which are ‘one-size-fits-all’ prudential regulation standards. 
Such a regulatory regime seriously limits RMCs’ growth more so than their 
counterparts, VTBs. This thesis regards the restrictive regulatory regime and 
limited financial resources as the main burdens on RMC growth. 
 
In addition, an evident weakness in the CBRC’s regulatory regime of RMCs is 
that it strictly controls the licensed ones, but leaves the unlicensed, ‘fake’ RMCs 
that also exist in the market. This may distort consumers’ decisions and mislead 
them into believing that the fake ones are licensed and are backed by the 
government. It is also unfair to the licensed RMCs, since their compliance with 
the regulations only leads to a burden. In this sense, the CBRC might be regarded 
as being irresponsible. The licensing regime has de facto lost its original sense of 
controlling market entry. This thesis deems that it is irresponsible for the CBRC to 
regulate only the licensed RMC but leave unlicensed ones to the market, 
especially when those unlicensed mutuals are unable to obtain licences. 
 
The second kind of alternative credit facility is the VTB which, by nature, is a 
commercial bank but set up at community level to maintain its inclusion feature. 
Although the development process of VTBs is better than the RMCs, they are also 
seriously restricted by improper regulations. The strict limit on eligible setting-up 
promoters excludes those banks that have incentives, while the eligible banks are 
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found to be of less interest. Again, incentives here are set up, but are not attractive 
enough.  
 
In general, for the test of a regulatory regime for alternative credit facilities (ie, 
mutuals and VTBs), this thesis regards the regime in the UK as more effective in 
facilitating firms’ growth, while in China the regulator de facto retains a cautious 
attitude towards the non-state-holding depositaries. The regulations are mainly 
intended to discipline rather than facilitate. 
 
Chapter 4 discusses the regulatory regime of the remaining kind of creditors in the 
consumer credit market, namely subprime lenders. Regulations focus on business 
conduct regulation as these lenders do not have licences to take deposits. They 
simply lend money to the public, which is less likely to cause systemic risks. Both 
the UK and China have multiple subprime lenders. In genera l, the regulatory 
regime in the UK is regarded here as better protecting the ‘substantial’ interests of 
consumers, while in China regulations still ignore substantive fairness. This is 
reflected in all four aspects of the chapter: (i) information disclosure, (ii) 
responsible lending, (iii) usury cap, and (iv) dispute resolution.  
 
For example, the UK has set up the standards of ‘clear, fair and not misleading’, 
which require contract terms to be plain and intelligible, not mislead consumers 
through any business activity, and increase the level of consumers’ real awareness 
of price terms; while China only requires that essential terms be listed in contracts, 
and there are no requirements related to language used or awareness. This leads to 
the disadvantaged status of consumers if a dispute breaks out, since lenders are 
exempted from the duty if they have listed the issue in the contract. Furthermore, 
there is no affordability check requirement in China’s regulatory regime; 
consumers’ potential financial difficulty would not be considered by the court. 
The usury cap in China also has a loophole and is less effective than the all-
covering total cost cap of the UK’s regime. In both countries court procedures are 
regarded as expensive and ineffective for individual borrowers. Decisions made 
by FOS in the UK are final and legally binding on firms, while in the newly set up 
dispute resolution regime under the PBoC, agreements made by two parties would 
not be binding. The most advantageous aspect of the ADR is therefore missing.  
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In sum, through a detailed analysis and comparison of the UK and China, this 
thesis arrives at the conclusion that it is possible to use law and regulations to 
facilitate financial inclusion, as long as regulations are properly set up. However, 
regulations could also become a serious burden to the growth prospects of 
community- level lenders. Furthermore, business conduct regulation in the 
subprime lending sector may lose its effectiveness if it does not consider the real 
and substantial interests of consumers. 
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